GHSA-J842-XGM4-WF88
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-21 18:03 – Updated: 2025-11-21 22:18
VLAI?
Summary
MLX has Wild Pointer Dereference in load_gguf()
Details
Summary
Segmentation fault in mlx::core::load_gguf() when loading malicious GGUF files. Untrusted pointer from external gguflib library is dereferenced without validation, causing application crash.
Environment: - OS: Ubuntu 20.04.6 LTS - Compiler: Clang 19.1.7
Vulnerability
Location: mlx/io/gguf.cpp
- Function extract_tensor_data() at lines 59-79
- Vulnerable memcpy at lines 64-67
- Called from load_arrays() at line 177
The Bug:
std::tuple<allocator::Buffer, Dtype> extract_tensor_data(gguf_tensor* tensor) {
std::optional<Dtype> equivalent_dtype = gguf_type_to_dtype(tensor->type);
if (equivalent_dtype.has_value()) {
allocator::Buffer buffer = allocator::malloc(tensor->bsize);
memcpy(
buffer.raw_ptr(),
tensor->weights_data, // untrusted pointer from gguflib
tensor->num_weights * equivalent_dtype.value().size());
return {buffer, equivalent_dtype.value()};
}
// ...
}
Possible Fix
std::tuple<allocator::Buffer, Dtype> extract_tensor_data(gguf_tensor* tensor) {
std::optional<Dtype> equivalent_dtype = gguf_type_to_dtype(tensor->type);
if (equivalent_dtype.has_value()) {
// FIX: Validate pointer
if (!tensor->weights_data) {
throw std::runtime_error("[load_gguf] NULL tensor data pointer");
}
allocator::Buffer buffer = allocator::malloc(tensor->bsize);
memcpy(
buffer.raw_ptr(),
tensor->weights_data,
tensor->num_weights * equivalent_dtype.value().size());
return {buffer, equivalent_dtype.value()};
}
// ...
}
PoC
# Install MLX
pip install mlx
python3 -c "import mlx.core as mx; mx.load('exploit.gguf', format='gguf')"
Download the poc file there, or let me know how I can send it to you.
AddressSanitizer Output (with instrumented build):
AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL
=================================================================
==5855==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x7fc432f64bc0 (pc 0x7fc430841c12 bp 0x7ffc04847ab0 sp 0x7ffc04847268 T0)
==5855==The signal is caused by a READ memory access.
#0 0x7fc430841c12 /build/glibc-B3wQXB/glibc-2.31/string/../sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/memmove-vec-unaligned-erms.S:312
#1 0x55aac829756b in __asan_memcpy (/home/user1/mlx/fuzz/load_gguf/fuzz_load_gguf+0x9ef56b) (BuildId: 57467f1ce96052757daeef4b04739be7f23c5f1f)
#2 0x55aacaa6e8dc in mlx::core::extract_tensor_data(gguf_tensor*) /home/user1/mlx/mlx/io/gguf.cpp:64:5
#3 0x55aacaa773fc in mlx::core::load_arrays[abi:cxx11](gguf_ctx*) /home/user1/mlx/mlx/io/gguf.cpp:226:35
#4 0x55aacaa782a9 in mlx::core::load_gguf(std::__cxx11::basic_string<char, std::char_traits<char>, std::allocator<char>> const&, std::variant<std::monostate, mlx::core::Stream, mlx::core::Device>) /home/user1/mlx/mlx/io/gguf.cpp:250:17
#5 0x55aac82dc696 in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput /home/user1/mlx/fuzz/load_gguf/fuzz_load_gguf.cpp:49:19
#6 0x55aac81e25c6 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::ExecuteCallback(unsigned char const*, unsigned long) (/home/user1/mlx/fuzz/load_gguf/fuzz_load_gguf+0x93a5c6) (BuildId: 57467f1ce96052757daeef4b04739be7f23c5f1f)
#7 0x55aac81cc738 in fuzzer::RunOneTest(fuzzer::Fuzzer*, char const*, unsigned long) (/home/user1/mlx/fuzz/load_gguf/fuzz_load_gguf+0x924738) (BuildId: 57467f1ce96052757daeef4b04739be7f23c5f1f)
#8 0x55aac81d220a in fuzzer::FuzzerDriver(int*, char***, int (*)(unsigned char const*, unsigned long)) (/home/user1/mlx/fuzz/load_gguf/fuzz_load_gguf+0x92a20a) (BuildId: 57467f1ce96052757daeef4b04739be7f23c5f1f)
#9 0x55aac81fbb82 in main (/home/user1/mlx/fuzz/load_gguf/fuzz_load_gguf+0x953b82) (BuildId: 57467f1ce96052757daeef4b04739be7f23c5f1f)
#10 0x7fc4307aa082 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-B3wQXB/glibc-2.31/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:308:16
#11 0x55aac81c73ed in _start (/home/user1/mlx/fuzz/load_gguf/fuzz_load_gguf+0x91f3ed) (BuildId: 57467f1ce96052757daeef4b04739be7f23c5f1f)
==5855==Register values:
rax = 0x0000502000000098 rbx = 0xfafafafa0000fa00 rcx = 0x00000a047fff8013 rdx = 0x0000000000000008
rdi = 0x0000502000000098 rsi = 0x00007fc432f64bc0 rbp = 0x00007ffc04847ab0 rsp = 0x00007ffc04847268
r8 = 0x00000a0400000013 r9 = 0x0000000000000000 r10 = 0x00000a0400000013 r11 = 0x0000000000000000
r12 = 0x00000a047fff8010 r13 = 0xffffffffffffffc7 r14 = 0x00007fc42dd00280 r15 = 0x00000ff885ba0050
AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info.
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV /build/glibc-B3wQXB/glibc-2.31/string/../sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/memmove-vec-unaligned-erms.S:312
==5855==ABORTING
Impact
- Attack vector: Malicious GGUF file (model weights, typically from untrusted sources)
- Affects: MLX users on all platforms who call the vulnerable method with unsanitized input.
- Result: Segmentation fault (uncatchable by exception handlers)
Credits:
- Markiyan Melnyk (ARIMLABS)
- Mykyta Mudryi (ARIMLABS)
- Markiyan Chaklosh (ARIMLABS)
Severity ?
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.29.3"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "mlx"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.29.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-62609"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-476"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-11-21T18:03:20Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-11-21T19:16:02Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nSegmentation fault in `mlx::core::load_gguf()` when loading malicious GGUF files. Untrusted pointer from external gguflib library is dereferenced without validation, causing application crash.\n\nEnvironment:\n- OS: Ubuntu 20.04.6 LTS\n- Compiler: Clang 19.1.7\n\n## Vulnerability\n\n**Location**: `mlx/io/gguf.cpp`\n- Function `extract_tensor_data()` at lines 59-79\n- Vulnerable memcpy at lines 64-67\n- Called from `load_arrays()` at line 177\n\n**The Bug**:\n```cpp\nstd::tuple\u003callocator::Buffer, Dtype\u003e extract_tensor_data(gguf_tensor* tensor) {\n std::optional\u003cDtype\u003e equivalent_dtype = gguf_type_to_dtype(tensor-\u003etype);\n if (equivalent_dtype.has_value()) {\n allocator::Buffer buffer = allocator::malloc(tensor-\u003ebsize);\n memcpy(\n buffer.raw_ptr(),\n tensor-\u003eweights_data, // untrusted pointer from gguflib\n tensor-\u003enum_weights * equivalent_dtype.value().size());\n return {buffer, equivalent_dtype.value()};\n }\n // ...\n}\n```\n\n## Possible Fix\n\n```cpp\nstd::tuple\u003callocator::Buffer, Dtype\u003e extract_tensor_data(gguf_tensor* tensor) {\n std::optional\u003cDtype\u003e equivalent_dtype = gguf_type_to_dtype(tensor-\u003etype);\n if (equivalent_dtype.has_value()) {\n // FIX: Validate pointer\n if (!tensor-\u003eweights_data) {\n throw std::runtime_error(\"[load_gguf] NULL tensor data pointer\");\n }\n\n allocator::Buffer buffer = allocator::malloc(tensor-\u003ebsize);\n memcpy(\n buffer.raw_ptr(),\n tensor-\u003eweights_data,\n tensor-\u003enum_weights * equivalent_dtype.value().size());\n return {buffer, equivalent_dtype.value()};\n }\n // ...\n}\n```\n\n## PoC\n\n```bash\n# Install MLX\npip install mlx\n\npython3 -c \"import mlx.core as mx; mx.load(\u0027exploit.gguf\u0027, format=\u0027gguf\u0027)\"\n```\n\nDownload the poc file [there](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t9Z2RJGn-oHmluKWebU077UWSMGXeuVp/view?usp=sharing), or let me know how I can send it to you.\n\n**AddressSanitizer Output (with instrumented build)**:\n```\nAddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL\n=================================================================\n==5855==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x7fc432f64bc0 (pc 0x7fc430841c12 bp 0x7ffc04847ab0 sp 0x7ffc04847268 T0)\n==5855==The signal is caused by a READ memory access.\n #0 0x7fc430841c12 /build/glibc-B3wQXB/glibc-2.31/string/../sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/memmove-vec-unaligned-erms.S:312\n #1 0x55aac829756b in __asan_memcpy (/home/user1/mlx/fuzz/load_gguf/fuzz_load_gguf+0x9ef56b) (BuildId: 57467f1ce96052757daeef4b04739be7f23c5f1f)\n #2 0x55aacaa6e8dc in mlx::core::extract_tensor_data(gguf_tensor*) /home/user1/mlx/mlx/io/gguf.cpp:64:5\n #3 0x55aacaa773fc in mlx::core::load_arrays[abi:cxx11](gguf_ctx*) /home/user1/mlx/mlx/io/gguf.cpp:226:35\n #4 0x55aacaa782a9 in mlx::core::load_gguf(std::__cxx11::basic_string\u003cchar, std::char_traits\u003cchar\u003e, std::allocator\u003cchar\u003e\u003e const\u0026, std::variant\u003cstd::monostate, mlx::core::Stream, mlx::core::Device\u003e) /home/user1/mlx/mlx/io/gguf.cpp:250:17\n #5 0x55aac82dc696 in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput /home/user1/mlx/fuzz/load_gguf/fuzz_load_gguf.cpp:49:19\n #6 0x55aac81e25c6 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::ExecuteCallback(unsigned char const*, unsigned long) (/home/user1/mlx/fuzz/load_gguf/fuzz_load_gguf+0x93a5c6) (BuildId: 57467f1ce96052757daeef4b04739be7f23c5f1f)\n #7 0x55aac81cc738 in fuzzer::RunOneTest(fuzzer::Fuzzer*, char const*, unsigned long) (/home/user1/mlx/fuzz/load_gguf/fuzz_load_gguf+0x924738) (BuildId: 57467f1ce96052757daeef4b04739be7f23c5f1f)\n #8 0x55aac81d220a in fuzzer::FuzzerDriver(int*, char***, int (*)(unsigned char const*, unsigned long)) (/home/user1/mlx/fuzz/load_gguf/fuzz_load_gguf+0x92a20a) (BuildId: 57467f1ce96052757daeef4b04739be7f23c5f1f)\n #9 0x55aac81fbb82 in main (/home/user1/mlx/fuzz/load_gguf/fuzz_load_gguf+0x953b82) (BuildId: 57467f1ce96052757daeef4b04739be7f23c5f1f)\n #10 0x7fc4307aa082 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-B3wQXB/glibc-2.31/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:308:16\n #11 0x55aac81c73ed in _start (/home/user1/mlx/fuzz/load_gguf/fuzz_load_gguf+0x91f3ed) (BuildId: 57467f1ce96052757daeef4b04739be7f23c5f1f)\n\n==5855==Register values:\nrax = 0x0000502000000098 rbx = 0xfafafafa0000fa00 rcx = 0x00000a047fff8013 rdx = 0x0000000000000008\nrdi = 0x0000502000000098 rsi = 0x00007fc432f64bc0 rbp = 0x00007ffc04847ab0 rsp = 0x00007ffc04847268\n r8 = 0x00000a0400000013 r9 = 0x0000000000000000 r10 = 0x00000a0400000013 r11 = 0x0000000000000000\nr12 = 0x00000a047fff8010 r13 = 0xffffffffffffffc7 r14 = 0x00007fc42dd00280 r15 = 0x00000ff885ba0050\nAddressSanitizer can not provide additional info.\nSUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV /build/glibc-B3wQXB/glibc-2.31/string/../sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/memmove-vec-unaligned-erms.S:312\n==5855==ABORTING\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Attack vector**: Malicious GGUF file (model weights, typically from untrusted sources)\n- **Affects**: MLX users on all platforms who call the vulnerable method with unsanitized input.\n- **Result**: Segmentation fault (uncatchable by exception handlers)\n\n---\nCredits:\n\n- Markiyan Melnyk (ARIMLABS)\n- Mykyta Mudryi (ARIMLABS)\n- Markiyan Chaklosh (ARIMLABS)",
"id": "GHSA-j842-xgm4-wf88",
"modified": "2025-11-21T22:18:18Z",
"published": "2025-11-21T18:03:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ml-explore/mlx/security/advisories/GHSA-j842-xgm4-wf88"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-62609"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/ml-explore/mlx"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "MLX has Wild Pointer Dereference in load_gguf()"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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