GHSA-JPVM-9FRM-HJCQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-22 20:37 – Updated: 2026-09-22 20:37
VLAI
Summary
Nuclei: Environment Variable Disclosure via Response-Derived Data in DAST/Fuzz Mode
Details

A vulnerability in Nuclei's DAST/fuzz expression evaluation path allows a malicious target server to trigger disclosure of scanner-host environment variables when the -env-vars / -ev option is explicitly enabled.

This is an incomplete fix for CVE-2026-41645 / GHSA-jm34-66cf-qpvr. The original fix hardened expressions.Evaluate() to be single-pass within one call, but did not address callers that invoked evaluation multiple times on substituted output in the DAST/fuzz pipeline.

Affected Component

The issue is in the DAST/fuzz payload evaluation path (pkg/fuzz/parts.go) and the shared template rendering boundary. When a multi-step template captures response data via an internal extractor and reuses it in a subsequent fuzz step, the fuzz evaluator could treat the substituted response content as fresh template syntax on a second evaluation pass.

Description

In DAST/fuzz mode, payload evaluation previously ran expression substitution more than once on the same value. Response-derived content captured by an internal: true extractor in a prior protocol step could flow into a fuzz payload and be reinterpreted as DSL/helper syntax on a subsequent pass.

When -env-vars (-ev) is enabled, environment variables are merged into the template variable map. A malicious target can return response data containing expressions like {{env_var_name}} which, when reused in a subsequent fuzz step, resolve to actual environment variable values. This can expose sensitive host data such as API keys, credentials, and tokens.

Without -ev enabled (the default), response-derived data may still cause other DSL helpers to run, but that behavior is not treated as a security issue and has no meaningful security impact beyond unexpected behavior.

[!NOTE] The -env-vars / -ev option is off by default. Users who have not explicitly enabled it are not affected by this vulnerability.

Affected Users

  • CLI users running nuclei -dast (or fuzzing) with multi-step templates that chain an internal extractor into a subsequent fuzz step against untrusted targets, with the -ev flag enabled.
  • SDK users who integrate Nuclei with the fuzz pipeline enabled, EnvironmentVariables set to true, and scan targets that are not fully trusted.

Patches

  • The vulnerability is fixed in Nuclei v3.10.0. Upgrading is strongly recommended.
  • Fix reference: https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/pull/7499
  • Related original fix: https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/pull/7221, https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/pull/7321

Mitigation

Upgrade to Nuclei v3.10.0, where template-authored text is rendered once through a shared rendering boundary and runtime values from responses, extractors, and constants remain opaque data.

If you have -ev enabled, disable it when scanning untrusted targets to avoid environment variable disclosure.

Workarounds

If upgrading is not an option, ensure -env-vars / -ev is not enabled when running DAST/fuzz scans with multi-step templates against untrusted targets.

Acknowledgments

Thanks to @BerSecHub for reporting this issue.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/v3"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.10.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-76805"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-22T20:37:24Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-22T17:17:25Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability in Nuclei\u0027s DAST/fuzz expression evaluation path allows a malicious target server to trigger disclosure of scanner-host environment variables when the `-env-vars` / `-ev` option is explicitly enabled.\n\nThis is an incomplete fix for [CVE-2026-41645](https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/security/advisories/GHSA-jm34-66cf-qpvr) / GHSA-jm34-66cf-qpvr. The original fix hardened `expressions.Evaluate()` to be single-pass within one call, but did not address callers that invoked evaluation multiple times on substituted output in the DAST/fuzz pipeline.\n\n**Affected Component**\n\nThe issue is in the DAST/fuzz payload evaluation path (`pkg/fuzz/parts.go`) and the shared template rendering boundary. When a multi-step template captures response data via an internal extractor and reuses it in a subsequent fuzz step, the fuzz evaluator could treat the substituted response content as fresh template syntax on a second evaluation pass.\n\n**Description**\n\nIn DAST/fuzz mode, payload evaluation previously ran expression substitution more than once on the same value. Response-derived content captured by an `internal: true` extractor in a prior protocol step could flow into a fuzz payload and be reinterpreted as DSL/helper syntax on a subsequent pass.\n\nWhen `-env-vars` (`-ev`) is enabled, environment variables are merged into the template variable map. A malicious target can return response data containing expressions like `{{env_var_name}}` which, when reused in a subsequent fuzz step, resolve to actual environment variable values. This can expose sensitive host data such as API keys, credentials, and tokens.\n\nWithout `-ev` enabled (the default), response-derived data may still cause other DSL helpers to run, but that behavior is not treated as a security issue and has no meaningful security impact beyond unexpected behavior.\n\n\u003e [!NOTE]\nThe `-env-vars` / `-ev` option is off by default. Users who have not explicitly enabled it are not affected by this vulnerability.\n\n**Affected Users**\n\n- **CLI users** running `nuclei -dast` (or fuzzing) with multi-step templates that chain an internal extractor into a subsequent fuzz step against untrusted targets, with the `-ev` flag enabled.\n- **SDK users** who integrate Nuclei with the fuzz pipeline enabled, `EnvironmentVariables` set to `true`, and scan targets that are not fully trusted.\n\n**Patches**\n\n- The vulnerability is fixed in Nuclei v3.10.0. Upgrading is strongly recommended.\n- Fix reference: https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/pull/7499\n- Related original fix: https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/pull/7221, https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/pull/7321\n\n**Mitigation**\n\nUpgrade to Nuclei v3.10.0, where template-authored text is rendered once through a shared rendering boundary and runtime values from responses, extractors, and constants remain opaque data.\n\nIf you have `-ev` enabled, disable it when scanning untrusted targets to avoid environment variable disclosure.\n\n**Workarounds**\n\nIf upgrading is not an option, ensure `-env-vars` / `-ev` is not enabled when running DAST/fuzz scans with multi-step templates against untrusted targets.\n\n**Acknowledgments**\n\nThanks to @BerSecHub for reporting this issue.",
  "id": "GHSA-jpvm-9frm-hjcq",
  "modified": "2026-09-22T20:37:24Z",
  "published": "2026-09-22T20:37:24Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/security/advisories/GHSA-jpvm-9frm-hjcq"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76805"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/pull/7499"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/commit/ccbfb12bd01447ba25f6e755dfb2bee677736da6"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/releases/tag/v3.10.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Nuclei: Environment Variable Disclosure via Response-Derived Data in DAST/Fuzz Mode"
}



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