GHSA-JQ8V-RMF6-65JW

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-22 23:58 – Updated: 2026-06-22 23:58
VLAI
Summary
Gogs has Stored XSS in `.ipynb` Preview
Details

Summary

Although .ipynb previews are sanitized on the server side via /-/api/sanitize_ipynb, the inserted content is re-rendered on the client side without sanitization using marked() on elements with the .nb-markdown-cell class. During this process, links containing schemes such as javascript: can be regenerated.

As a result, when a victim views an attacker-crafted .ipynb file and clicks the link, arbitrary JavaScript is executed in the Gogs origin, leading to a click-based Stored XSS.

Details

After the rendered output of a .ipynb file is sanitized via /-/api/sanitize_ipynb and inserted into the DOM, only the Markdown cell portions are re-rendered using marked() and overwritten in the DOM. During this process, links with the javascript: scheme can be regenerated.

templates/repo/view_file.tmpl:42–71

{{else if .IsIPythonNotebook}}
  <script>
    $.getJSON("{{.RawFileLink}}", null, function(notebook_json) {
      var notebook = nb.parse(notebook_json);
      var rendered = notebook.render();
      $.ajax({
        type: "POST",
        url: '{{AppSubURL}}/-/api/sanitize_ipynb',
        data: rendered.outerHTML,
        processData: false,
        contentType: false,
      }).done(function(data) {
        $("#ipython-notebook").append(data);
        $("#ipython-notebook code").each(function(i, block) {
          $(block).addClass("py").addClass("python");
          hljs.highlightBlock(block);
        });

        // Overwrite image method to append proper prefix to the source URL
        var renderer = new marked.Renderer();
        var context = '{{.RawFileLink}}';
        context = context.substring(0, context.lastIndexOf("/"));
        renderer.image = function (href, title, text) {
          return `<img src="${context}/${href}"`
        };
        $("#ipython-notebook .nb-markdown-cell").each(function(i, markdown) {
          $(markdown).html(marked($(markdown).html(), {renderer: renderer}));
        });
      });
    });
  </script>

While regular HTML pages (including .ipynb preview pages) are served without a Content Security Policy (CSP), CSP headers are applied only to attachment delivery routes.

internal/cmd/web.go:323

c.Header().Set("Content-Security-Policy", "default-src 'none'; style-src 'unsafe-inline'; sandbox")

Steps to Reproduce

  1. As the attacker, add and push/commit a .ipynb file containing a javascript: link in a Markdown cell to a repository.

  2. Example (PoC):

    json { "nbformat": 4, "nbformat_minor": 2, "metadata": {}, "cells": [ { "cell_type": "markdown", "metadata": {}, "source": [ "[poc](javascript:alert(document.domain))" ] } ] }

  3. The victim opens the file on Gogs (e.g., /<user>/<repo>/src/<branch>/poc.ipynb). image

  4. When the victim clicks the poc link displayed in the preview, alert(document.domain) is executed in the same Gogs origin. image

Minimum Required Privileges

  • Attacker: Ability to place a .ipynb file as a regular (non-admin) user

  • For example: a general user who can create a public repository and add files.

  • Or: write access (collaborator, etc.) to an existing repository that the victim will view.
  • Victim: Permission to view the repository (a click is required).

Impact

  • Unauthorized actions performed with the victim’s account privileges (e.g., repository settings changes, Issue operations,誘導 to token creation).
  • Theft of information accessible to the victim (repository/Issue/Wiki contents, tokens exposed in page context).
  • If the victim is an administrator, the impact may escalate to instance-wide configuration changes and user management.
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.14.2"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "gogs.io/gogs"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.14.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-52798"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-79"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-22T23:58:46Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "# Summary\n\nAlthough `.ipynb` previews are sanitized on the server side via `/-/api/sanitize_ipynb`, the inserted content is **re-rendered on the client side without sanitization** using `marked()` on elements with the `.nb-markdown-cell` class. During this process, links containing schemes such as `javascript:` can be regenerated.\n\nAs a result, when a victim views an attacker-crafted `.ipynb` file and clicks the link, **arbitrary JavaScript is executed in the Gogs origin**, leading to a click-based Stored XSS.\n\n# Details\n\nAfter the rendered output of a `.ipynb` file is sanitized via `/-/api/sanitize_ipynb` and inserted into the DOM, **only the Markdown cell portions are re-rendered using `marked()` and overwritten in the DOM**. During this process, links with the `javascript:` scheme can be regenerated.\n\n`templates/repo/view_file.tmpl:42\u201371`\n\n```html\n{{else if .IsIPythonNotebook}}\n  \u003cscript\u003e\n    $.getJSON(\"{{.RawFileLink}}\", null, function(notebook_json) {\n      var notebook = nb.parse(notebook_json);\n      var rendered = notebook.render();\n      $.ajax({\n        type: \"POST\",\n        url: \u0027{{AppSubURL}}/-/api/sanitize_ipynb\u0027,\n        data: rendered.outerHTML,\n        processData: false,\n        contentType: false,\n      }).done(function(data) {\n        $(\"#ipython-notebook\").append(data);\n        $(\"#ipython-notebook code\").each(function(i, block) {\n          $(block).addClass(\"py\").addClass(\"python\");\n          hljs.highlightBlock(block);\n        });\n\n        // Overwrite image method to append proper prefix to the source URL\n        var renderer = new marked.Renderer();\n        var context = \u0027{{.RawFileLink}}\u0027;\n        context = context.substring(0, context.lastIndexOf(\"/\"));\n        renderer.image = function (href, title, text) {\n          return `\u003cimg src=\"${context}/${href}\"`\n        };\n        $(\"#ipython-notebook .nb-markdown-cell\").each(function(i, markdown) {\n          $(markdown).html(marked($(markdown).html(), {renderer: renderer}));\n        });\n      });\n    });\n  \u003c/script\u003e\n```\n\nWhile **regular HTML pages (including `.ipynb` preview pages)** are served **without a Content Security Policy (CSP)**, CSP headers are applied **only to attachment delivery routes**.\n\n`internal/cmd/web.go:323`\n\n```go\nc.Header().Set(\"Content-Security-Policy\", \"default-src \u0027none\u0027; style-src \u0027unsafe-inline\u0027; sandbox\")\n```\n\n\n# Steps to Reproduce\n\n1. As the attacker, add and push/commit a `.ipynb` file containing a `javascript:` link in a Markdown cell to a repository.\n\n   * Example (PoC):\n\n     ```json\n     {\n       \"nbformat\": 4,\n       \"nbformat_minor\": 2,\n       \"metadata\": {},\n       \"cells\": [\n         {\n           \"cell_type\": \"markdown\",\n           \"metadata\": {},\n           \"source\": [\n             \"[poc](javascript:alert(document.domain))\"\n           ]\n         }\n       ]\n     }\n     ```\n\n2. The victim opens the file on Gogs (e.g., `/\u003cuser\u003e/\u003crepo\u003e/src/\u003cbranch\u003e/poc.ipynb`).\n\u003cimg width=\"2386\" height=\"1218\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b0d93fd8-c5ca-4058-8af0-98dee590d3ad\" /\u003e\n\n3. When the victim clicks the `poc` link displayed in the preview, `alert(document.domain)` is executed in the same Gogs origin.\n\u003cimg width=\"2390\" height=\"1388\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/0eb6ebe8-632c-4a41-8a11-46471514b4c4\" /\u003e\n\n# Minimum Required Privileges\n\n* **Attacker**: Ability to place a `.ipynb` file as a **regular (non-admin) user**\n\n  * For example: a general user who can create a public repository and add files.\n  * Or: write access (collaborator, etc.) to an existing repository that the victim will view.\n* **Victim**: Permission to view the repository (a click is required).\n\n# Impact\n\n* Unauthorized actions performed with the victim\u2019s account privileges (e.g., repository settings changes, Issue operations,\u8a98\u5c0e to token creation).\n* Theft of information accessible to the victim (repository/Issue/Wiki contents, tokens exposed in page context).\n* If the victim is an administrator, the impact may escalate to instance-wide configuration changes and user management.",
  "id": "GHSA-jq8v-rmf6-65jw",
  "modified": "2026-06-22T23:58:46Z",
  "published": "2026-06-22T23:58:46Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs/security/advisories/GHSA-jq8v-rmf6-65jw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs/pull/8319"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs/commit/17b168b11ca759a7550e1f4bbd68bbde14db7785"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs/releases/tag/v0.14.3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Gogs has Stored XSS in `.ipynb` Preview"
}


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