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GHSA-JQRF-J7H5-X2P4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-16 12:30 – Updated: 2026-09-16 15:31

Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

scsi: bsg: Cap io_uring sense copy to max_response_len

Completion copied scmd->sense_len to the user response buffer without honoring max_response_len. After a valid sense, the midlayer sets sense_len to the real length (up to SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE), so a smaller user buffer was overrun.

Severity

7.8 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-90010"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-16T11:17:13Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nscsi: bsg: Cap io_uring sense copy to max_response_len\n\nCompletion copied scmd-\u003esense_len to the user response buffer without\nhonoring max_response_len. After a valid sense, the midlayer sets\nsense_len to the real length (up to SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE), so a smaller\nuser buffer was overrun.",
  "id": "GHSA-jqrf-j7h5-x2p4",
  "modified": "2026-09-16T15:31:06Z",
  "published": "2026-09-16T12:30:45Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-90010"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5d326efc334ea21afd8161f6ca53e17de71948a9"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ece06de726737e887dc0225c8283477624f8ae21"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

CVE-2026-90010 (GCVE-0-2026-90010)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-16 10:33 – Updated: 2026-09-16 14:41

Title

scsi: bsg: Cap io_uring sense copy to max_response_len

Summary

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: bsg: Cap io_uring sense copy to max_response_len Completion copied scmd->sense_len to the user response buffer without honoring max_response_len. After a valid sense, the midlayer sets sense_len to the real length (up to SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE), so a smaller user buffer was overrun.

Severity

7.8 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Assigner

Linux mitre root

References

2 references

URL	Tags
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5d326efc334ea21af…
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ece06de726737e887…

Impacted products

2 products

Vendor	Product	Version
Linux	Linux	Affected: 7b6d3255e7f8c6df2d21504c47808e3ce84649ac , < 5d326efc334ea21afd8161f6ca53e17de71948a9 (git) Affected: 7b6d3255e7f8c6df2d21504c47808e3ce84649ac , < ece06de726737e887dc0225c8283477624f8ae21 (git)
Linux	Linux	Affected: 7.1 Unaffected: 0 , < 7.1 (semver) Unaffected: 7.2.5 , ≤ 7.2.* (semver) Unaffected: 7.3-rc2 , ≤ * (original_commit_for_fix)

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{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/scsi/scsi_bsg.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "5d326efc334ea21afd8161f6ca53e17de71948a9",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "7b6d3255e7f8c6df2d21504c47808e3ce84649ac",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "ece06de726737e887dc0225c8283477624f8ae21",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "7b6d3255e7f8c6df2d21504c47808e3ce84649ac",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/scsi/scsi_bsg.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "7.1"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "7.1",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.2.5",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.3-rc2",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "cpeApplicability": [
        {
          "nodes": [
            {
              "cpeMatch": [
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "7.2.5",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "7.1",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "7.3-rc2",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "7.1",
                  "vulnerable": true
                }
              ],
              "negate": false,
              "operator": "OR"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nscsi: bsg: Cap io_uring sense copy to max_response_len\n\nCompletion copied scmd-\u003esense_len to the user response buffer without\nhonoring max_response_len. After a valid sense, the midlayer sets\nsense_len to the real length (up to SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE), so a smaller\nuser buffer was overrun."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "baseScore": 7.8,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
            "version": "3.1"
          },
          "scenarios": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "AV:L - Reached only via IORING_OP_URING_CMD on a local /dev/bsg character device (bsg_fops.uring_cmd \u2192 bsg_uring_cmd \u2192 scsi_bsg_uring_cmd \u2192 scsi_bsg_uring_task_cb); per CNA guidance io_uring is Local, and no network or adjacent-radio path feeds SCSI sense completion.\nAC:L - The attacker controls the CDB, response pointer, and claimed max_response_len, and can reliably force CHECK CONDITION with an illegal-field or out-of-range READ/INQUIRY/TEST_UNIT_READY so the midlayer sets sense_len up to SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE (96) and the uncapped copy_to_user runs with no race.\nPR:L - bsg_open() has no capable() check and scsi_cmd_allowed() permits unprivileged read-class CDBs (INQUIRY, READ_*, TEST_UNIT_READY) without CAP_SYS_RAWIO; /dev/bsg nodes are routinely granted to disk/cdrom group members and uaccess-seated users on desktops, Android, and shared workstations.\nUI:N - The attacker opens /dev/bsg and submits the io_uring command from their own process; no separate victim action such as mounting a filesystem or attaching hardware is required.\nS:U - copy_to_user() writes past the caller-supplied userspace sense buffer in the submitting process and does not by itself corrupt kernel slab independently of that process or cross a VM, IOMMU, or sandbox boundary.\nC:H - Completion ignores max_response_len and copies up to 96 bytes of sense into adjacent userspace, a heap/stack overflow that can be turned into an arbitrary-read primitive against a privileged bsg/io_uring consumer rather than a bounded disclosure of intended sense data.\nI:H - scsi_bsg_uring_task_cb uses min(sense_len, SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE) instead of max_response_len, so a small user buffer is overrun by up to 96 bytes of sense, enabling adjacent heap/stack corruption and potential control-flow hijacking.\nA:H - The out-of-bounds write can crash the calling process or a storage-management consumer using a traditional 18/32-byte sense buffer, and CHECK CONDITION commands can be repeated to induce process termination."
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-09-16T14:41:26.660Z",
        "orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "shortName": "Linux"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5d326efc334ea21afd8161f6ca53e17de71948a9"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ece06de726737e887dc0225c8283477624f8ae21"
        }
      ],
      "title": "scsi: bsg: Cap io_uring sense copy to max_response_len",
      "x_generator": {
        "engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
      }
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
    "assignerShortName": "Linux",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-90010",
    "datePublished": "2026-09-16T10:33:18.118Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-09-11T19:38:34.781Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-09-16T14:41:26.660Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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