GHSA-JRHX-3QQ6-X5Q2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-16 12:30 – Updated: 2026-09-16 15:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read / stack overflow in rtw_get_wps_attr()
rtw_get_wps_attr() walks WPS attributes inside a WPS IE taken from a wireless management frame. For each candidate attribute it only checks that the fixed 4-byte attribute header (2-byte ID + 2-byte length) fits inside the IE:
if (attr_ptr + 4 > wps_ie + wps_ielen)
break;
u16 attr_id = get_unaligned_be16(attr_ptr);
u16 attr_data_len = get_unaligned_be16(attr_ptr + 2);
u16 attr_len = attr_data_len + 4;
attr_data_len (and therefore attr_len) is read directly from the wire and is never checked against the remaining bytes in the IE before being used as the size of:
memcpy(buf_attr, attr_ptr, attr_len);
Since attr_len is fully attacker controlled (0 to 65535+4), this is both a heap OOB read of wps_ie, and, more seriously, a stack buffer overflow at several call sites where buf_attr is a single-byte stack variable, e.g. rtw_get_wps_attr_content()'s callers passing WPS_ATTR_SELECTED_REGISTRAR into a stack "u8 sr"/"u8 selected_registrar" (drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_cfg80211.c, drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_mlme_ext.c). A crafted WPS IE in a beacon or probe response processed during scanning can therefore smash the stack of the parsing thread.
rtw_get_wps_attr_content() itself has no independent length check and simply trusts the attr_len it gets back from rtw_get_wps_attr(), so fixing the bound here also fixes that caller.
The "attr_ptr + 4 > wps_ie + wps_ielen" header check above was added by commit 1463ca3ec6601 ("staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB reads in rtw_get_sec_ie(), rtw_get_wapi_ie(), and rtw_get_wps_attr()"), which bounded the fixed header but never extended the check to cover the variable-length attribute data that follows it. Add that missing check before attr_len is used as a memcpy() length or accepted as a match.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-90018"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-16T11:17:14Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nstaging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read / stack overflow in rtw_get_wps_attr()\n\nrtw_get_wps_attr() walks WPS attributes inside a WPS IE taken from\na wireless management frame. For each candidate attribute it only\nchecks that the fixed 4-byte attribute header (2-byte ID + 2-byte\nlength) fits inside the IE:\n\n\tif (attr_ptr + 4 \u003e wps_ie + wps_ielen)\n\t\tbreak;\n\tu16 attr_id = get_unaligned_be16(attr_ptr);\n\tu16 attr_data_len = get_unaligned_be16(attr_ptr + 2);\n\tu16 attr_len = attr_data_len + 4;\n\nattr_data_len (and therefore attr_len) is read directly from the\nwire and is never checked against the remaining bytes in the IE\nbefore being used as the size of:\n\n\tmemcpy(buf_attr, attr_ptr, attr_len);\n\nSince attr_len is fully attacker controlled (0 to 65535+4), this is\nboth a heap OOB read of wps_ie, and, more seriously, a stack buffer\noverflow at several call sites where buf_attr is a single-byte\nstack variable, e.g. rtw_get_wps_attr_content()\u0027s callers passing\nWPS_ATTR_SELECTED_REGISTRAR into a stack \"u8 sr\"/\"u8\nselected_registrar\" (drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_cfg80211.c,\ndrivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_mlme_ext.c). A crafted WPS IE in a\nbeacon or probe response processed during scanning can therefore\nsmash the stack of the parsing thread.\n\nrtw_get_wps_attr_content() itself has no independent length check\nand simply trusts the attr_len it gets back from rtw_get_wps_attr(),\nso fixing the bound here also fixes that caller.\n\nThe \"attr_ptr + 4 \u003e wps_ie + wps_ielen\" header check above was added\nby commit 1463ca3ec6601 (\"staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB reads in\nrtw_get_sec_ie(), rtw_get_wapi_ie(), and rtw_get_wps_attr()\"), which\nbounded the fixed header but never extended the check to cover the\nvariable-length attribute data that follows it. Add that missing\ncheck before attr_len is used as a memcpy() length or accepted as a\nmatch.",
"id": "GHSA-jrhx-3qq6-x5q2",
"modified": "2026-09-16T15:31:07Z",
"published": "2026-09-16T12:30:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-90018"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/34f51d196c43a42046d229de5e79025d5ca553ca"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3a6457ebf39080b87c712657fdb38f34a24fc3ff"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/931640dfcb8cfa08f6cfb46229716d8072356420"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/99aa998dec83ba180822f70e6d48a514fc81c20d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a53d1ac9ce63db07943b2b2248111003851fb00f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fd5e24ea8373347d0352f153a66e8647337d1b10"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ff61aa3289355dafa811550a1764691cd1f5d33b"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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