GHSA-JRXP-W58R-G8C9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-24 18:31 – Updated: 2026-09-24 18:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tty: serial: 8250: protect against NULL uart->port.dev in register
serial8250_register_8250_port() conditionally copies uart->port.dev from up->port.dev only when up->port.dev is non-NULL:
if (up->port.dev) {
uart->port.dev = up->port.dev;
...
}
So if both the existing uart slot and up have a NULL ->dev, uart->port.dev remains NULL. The very next ACPI companion check then dereferences it unconditionally:
if (!has_acpi_companion(uart->port.dev)) {
has_acpi_companion() reads dev->fwnode without a NULL guard (include/linux/acpi.h), so this NULL-derefs the kernel for the remaining no-dev case rather than just skipping the mctrl_gpio_init() initialisation as intended.
smatch flags the inconsistency:
drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_core.c:767 serial8250_register_8250_port() error: 'uart->port.dev' could be null (see line 719)
Guard the call with a NULL check so register continues to work for callers that legitimately have no parent device (legacy non-OF/non-ACPI registrations).
No functional change for callers that pass a non-NULL ->dev.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-97480"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-24T17:17:25Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ntty: serial: 8250: protect against NULL uart-\u003eport.dev in register\n\nserial8250_register_8250_port() conditionally copies uart-\u003eport.dev\nfrom up-\u003eport.dev only when up-\u003eport.dev is non-NULL:\n\n\tif (up-\u003eport.dev) {\n\t\tuart-\u003eport.dev = up-\u003eport.dev;\n\t\t...\n\t}\n\nSo if both the existing uart slot and up have a NULL -\u003edev,\nuart-\u003eport.dev remains NULL. The very next ACPI companion check\nthen dereferences it unconditionally:\n\n\tif (!has_acpi_companion(uart-\u003eport.dev)) {\n\nhas_acpi_companion() reads dev-\u003efwnode without a NULL guard\n(include/linux/acpi.h), so this NULL-derefs the kernel for the\nremaining no-dev case rather than just skipping the\nmctrl_gpio_init() initialisation as intended.\n\nsmatch flags the inconsistency:\n\n drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_core.c:767\n serial8250_register_8250_port() error: \u0027uart-\u003eport.dev\u0027 could be\n null (see line 719)\n\nGuard the call with a NULL check so register continues to work\nfor callers that legitimately have no parent device (legacy\nnon-OF/non-ACPI registrations).\n\nNo functional change for callers that pass a non-NULL -\u003edev.",
"id": "GHSA-jrxp-w58r-g8c9",
"modified": "2026-09-24T18:31:34Z",
"published": "2026-09-24T18:31:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-97480"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5cbab666721d974bfe033a12045d808936deaefd"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/941c9f84c9b6310f7aaa1c8c785dcc634ee33050"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.