GHSA-JVJX-CFGV-JW7V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-17 18:32 – Updated: 2026-09-17 18:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/x86: asus-wireless: Fail probe when there is no ACPI match
Every platform driver can be forced to match a device that does not match its list of device IDs because of device_match_driver_override(), so platform drivers that rely on the existence of a device ACPI companion object need to verify its presence.
asus_wireless_probe() returns success when acpi_match_acpi_device() finds no match, leaving behind an input device that never reports anything because the notify handler is not installed. Worse, when the driver is force-bound to a device without an ACPI companion, probe still succeeds and stores a NULL companion pointer, which asus_wireless_remove() later passes to acpi_dev_remove_notify_handler(), leading to a NULL pointer dereference on unbind.
Return -ENODEV when the device does not match the ID table. This also covers the missing-companion case, because acpi_match_acpi_device() rejects a NULL device. Perform the check before allocating any driver state, instead of after the input device has already been registered.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-93124"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-17T17:18:07Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nplatform/x86: asus-wireless: Fail probe when there is no ACPI match\n\nEvery platform driver can be forced to match a device that does not match\nits list of device IDs because of device_match_driver_override(), so\nplatform drivers that rely on the existence of a device ACPI companion\nobject need to verify its presence.\n\nasus_wireless_probe() returns success when acpi_match_acpi_device()\nfinds no match, leaving behind an input device that never reports\nanything because the notify handler is not installed. Worse, when the\ndriver is force-bound to a device without an ACPI companion, probe\nstill succeeds and stores a NULL companion pointer, which\nasus_wireless_remove() later passes to acpi_dev_remove_notify_handler(),\nleading to a NULL pointer dereference on unbind.\n\nReturn -ENODEV when the device does not match the ID table. This also\ncovers the missing-companion case, because acpi_match_acpi_device()\nrejects a NULL device. Perform the check before allocating any driver\nstate, instead of after the input device has already been registered.",
"id": "GHSA-jvjx-cfgv-jw7v",
"modified": "2026-09-17T18:32:11Z",
"published": "2026-09-17T18:32:11Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-93124"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4aefd66ef7822cf7d3f53146dcee0b71021ed2b7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7bfa711f311a584002e16ecd750627306deb805c"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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