GHSA-JW9P-3GC4-84RW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-09-03 15:30 – Updated: 2024-09-05 15:33Host name validation for TLS certificates is bypassed when the installed OpenEdge default certificates are used to perform the TLS handshake for a networked connection. This has been corrected so that default certificates are no longer capable of overriding host name validation and will need to be replaced where full TLS certificate validation is needed for network security. The existing certificates should be replaced with CA-signed certificates from a recognized certificate authority that contain the necessary information to support host name validation.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-7346"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-287",
"CWE-297"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-09-03T15:15:16Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Host name validation for TLS certificates is bypassed when the installed OpenEdge default certificates are used to perform the TLS handshake for a networked connection.\u00a0 This has been corrected so that default certificates are no longer capable of overriding host name validation and will need to be replaced where full TLS certificate validation is needed for network security.\u00a0 The existing certificates should be replaced with CA-signed certificates from a recognized certificate authority that contain the necessary information to support host name validation.",
"id": "GHSA-jw9p-3gc4-84rw",
"modified": "2024-09-05T15:33:34Z",
"published": "2024-09-03T15:30:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-7346"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://community.progress.com/s/article/Client-connections-using-default-TLS-certificates-from-OpenEdge-may-bypass-TLS-host-name-validation"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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