GHSA-JXHV-6VCG-8FFM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-09 03:31 – Updated: 2025-12-09 03:31
VLAI?
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

blk-mq: release crypto keyslot before reporting I/O complete

Once all I/O using a blk_crypto_key has completed, filesystems can call blk_crypto_evict_key(). However, the block layer currently doesn't call blk_crypto_put_keyslot() until the request is being freed, which happens after upper layers have been told (via bio_endio()) the I/O has completed. This causes a race condition where blk_crypto_evict_key() can see 'slot_refs != 0' without there being an actual bug.

This makes __blk_crypto_evict_key() hit the 'WARN_ON_ONCE(atomic_read(&slot->slot_refs) != 0)' and return without doing anything, eventually causing a use-after-free in blk_crypto_reprogram_all_keys(). (This is a very rare bug and has only been seen when per-file keys are being used with fscrypt.)

There are two options to fix this: either release the keyslot before bio_endio() is called on the request's last bio, or make __blk_crypto_evict_key() ignore slot_refs. Let's go with the first solution, since it preserves the ability to report bugs (via WARN_ON_ONCE) where a key is evicted while still in-use.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-53810"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-12-09T01:16:53Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nblk-mq: release crypto keyslot before reporting I/O complete\n\nOnce all I/O using a blk_crypto_key has completed, filesystems can call\nblk_crypto_evict_key().  However, the block layer currently doesn\u0027t call\nblk_crypto_put_keyslot() until the request is being freed, which happens\nafter upper layers have been told (via bio_endio()) the I/O has\ncompleted.  This causes a race condition where blk_crypto_evict_key()\ncan see \u0027slot_refs != 0\u0027 without there being an actual bug.\n\nThis makes __blk_crypto_evict_key() hit the\n\u0027WARN_ON_ONCE(atomic_read(\u0026slot-\u003eslot_refs) != 0)\u0027 and return without\ndoing anything, eventually causing a use-after-free in\nblk_crypto_reprogram_all_keys().  (This is a very rare bug and has only\nbeen seen when per-file keys are being used with fscrypt.)\n\nThere are two options to fix this: either release the keyslot before\nbio_endio() is called on the request\u0027s last bio, or make\n__blk_crypto_evict_key() ignore slot_refs.  Let\u0027s go with the first\nsolution, since it preserves the ability to report bugs (via\nWARN_ON_ONCE) where a key is evicted while still in-use.",
  "id": "GHSA-jxhv-6vcg-8ffm",
  "modified": "2025-12-09T03:31:11Z",
  "published": "2025-12-09T03:31:11Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-53810"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7d206ec7a04e8545828191b6ea8b49d3ea61391f"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/874bdf43b4a7dc5463c31508f62b3e42eb237b08"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/92d5d233b9ff531cf9cc36ab4251779e07adb633"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9cd1e566676bbcb8a126acd921e4e194e6339603"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b278570e2c59d538216f8b656e97680188a8fba4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d206f79d9cd658665b37ce8134c6ec849ac7af0c"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}


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