GHSA-M36X-MGFH-8G78

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-01-27 15:15 – Updated: 2023-07-07 16:28
VLAI?
Summary
Subdomain Takeover in Interactsh server
Details

A domain configured with interactsh server was vulnerable to subdomain takeover for specfic subdomain, i.e app, Interactsh server before < 1.0.0 used to create cname entries for app pointing to projectdiscovery.github.io as default which intended to used for hosting interactsh web client using GitHub pages. It turns out to be a security issue with a self-hosted interactsh server in which the user may not have configured a web client but still have a cname entry pointing to GitHub pages, making them vulnerable to subdomain takeover.

This issue was initially reported to us as a subdomain takeover for one of our domains that runs interactsh server by Melih at security@projectdiscovery.io, and after conducting an internal investigation, we determined that it was an issue with the default config of interactsh server affecting all the server running self-hosted instance of interactsh, as a result - cname entry has been removed in the latest release.

Impact

This allows one to host / run arbitrary client side code (XSS) in a user's browser when browsing the vulnerable subdomain, for more details on the impact, please read this detailed blogpost from Detectify.

Patches

Update to Interactsh server v1.0.0 with go install -v github.com/projectdiscovery/interactsh/cmd/interactsh-server@latest

References

https://github.com/projectdiscovery/interactsh/issues/136

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Email us at security@projectdiscovery.io

Severity ?
6.1 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/projectdiscovery/interactsh"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.0.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-36474"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-79"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2022-01-24T22:24:55Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-06-28T22:15:09Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A domain configured with interactsh server was vulnerable to subdomain takeover for specfic subdomain, i.e `app`, Interactsh server before `\u003c 1.0.0` used to create cname entries for `app` pointing to `projectdiscovery.github.io` as default which intended to used for hosting interactsh [web client](https://github.com/projectdiscovery/interactsh-web) using GitHub pages. It turns out to be a security issue with a self-hosted interactsh server in which the user may not have configured a web client but still have a cname entry pointing to GitHub pages, making them vulnerable to subdomain takeover.\n\nThis issue was initially reported to us as a subdomain takeover for one of our domains that runs interactsh server by **Melih** at `security@projectdiscovery.io`, and after conducting an internal investigation, we determined that it was an issue with the default config of interactsh server affecting all the server running self-hosted instance of interactsh, as a result - cname entry has been removed in the latest release.\n\n#### Impact\nThis allows one to host / run arbitrary client side code (XSS) in a user\u0027s browser when browsing the vulnerable subdomain, for more details on the impact, please read this [detailed blogpost](https://labs.detectify.com/2014/10/21/hostile-subdomain-takeover-using-herokugithubdesk-more/) from Detectify.\n#### Patches\nUpdate to [Interactsh server v1.0.0 ](https://github.com/projectdiscovery/interactsh/releases/tag/v1.0.0)with `go install -v github.com/projectdiscovery/interactsh/cmd/interactsh-server@latest`\n\n#### References\nhttps://github.com/projectdiscovery/interactsh/issues/136\n\n#### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* Email us at [security@projectdiscovery.io](mailto:security@projectdiscovery.io)\n",
  "id": "GHSA-m36x-mgfh-8g78",
  "modified": "2023-07-07T16:28:46Z",
  "published": "2022-01-27T15:15:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/projectdiscovery/interactsh/security/advisories/GHSA-m36x-mgfh-8g78"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-36474"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/projectdiscovery/interactsh/issues/136"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/projectdiscovery/interactsh/pull/155"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/projectdiscovery/interactsh"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://labs.detectify.com/2014/10/21/hostile-subdomain-takeover-using-herokugithubdesk-more"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Subdomain Takeover in Interactsh server"
}


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