GHSA-M483-33MW-4P7W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-17 18:32 – Updated: 2026-09-17 18:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
esp: do not unref managed frag pages in esp_ssg_unref()
esp_ssg_unref() releases the page references held on the source scatterlist after the AEAD operation completes. It calls skb_page_unref() on every frag page for an out-of-place transform (req->src != req->dst), and in the error path of esp_output_tail() (already_unref == true) on the request's own scatterlist.
This is wrong when the skb carries managed frags (SKBFL_MANAGED_FRAG_REFS). Managed frags are owned by a zerocopy ubuf and the skb does not hold a per-frag page reference; io_uring SEND_ZC with a registered buffer attaches the bvec pages this way via io_sg_from_iter(). The rest of the stack honours this invariant: skb_release_data() skips the per-frag unref when SKBFL_MANAGED_FRAG_REFS is set, and skb_zcopy_managed() is the guard used at the other unref sites.
esp_ssg_unref() is missing that guard, so for a managed-frag skb it drops a page reference the skb never acquired. This can underflow the page reference count and free a page that is still in use.
Guard the function with skb_zcopy_managed() so both unref paths are skipped for managed-frag skbs, matching skb_release_data().
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-93105"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-17T17:18:04Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nesp: do not unref managed frag pages in esp_ssg_unref()\n\nesp_ssg_unref() releases the page references held on the source\nscatterlist after the AEAD operation completes. It calls\nskb_page_unref() on every frag page for an out-of-place transform\n(req-\u003esrc != req-\u003edst), and in the error path of esp_output_tail()\n(already_unref == true) on the request\u0027s own scatterlist.\n\nThis is wrong when the skb carries managed frags\n(SKBFL_MANAGED_FRAG_REFS). Managed frags are owned by a zerocopy ubuf\nand the skb does not hold a per-frag page reference; io_uring SEND_ZC\nwith a registered buffer attaches the bvec pages this way via\nio_sg_from_iter(). The rest of the stack honours this invariant:\nskb_release_data() skips the per-frag unref when SKBFL_MANAGED_FRAG_REFS\nis set, and skb_zcopy_managed() is the guard used at the other unref\nsites.\n\nesp_ssg_unref() is missing that guard, so for a managed-frag skb it\ndrops a page reference the skb never acquired. This can underflow the\npage reference count and free a page that is still in use.\n\nGuard the function with skb_zcopy_managed() so both unref paths are\nskipped for managed-frag skbs, matching skb_release_data().",
"id": "GHSA-m483-33mw-4p7w",
"modified": "2026-09-17T18:32:10Z",
"published": "2026-09-17T18:32:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-93105"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/21697720ff43b8dfa25b8e8d9ca7f56f4597fc80"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/26b6b14c7a0368e317a1e9fb5144ebe6f8d495cf"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.