GHSA-M58P-8FJH-3WHJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-27 21:31 – Updated: 2026-07-27 21:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

sctp: validate STALE_COOKIE cause length before reading staleness

When an ERROR chunk with a STALE_COOKIE cause is received in the COOKIE_ECHOED state, sctp_sf_do_5_2_6_stale() reads the 4-byte Measure of Staleness that follows the cause header:

err   = (struct sctp_errhdr *)(chunk->skb->data);
stale = ntohl(*(__be32 *)((u8 *)err + sizeof(*err)));

err is the first cause in the chunk, not the STALE_COOKIE cause that caused the dispatch, and nothing guarantees the staleness field is present. sctp_walk_errors() only requires a cause to be as long as the 4-byte header, so for a STALE_COOKIE cause of length 4 the read runs past the cause, and for a minimal ERROR chunk past skb->tail. The value is echoed to the peer in the Cookie Preservative of the reply INIT, leaking uninitialized memory.

sctp_sf_cookie_echoed_err() already walks to the STALE_COOKIE cause, so check its length there and pass it to sctp_sf_do_5_2_6_stale(), which reads that cause instead of the first one. A STALE_COOKIE cause too short to hold the staleness field is discarded.

The read is reachable by any peer that can drive an association into COOKIE_ECHOED, including an unprivileged process using a raw SCTP socket in a user and network namespace.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-64551"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-27T21:17:08Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsctp: validate STALE_COOKIE cause length before reading staleness\n\nWhen an ERROR chunk with a STALE_COOKIE cause is received in the\nCOOKIE_ECHOED state, sctp_sf_do_5_2_6_stale() reads the 4-byte Measure\nof Staleness that follows the cause header:\n\n\terr   = (struct sctp_errhdr *)(chunk-\u003eskb-\u003edata);\n\tstale = ntohl(*(__be32 *)((u8 *)err + sizeof(*err)));\n\nerr is the first cause in the chunk, not the STALE_COOKIE cause that\ncaused the dispatch, and nothing guarantees the staleness field is\npresent. sctp_walk_errors() only requires a cause to be as long as the\n4-byte header, so for a STALE_COOKIE cause of length 4 the read runs\npast the cause, and for a minimal ERROR chunk past skb-\u003etail. The value\nis echoed to the peer in the Cookie Preservative of the reply INIT,\nleaking uninitialized memory.\n\nsctp_sf_cookie_echoed_err() already walks to the STALE_COOKIE cause, so\ncheck its length there and pass it to sctp_sf_do_5_2_6_stale(), which\nreads that cause instead of the first one. A STALE_COOKIE cause too\nshort to hold the staleness field is discarded.\n\nThe read is reachable by any peer that can drive an association into\nCOOKIE_ECHOED, including an unprivileged process using a raw SCTP socket\nin a user and network namespace.",
  "id": "GHSA-m58p-8fjh-3whj",
  "modified": "2026-07-27T21:31:27Z",
  "published": "2026-07-27T21:31:27Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64551"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/08a8f2d13f703924316e9aeac863a88ef50990c7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1cd23ca80784223fa2204e16203f754da4e821f8"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/588706ebaf8cdb4a4161602949eba365514b1db1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6022da37786701df1fc5dd946a6dcba59d5473b1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/861f884f5471632c731cbbd612a1c072e391a624"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a257b41ddfe9e327b26581ad2777f04b23ac73f5"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bbd6b2ea966cf57b6ae095cf5a8dbc993cd197a0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ebe0a55d954fa8da383b6192edb8f763dcb002d5"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

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