GHSA-M58P-8FJH-3WHJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-27 21:31 – Updated: 2026-07-27 21:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: validate STALE_COOKIE cause length before reading staleness
When an ERROR chunk with a STALE_COOKIE cause is received in the COOKIE_ECHOED state, sctp_sf_do_5_2_6_stale() reads the 4-byte Measure of Staleness that follows the cause header:
err = (struct sctp_errhdr *)(chunk->skb->data);
stale = ntohl(*(__be32 *)((u8 *)err + sizeof(*err)));
err is the first cause in the chunk, not the STALE_COOKIE cause that caused the dispatch, and nothing guarantees the staleness field is present. sctp_walk_errors() only requires a cause to be as long as the 4-byte header, so for a STALE_COOKIE cause of length 4 the read runs past the cause, and for a minimal ERROR chunk past skb->tail. The value is echoed to the peer in the Cookie Preservative of the reply INIT, leaking uninitialized memory.
sctp_sf_cookie_echoed_err() already walks to the STALE_COOKIE cause, so check its length there and pass it to sctp_sf_do_5_2_6_stale(), which reads that cause instead of the first one. A STALE_COOKIE cause too short to hold the staleness field is discarded.
The read is reachable by any peer that can drive an association into COOKIE_ECHOED, including an unprivileged process using a raw SCTP socket in a user and network namespace.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-64551"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-27T21:17:08Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsctp: validate STALE_COOKIE cause length before reading staleness\n\nWhen an ERROR chunk with a STALE_COOKIE cause is received in the\nCOOKIE_ECHOED state, sctp_sf_do_5_2_6_stale() reads the 4-byte Measure\nof Staleness that follows the cause header:\n\n\terr = (struct sctp_errhdr *)(chunk-\u003eskb-\u003edata);\n\tstale = ntohl(*(__be32 *)((u8 *)err + sizeof(*err)));\n\nerr is the first cause in the chunk, not the STALE_COOKIE cause that\ncaused the dispatch, and nothing guarantees the staleness field is\npresent. sctp_walk_errors() only requires a cause to be as long as the\n4-byte header, so for a STALE_COOKIE cause of length 4 the read runs\npast the cause, and for a minimal ERROR chunk past skb-\u003etail. The value\nis echoed to the peer in the Cookie Preservative of the reply INIT,\nleaking uninitialized memory.\n\nsctp_sf_cookie_echoed_err() already walks to the STALE_COOKIE cause, so\ncheck its length there and pass it to sctp_sf_do_5_2_6_stale(), which\nreads that cause instead of the first one. A STALE_COOKIE cause too\nshort to hold the staleness field is discarded.\n\nThe read is reachable by any peer that can drive an association into\nCOOKIE_ECHOED, including an unprivileged process using a raw SCTP socket\nin a user and network namespace.",
"id": "GHSA-m58p-8fjh-3whj",
"modified": "2026-07-27T21:31:27Z",
"published": "2026-07-27T21:31:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64551"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/08a8f2d13f703924316e9aeac863a88ef50990c7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1cd23ca80784223fa2204e16203f754da4e821f8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/588706ebaf8cdb4a4161602949eba365514b1db1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6022da37786701df1fc5dd946a6dcba59d5473b1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/861f884f5471632c731cbbd612a1c072e391a624"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a257b41ddfe9e327b26581ad2777f04b23ac73f5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bbd6b2ea966cf57b6ae095cf5a8dbc993cd197a0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ebe0a55d954fa8da383b6192edb8f763dcb002d5"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
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- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.