GHSA-M6JW-VJQW-78FH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-17 18:32 – Updated: 2026-09-17 18:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dax/fsdev: clear pgmap ops and owner on unbind
fsdev_dax_probe() sets pgmap->ops = &fsdev_pagemap_ops and pgmap->owner = dev_dax, but nothing ever clears them. For a dynamic device the pgmap is devm-allocated and freed on unbind, so this is harmless. For a static device the pgmap is the shared, long-lived one owned by the dax bus (kill_dev_dax() only NULLs dev_dax->pgmap for the non-static case), and device.c's probe sets only pgmap->type, never clearing ops/owner.
So after fsdev unbinds a static device the stale fsdev_pagemap_ops survives on the shared pgmap. If the device is then rebound to device_dax (MEMORY_DEVICE_GENERIC, which installs no ->memory_failure), or the fsdev_dax module is unloaded, a subsequent memory_failure on that pgmap dispatches through the stale -- and possibly freed -- handler.
Register a devm action that clears pgmap->ops and pgmap->owner on unbind, symmetric with setting them at probe, so the pgmap carries no fsdev state once fsdev is detached.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-93075"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-17T17:18:01Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndax/fsdev: clear pgmap ops and owner on unbind\n\nfsdev_dax_probe() sets pgmap-\u003eops = \u0026fsdev_pagemap_ops and\npgmap-\u003eowner = dev_dax, but nothing ever clears them. For a dynamic\ndevice the pgmap is devm-allocated and freed on unbind, so this is\nharmless. For a static device the pgmap is the shared, long-lived one\nowned by the dax bus (kill_dev_dax() only NULLs dev_dax-\u003epgmap for the\nnon-static case), and device.c\u0027s probe sets only pgmap-\u003etype, never\nclearing ops/owner.\n\nSo after fsdev unbinds a static device the stale fsdev_pagemap_ops\nsurvives on the shared pgmap. If the device is then rebound to\ndevice_dax (MEMORY_DEVICE_GENERIC, which installs no -\u003ememory_failure),\nor the fsdev_dax module is unloaded, a subsequent memory_failure on that\npgmap dispatches through the stale -- and possibly freed -- handler.\n\nRegister a devm action that clears pgmap-\u003eops and pgmap-\u003eowner on unbind,\nsymmetric with setting them at probe, so the pgmap carries no fsdev state\nonce fsdev is detached.",
"id": "GHSA-m6jw-vjqw-78fh",
"modified": "2026-09-17T18:32:09Z",
"published": "2026-09-17T18:32:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-93075"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9b0f91dc9147a8601cec3d4d83cf13c6aaf71b27"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f48884ac31b6bfc99f36b3f207b8c0cbe5d54bd7"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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