GHSA-M9FJ-XVR8-VH59
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-16 12:30 – Updated: 2026-09-16 15:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Clamp MSI-X derived queue counts to avoid truncation
ha->msix_count is u16, but ha->max_req_queues, ha->max_rsp_queues and ha->max_qpairs are u8. Deriving the queue count as "ha->max_req_queues = ha->msix_count - 1" therefore truncates: a board (or a misconfigured/malicious hot-plugged device) advertising 257 MSI-X vectors yields msix_count - 1 == 256, which truncates to 0. An MSI-X count of 1 zeroes it as well, and in target mode the subsequent "ha->max_req_queues--" then underflows 0 to 255.
When the count is 0, qla2x00_alloc_queues() calls kzalloc_objs(struct req_que *, 0), which returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR. That is not NULL, so the allocation check passes and the following "ha->req_q_map[0] = req" dereferences ZERO_SIZE_PTR, corrupting memory or crashing the kernel.
Add qla_calc_queue_count() to clamp the derived value into [1, QLA_MAX_QUEUES - 1] so it always fits in u8 and is never zero, and use it at all three derivation sites (qla25xx_iospace_config(), qla83xx_iospace_config() and qla24xx_enable_msix()). Also guard the target-mode decrement so it cannot reintroduce a zero (which would in turn underflow max_qpairs).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-89856"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-16T11:16:53Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nscsi: qla2xxx: Clamp MSI-X derived queue counts to avoid truncation\n\nha-\u003emsix_count is u16, but ha-\u003emax_req_queues, ha-\u003emax_rsp_queues and\nha-\u003emax_qpairs are u8. Deriving the queue count as\n\"ha-\u003emax_req_queues = ha-\u003emsix_count - 1\" therefore truncates: a board\n(or a misconfigured/malicious hot-plugged device) advertising 257 MSI-X\nvectors yields msix_count - 1 == 256, which truncates to 0. An MSI-X\ncount of 1 zeroes it as well, and in target mode the subsequent\n\"ha-\u003emax_req_queues--\" then underflows 0 to 255.\n\nWhen the count is 0, qla2x00_alloc_queues() calls\nkzalloc_objs(struct req_que *, 0), which returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR. That is\nnot NULL, so the allocation check passes and the following\n\"ha-\u003ereq_q_map[0] = req\" dereferences ZERO_SIZE_PTR, corrupting memory\nor crashing the kernel.\n\nAdd qla_calc_queue_count() to clamp the derived value into\n[1, QLA_MAX_QUEUES - 1] so it always fits in u8 and is never zero, and\nuse it at all three derivation sites (qla25xx_iospace_config(),\nqla83xx_iospace_config() and qla24xx_enable_msix()). Also guard the\ntarget-mode decrement so it cannot reintroduce a zero (which would in\nturn underflow max_qpairs).",
"id": "GHSA-m9fj-xvr8-vh59",
"modified": "2026-09-16T15:30:59Z",
"published": "2026-09-16T12:30:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89856"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2efe50b2da829909023de4a2eb87badb7cfa53cc"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/33c77254e6e91f37c72c7fad4051777452b10de8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7a448f5ed0b283dbde4e9183dd1e98c221432dab"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/802068b9b683b8008fcccbf6e9ad133e597ec87c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9eeddbeaa896f39d943644b16d83a6ad0ceab255"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cf623d32761b00f221a9cfded3303d56e84b429d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e80adfeac61b4d5db7ffe0f5af43999c33a4145e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ebfd35c64433821bd5619a6d07ccc2df8b5b1de3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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