GHSA-M9XX-Q2G4-96MR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-15 06:32 – Updated: 2026-08-17 06:33In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvmet-auth: reject short AUTH_RECEIVE buffers
nvmet_execute_auth_receive() trusts the AUTH_RECEIVE allocation length after checking only that it is nonzero and matches the transfer length. In the SUCCESS1 and FAILURE1/default states, that lets a remote NVMe-oF initiator reach the fixed-size DH-HMAC-CHAP response builders with a kmalloc() buffer shorter than the response, so nvmet_auth_success1() and nvmet_auth_failure1() write past the allocation; both only WARN_ON the short length and then format the message anyway.
Impact: A remote NVMe-oF initiator with access to an auth-enabled target can trigger a 16-byte heap out-of-bounds write via a one-byte AUTH_RECEIVE allocation length.
Compute the minimum response length for the current DH-HMAC-CHAP step in nvmet_auth_receive_data_len() and report a zero data length when the host-supplied allocation length is shorter, so the existing zero-length check in nvmet_execute_auth_receive() rejects the command before any builder runs. The SUCCESS1 minimum is sizeof(struct nvmf_auth_dhchap_success1_data) plus the HMAC hash length, because the response hash is written into the rval[] flexible-array tail, so the minimum is state dependent rather than a flat sizeof. CHALLENGE keeps its existing variable-length guard in nvmet_auth_challenge().
This is reachable only when in-band DH-HMAC-CHAP authentication is configured on the target.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-72130"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-15T06:21:30Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnvmet-auth: reject short AUTH_RECEIVE buffers\n\nnvmet_execute_auth_receive() trusts the AUTH_RECEIVE allocation length\nafter checking only that it is nonzero and matches the transfer length.\nIn the SUCCESS1 and FAILURE1/default states, that lets a remote NVMe-oF\ninitiator reach the fixed-size DH-HMAC-CHAP response builders with a\nkmalloc() buffer shorter than the response, so nvmet_auth_success1() and\nnvmet_auth_failure1() write past the allocation; both only WARN_ON the\nshort length and then format the message anyway.\n\nImpact: A remote NVMe-oF initiator with access to an auth-enabled target\ncan trigger a 16-byte heap out-of-bounds write via a one-byte\nAUTH_RECEIVE allocation length.\n\nCompute the minimum response length for the current DH-HMAC-CHAP step in\nnvmet_auth_receive_data_len() and report a zero data length when the\nhost-supplied allocation length is shorter, so the existing zero-length\ncheck in nvmet_execute_auth_receive() rejects the command before any\nbuilder runs. The SUCCESS1 minimum is sizeof(struct\nnvmf_auth_dhchap_success1_data) plus the HMAC hash length, because the\nresponse hash is written into the rval[] flexible-array tail, so the\nminimum is state dependent rather than a flat sizeof. CHALLENGE keeps its\nexisting variable-length guard in nvmet_auth_challenge().\n\nThis is reachable only when in-band DH-HMAC-CHAP authentication is\nconfigured on the target.",
"id": "GHSA-m9xx-q2g4-96mr",
"modified": "2026-08-17T06:33:12Z",
"published": "2026-08-15T06:32:13Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72130"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2eaa3ad450141cfcf187bb43cb8335eb336b5f87"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/779575bc35c687697ba69e904f2cd22e60112534"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/80bf7b7f676e3987bbe06af3c359bd56ac91a5a9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bc111698b46e43eddd8664cceaa621cd559e99a0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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