GHSA-MHCF-GHW6-C6WV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-10 12:31 – Updated: 2026-08-14 00:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_uart: clear HCI_UART_SENDING when write_work is canceled
HCI_UART_SENDING bit in tx_state means write_work is pending and blocks queueing it again. Currently this bit is not cleared when canceling the work in hci_uart_close(), which blocks future writes when device is reopened later if write_work was pending.
Fix by clearing HCI_UART_SENDING when canceling the work.
Also make clearing of tx_skb safe by using disable_work_sync + enable_work instead of just cancel_work_sync. hci_uart_flush() purges the proto tx queue so we can cancel the pending write_work there, instead of doing it just in hci_uart_close(). Re-enable and possibly requeue the work after queue flush.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-68085"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-10T12:17:21Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nBluetooth: hci_uart: clear HCI_UART_SENDING when write_work is canceled\n\nHCI_UART_SENDING bit in tx_state means write_work is pending and blocks\nqueueing it again. Currently this bit is not cleared when canceling the\nwork in hci_uart_close(), which blocks future writes when device is\nreopened later if write_work was pending.\n\nFix by clearing HCI_UART_SENDING when canceling the work.\n\nAlso make clearing of tx_skb safe by using disable_work_sync +\nenable_work instead of just cancel_work_sync. hci_uart_flush() purges\nthe proto tx queue so we can cancel the pending write_work there,\ninstead of doing it just in hci_uart_close(). Re-enable and possibly\nrequeue the work after queue flush.",
"id": "GHSA-mhcf-ghw6-c6wv",
"modified": "2026-08-14T00:31:51Z",
"published": "2026-08-10T12:31:55Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68085"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1b0d946d6f08bd39211385bc703a440911b41e46"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/714d861d35d937f23375a4517569b13917bbbe51"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b9dd39cf1667e378b25a082ca796d495d578c5d3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d52446b3e735cfdbdc2a58342163803bc2e64249"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.