GHSA-MHPG-C27V-6MXR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-08 20:16 – Updated: 2026-01-08 20:16
VLAI?
Summary
NiceGUI apps which use `ui.sub_pages` vulnerable to zero-click XSS
Details

Summary

An unsafe implementation in the pushstate event listener used by ui.sub_pages allows an attacker to manipulate the fragment identifier of the URL, which they can do despite being cross-site, using an iframe.

Details

The problem is traced as follows:

  1. On pushstate, handleStateEvent is executed.

https://github.com/zauberzeug/nicegui/blob/59fa9424c470f1b12c5d368985fa36e21fda706b/nicegui/elements/sub_pages.js#L38-L39

  1. handleStateEvent emits sub_pages_open event.

https://github.com/zauberzeug/nicegui/blob/59fa9424c470f1b12c5d368985fa36e21fda706b/nicegui/elements/sub_pages.js#L22-L25

  1. SubPagesRouter (used by ui.sub_pages), lisnening on sub_pages_open, _handle_open runs.

https://github.com/zauberzeug/nicegui/blob/59fa9424c470f1b12c5d368985fa36e21fda706b/nicegui/sub_pages_router.py#L18-L22

  1. _handle_open finds any SubPages and runs _show() on them

https://github.com/zauberzeug/nicegui/blob/59fa9424c470f1b12c5d368985fa36e21fda706b/nicegui/sub_pages_router.py#L63-L71

  1. If the if-logic is followed or debug prints are added, it can be found that it calls self._handle_scrolling(match, behavior='smooth') directly

https://github.com/zauberzeug/nicegui/blob/59fa9424c470f1b12c5d368985fa36e21fda706b/nicegui/elements/sub_pages.py#L76-L100

  1. CULPRIT _handle_scrolling runs _scroll_to_fragment as there is a fragment, which runs vulnerable JS if the fragment (attacker-controlled) escapes out of the quotes.

https://github.com/zauberzeug/nicegui/blob/59fa9424c470f1b12c5d368985fa36e21fda706b/nicegui/elements/sub_pages.py#L206-L217

PoC

Just visiting this page (no click required), consistently triggers XSS in https://nicegui.io domain.

<html>
  <body>
    <iframe id="myiframe" src="https://nicegui.io" width="100%" height="600px" onload="triggerXSS()"></iframe>
    <script>
      function triggerXSS() {
        if (!myiframe.src.includes("#")) {
          myiframe.src = "https://nicegui.io#x');alert(document.domain)//";
        }
      }
    </script>
  </body>
</html>

image

Impact

Any page which uses ui.sub_pages and does not actively prevent itself from being put in an iframe is affected.

The impact is high since by-default NiceGUI pages are iframe-embeddable with no native opt-out functionalities except by manipulating the underlying app via FastAPI methods, and that ui.sub_pages is actively promoted as the new modern way to create Single-Page Applications (SPA).

Patch

  1. Not use ui.sub_pages
  2. Block iframe with the following code
@app.middleware('http')
async def iframe_blocking_middleware(request, call_next):
    response = await call_next(request)
    response.headers['X-Frame-Options'] = 'DENY'
    return response

Appendix

AI is used safely to judge the CVSS scoring (input is censored).

Please find the results in https://poe.com/s/3FXuwp7TAYxqLomARXma

Scoring update after manual review

The scoring done by AI was quite biased. Upon further review it is less dramatic.

  • User Interaction None: There's almost no interaction required, and none of the interaction is with the vulnerable system.
  • Confidentiality & Integrity Low: The extent of data confidentiality & integrity loss is bounded by the highest priviledged user in the entire NiceGUI application. There does not exist a means of performing data manipulating tasks that said admin cannot already do.
  • Availability None: No DDoS is possible with this. Site remains performant as ever.
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.4.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "nicegui"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.22.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.5.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-21873"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-79"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-01-08T20:16:41Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-01-08T10:15:55Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nAn unsafe implementation in the `pushstate` event listener used by `ui.sub_pages` allows an attacker to manipulate the fragment identifier of the URL, which _they can do despite being cross-site, using an iframe_. \n\n### Details\n\nThe problem is traced as follows:\n\n1. On `pushstate`, `handleStateEvent` is executed. \n\nhttps://github.com/zauberzeug/nicegui/blob/59fa9424c470f1b12c5d368985fa36e21fda706b/nicegui/elements/sub_pages.js#L38-L39\n\n2. `handleStateEvent` emits `sub_pages_open` event. \n\nhttps://github.com/zauberzeug/nicegui/blob/59fa9424c470f1b12c5d368985fa36e21fda706b/nicegui/elements/sub_pages.js#L22-L25 \n\n3. `SubPagesRouter` (used by `ui.sub_pages`), lisnening on `sub_pages_open`, `_handle_open` runs. \n\nhttps://github.com/zauberzeug/nicegui/blob/59fa9424c470f1b12c5d368985fa36e21fda706b/nicegui/sub_pages_router.py#L18-L22\n\n4. `_handle_open` finds any `SubPages` and runs `_show()` on them\n\nhttps://github.com/zauberzeug/nicegui/blob/59fa9424c470f1b12c5d368985fa36e21fda706b/nicegui/sub_pages_router.py#L63-L71\n\n5. If the if-logic is followed or debug prints are added, it can be found that it calls `self._handle_scrolling(match, behavior=\u0027smooth\u0027)` directly\n\nhttps://github.com/zauberzeug/nicegui/blob/59fa9424c470f1b12c5d368985fa36e21fda706b/nicegui/elements/sub_pages.py#L76-L100\n\n6. **CULPRIT** `_handle_scrolling` runs `_scroll_to_fragment` as there is a fragment, which runs vulnerable JS if the `fragment` (attacker-controlled) escapes out of the quotes. \n\nhttps://github.com/zauberzeug/nicegui/blob/59fa9424c470f1b12c5d368985fa36e21fda706b/nicegui/elements/sub_pages.py#L206-L217\n\n### PoC\n\nJust visiting this page (no click required), consistently triggers XSS in https://nicegui.io domain. \n\n```html\n\u003chtml\u003e\n  \u003cbody\u003e\n    \u003ciframe id=\"myiframe\" src=\"https://nicegui.io\" width=\"100%\" height=\"600px\" onload=\"triggerXSS()\"\u003e\u003c/iframe\u003e\n    \u003cscript\u003e\n      function triggerXSS() {\n        if (!myiframe.src.includes(\"#\")) {\n          myiframe.src = \"https://nicegui.io#x\u0027);alert(document.domain)//\";\n        }\n      }\n    \u003c/script\u003e\n  \u003c/body\u003e\n\u003c/html\u003e\n```\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1429\" height=\"643\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/310dbb5c-65d5-44f2-8417-dcf044829bc6\" /\u003e\n\n### Impact\n\nAny page which uses `ui.sub_pages` and does not actively prevent itself from being put in an iframe is affected.\n\nThe impact is high since by-default NiceGUI pages are iframe-embeddable with no native opt-out functionalities except by manipulating the underlying `app` via FastAPI methods, and that `ui.sub_pages` is actively promoted as the new modern way to create Single-Page Applications (SPA). \n\n### Patch\n\n1. Not use `ui.sub_pages`\n2. Block iframe with the following code\n\n```py\n@app.middleware(\u0027http\u0027)\nasync def iframe_blocking_middleware(request, call_next):\n    response = await call_next(request)\n    response.headers[\u0027X-Frame-Options\u0027] = \u0027DENY\u0027\n    return response\n```\n\n### Appendix\n\nAI is used safely to judge the CVSS scoring (input is censored).\n\nPlease find the results in https://poe.com/s/3FXuwp7TAYxqLomARXma\n\n### Scoring update after manual review\n\nThe scoring done by AI was quite biased. Upon further review it is less dramatic. \n\n- User Interaction **None**: There\u0027s _almost_ no interaction required, and none of the interaction is with the vulnerable system.\n- Confidentiality \u0026 Integrity **Low**: The extent of data confidentiality \u0026 integrity loss is bounded by the highest priviledged user in the entire NiceGUI application. There does not exist a means of performing data manipulating tasks that said admin cannot already do. \n- Availability **None**: No DDoS is possible with this. Site remains performant as ever.",
  "id": "GHSA-mhpg-c27v-6mxr",
  "modified": "2026-01-08T20:16:41Z",
  "published": "2026-01-08T20:16:41Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/zauberzeug/nicegui/security/advisories/GHSA-mhpg-c27v-6mxr"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-21873"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/zauberzeug/nicegui"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/zauberzeug/nicegui/releases/tag/v3.5.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "NiceGUI apps which use `ui.sub_pages` vulnerable to zero-click XSS"
}


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  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
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