GHSA-MHW6-P52X-6VXV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-21 15:34 – Updated: 2026-06-19 15:33In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: wwan: t7xx: validate port_count against message length in t7xx_port_enum_msg_handler
t7xx_port_enum_msg_handler() uses the modem-supplied port_count field as a loop bound over port_msg->data[] without checking that the message buffer contains sufficient data. A modem sending port_count=65535 in a 12-byte buffer triggers a slab-out-of-bounds read of up to 262140 bytes.
Add a sizeof(*port_msg) check before accessing the port message header fields to guard against undersized messages.
Add a struct_size() check after extracting port_count and before the loop.
In t7xx_parse_host_rt_data(), guard the rt_feature header read with a remaining-buffer check before accessing data_len, validate feat_data_len against the actual remaining buffer to prevent OOB reads and signed integer overflow on offset.
Pass msg_len from both call sites: skb->len at the DPMAIF path after skb_pull(), and the validated feat_data_len at the handshake path.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-43495"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-125"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-21T13:16:18Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: wwan: t7xx: validate port_count against message length in t7xx_port_enum_msg_handler\n\nt7xx_port_enum_msg_handler() uses the modem-supplied port_count field as\na loop bound over port_msg-\u003edata[] without checking that the message buffer\ncontains sufficient data. A modem sending port_count=65535 in a 12-byte\nbuffer triggers a slab-out-of-bounds read of up to 262140 bytes.\n\nAdd a sizeof(*port_msg) check before accessing the port message header\nfields to guard against undersized messages.\n\nAdd a struct_size() check after extracting port_count and before the loop.\n\nIn t7xx_parse_host_rt_data(), guard the rt_feature header read with a\nremaining-buffer check before accessing data_len, validate feat_data_len\nagainst the actual remaining buffer to prevent OOB reads and signed\ninteger overflow on offset.\n\nPass msg_len from both call sites: skb-\u003elen at the DPMAIF path after\nskb_pull(), and the validated feat_data_len at the handshake path.",
"id": "GHSA-mhw6-p52x-6vxv",
"modified": "2026-06-19T15:33:10Z",
"published": "2026-05-21T15:34:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43495"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0e7c074cfcd9bd93765505f9eb8b42f03ed2a744"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2b56d7903ab804481f5233a259d5f341e9fd513c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/307c5d0f36a5c74042217136da5bfbd9f7504650"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9855e063e063158cc5bded576382599dc3133202"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dd4f4c93c1488d7100b9964f2da4c8b3c29652f1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f94450ce5053b36002995b72d1fa1db3bb08c5bf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/06/18/1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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