{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.openrefine.dependencies:butterfly"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.2.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-185",
      "CWE-95"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-10-24T18:27:50Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nUsage of the `Butterfly.prototype.parseJSON` or `getJSON` functions on an attacker-controlled crafted input string allows the attacker to execute arbitrary JavaScript code on the server.\n\nSince Butterfly JavaScript code has access to Java classes, it can run arbitrary programs.\n\n### Details\n\nThe `parseJSON` function (edu/mit/simile/butterfly/Butterfly.js:64) works by calling `eval`, an approach that goes back to the original library by Crockford, before JSON was part of the ECMAScript language. It uses a regular expression to remove strings from the input, then checks that there are no unexpected characters in the non-string remainder.\n\nHowever, the regex is imperfect, as was [discovered earlier by Mike Samuel](https://dev.to/mikesamuel/2008-silently-securing-jsonparse-5cbb); specifically, the \"cleaner\" can be tricked into treating part of the input as a string that the \"evaluator\" does not, because of a difference in interpretation regarding the [the Unicode zero-width joiner character](https://unicode-explorer.com/c/200D). Representing that character with a visible symbol, a malicious input looks like:\n\n```js\n\"\\\ufffd\\\", Packages.java.lang.Runtime.getRuntime().exec(\u0027gnome-calculator\u0027)) // \"\n```\n\nThis is understood...\n\n* by `JSON_cleaning_RE` as a single string, and because it is a string it can be collapsed to nothing, which is not problematic, so the original input proceeds to `eval`.\n* by the `eval` function, which ignores zero-width joiners entirely, as a string containing a single escaped backslash, followed by a comma, then a function call, closing parenthesis, and finally a line comment.\n \nThe function call is evaluated, and a calculator is opened.\n\nPossible mitigations and additional defenses could include:\n\n* Replacing the JSON implementation with Rhino\u0027s built-in implementation.\n* Dropping all JSON-related and JSONP-related code entirely.\n* Restricting the access the JavaScript controller code has to the rest of the system by using `initSafeStandardObjects` instead of `initStandardObjects`, using `setClassShutter`, and so on.\n\n### PoC\n\nChange OpenRefine `core` `controller.js` to add a call to the vulnerable `getJSON` function:\n\n```diff\ndiff --git a/main/webapp/modules/core/MOD-INF/controller.js b/main/webapp/modules/core/MOD-INF/controller.js\nindex 4ceba0676..1ce0936d2 100644\n--- a/main/webapp/modules/core/MOD-INF/controller.js\n+++ b/main/webapp/modules/core/MOD-INF/controller.js\n@@ -631,0 +632,5 @@ function process(path, request, response) {\n+    if (path == \"getjsontest\") {\n+      butterfly.getJSON(request);\n+      return true;\n+    }\n+\n```\n\nThen, restart OpenRefine and submit the malicious request. For example, the following `bash` command (with $\u0027 quoting) should do it:\n\n```\ncurl -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json;charset=utf-8\u0027 --data $\u0027\"\\\\\\u200d\\\\\", Packages.java.lang.Runtime.getRuntime().exec(\\\u0027gnome-calculator\\\u0027)) // \"\u0027 http://localhost:3333/getjsontest\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nAny JavaScript controller that calls one of these functions is vulnerable to remote code execution.\n\nOpenRefine itself seems unaffected; both OpenRefine and jQuery have their own functions also called parseJSON and getJSON, but those are unrelated.",
  "id": "GHSA-mpcw-3j5p-p99x",
  "modified": "2024-10-24T18:27:50Z",
  "published": "2024-10-24T18:27:50Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/OpenRefine/simile-butterfly/security/advisories/GHSA-mpcw-3j5p-p99x"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/OpenRefine/simile-butterfly/commit/2ad1fa4cd8afe3c920c8e6e04fe7a7df5cf8294e"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/OpenRefine/simile-butterfly"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [],
  "summary": "Butterfly\u0027s parseJSON, getJSON functions eval malicious input, leading to remote code execution (RCE)"
}