GHSA-MPHV-75CG-56WG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-25 22:59 – Updated: 2026-02-25 22:59
VLAI
Summary
LangChain Community: redirect chaining can lead to SSRF bypass via RecursiveUrlLoader
Details

Summary

A redirect-based Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) bypass exists in RecursiveUrlLoader in @langchain/community. The loader validates the initial URL but allows the underlying fetch to follow redirects automatically, which permits a transition from a safe public URL to an internal or metadata endpoint without revalidation. This is a bypass of the SSRF protections introduced in 1.1.14 (CVE-2026-26019).

Affected Component

  • Package: @langchain/community
  • Component: RecursiveUrlLoader
  • Configuration: preventOutside (default: true) is insufficient to prevent this bypass when redirects are followed automatically.

Description

RecursiveUrlLoader is a web crawler that recursively follows links from a starting URL. The existing SSRF mitigation validates the initial URL before fetching, but it does not re-validate when the request follows redirects. Because fetch follows redirects by default, an attacker can supply a public URL that passes validation and then redirects to a private network address, localhost, or cloud metadata endpoint.

This constitutes a “check‑then‑act” gap in the request lifecycle: the safety check occurs before the redirect chain is resolved, and the final destination is never validated.

Impact

If an attacker can influence content on a page being crawled (e.g., user‑generated content, untrusted external pages), they can cause the crawler to: - Fetch cloud instance metadata (AWS, GCP, Azure), potentially exposing credentials or tokens - Access internal services on private networks (10.x, 172.16.x, 192.168.x) - Connect to localhost services - Exfiltrate response data through attacker-controlled redirect chains

This is exploitable in any environment where RecursiveUrlLoader runs with access to internal networks or metadata services, which includes most cloud-hosted deployments.

Attack Scenario

  1. The crawler is pointed at a public URL that passes initial SSRF validation.
  2. That URL responds with a 3xx redirect to an internal target.
  3. The fetch follows the redirect automatically without revalidation.
  4. The crawler accesses the internal or metadata endpoint.

Example redirector:

https://302.r3dir.me/--to/?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/

Root Cause

  • SSRF validation (validateSafeUrl) is only performed on the initial URL.
  • Redirects are followed automatically by fetch (redirect: "follow" default), so the request can change destinations without additional validation.

Resolution

Upgrade to @langchain/community >= 1.1.18, which validates every redirect hop by disabling automatic redirects and re-validating Location targets before following them. - Automatic redirects are disabled (redirect: "manual"). - Each 3xx Location is resolved and validated with validateSafeUrl() before the next request. - A maximum redirect limit prevents infinite loops.

Reources

  • Original SSRF fix (CVE-2026-26019): enforced origin comparison and added initial URL validation
  • https://github.com/langchain-ai/langchainjs/security/advisories/GHSA-gf3v-fwqg-4vh7
Severity
4.1 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.1.17"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@langchain/community"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.1.18"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-27795"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-25T22:59:48Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-25T18:23:41Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\nA redirect-based Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) bypass exists in `RecursiveUrlLoader` in `@langchain/community`. The loader validates the initial URL but allows the underlying fetch to follow redirects automatically, which permits a transition from a safe public URL to an internal or metadata endpoint without revalidation. This is a bypass of the SSRF protections introduced in 1.1.14 (CVE-2026-26019).\n\n## Affected Component\n- Package: `@langchain/community`\n- Component: `RecursiveUrlLoader`\n- Configuration: `preventOutside` (default: `true`) is insufficient to prevent this bypass when redirects are followed automatically.\n\n## Description\n`RecursiveUrlLoader` is a web crawler that recursively follows links from a starting URL. The existing SSRF mitigation validates the initial URL before fetching, but it does not re-validate when the request follows redirects. Because fetch follows redirects by default, an attacker can supply a public URL that passes validation and then redirects to a private network address, localhost, or cloud metadata endpoint.\n\nThis constitutes a \u201ccheck\u2011then\u2011act\u201d gap in the request lifecycle: the safety check occurs before the redirect chain is resolved, and the final destination is never validated.\n\n## Impact\nIf an attacker can influence content on a page being crawled (e.g., user\u2011generated content, untrusted external pages), they can cause the crawler to:\n- Fetch cloud instance metadata (AWS, GCP, Azure), potentially exposing credentials or tokens\n- Access internal services on private networks (`10.x`, `172.16.x`, `192.168.x`)\n- Connect to localhost services\n- Exfiltrate response data through attacker-controlled redirect chains\n\nThis is exploitable in any environment where `RecursiveUrlLoader` runs with access to internal networks or metadata services, which includes most cloud-hosted deployments.\n\n## Attack Scenario\n1. The crawler is pointed at a public URL that passes initial SSRF validation.\n2. That URL responds with a 3xx redirect to an internal target.\n3. The fetch follows the redirect automatically without revalidation.\n4. The crawler accesses the internal or metadata endpoint.\n\nExample redirector:\n```\nhttps://302.r3dir.me/--to/?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/\n```\n\n## Root Cause\n- SSRF validation (`validateSafeUrl`) is only performed on the initial URL.\n- Redirects are followed automatically by fetch (`redirect: \"follow\"` default), so the request can change destinations without additional validation.\n\n## Resolution\nUpgrade to `@langchain/community` **\u003e= 1.1.18**, which validates every redirect hop by disabling automatic redirects and re-validating `Location` targets before following them.\n- Automatic redirects are disabled (`redirect: \"manual\"`).\n- Each 3xx `Location` is resolved and validated with `validateSafeUrl()` before the next request.\n- A maximum redirect limit prevents infinite loops.\n\n## Reources\n- Original SSRF fix (CVE-2026-26019): enforced origin comparison and added initial URL validation\n- https://github.com/langchain-ai/langchainjs/security/advisories/GHSA-gf3v-fwqg-4vh7",
  "id": "GHSA-mphv-75cg-56wg",
  "modified": "2026-02-25T22:59:48Z",
  "published": "2026-02-25T22:59:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/langchain-ai/langchainjs/security/advisories/GHSA-gf3v-fwqg-4vh7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/langchain-ai/langchainjs/security/advisories/GHSA-mphv-75cg-56wg"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27795"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/langchain-ai/langchainjs/pull/9990"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/langchain-ai/langchainjs/commit/2812d2b2b9fd9343c4850e2ab906b8cf440975ee"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/langchain-ai/langchainjs/commit/d5e3db0d01ab321ec70a875805b2f74aefdadf9d"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/langchain-ai/langchainjs"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/langchain-ai/langchainjs/releases/tag/%40langchain%2Fcommunity%401.1.14"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/langchain-ai/langchainjs/releases/tag/%40langchain%2Fcommunity%401.1.18"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "LangChain Community: redirect chaining can lead to SSRF bypass via RecursiveUrlLoader"
}



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