GCVE Workshop - 22 September 2026 (14:00-18:00), Luxembourg Before The Vulnopticon Conference - Registration

GHSA-MQ36-523M-X7VV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-20 18:35 – Updated: 2026-08-20 18:35
VLAI
Summary
node-opcua missing nonce verification in UserNameIdentityToken authentication
Details

Summary A missing nonce verification in the UserNameIdentityToken authentication handler allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to forge a password token that extracts as an empty string, and to replay captured authentication tokens across sessions.

Affected versions: <= 2.165.0 Tested version: 2.165.0 CVSS Score: 8.1 (High) CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L CWE: CWE-347 Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature


Root Cause

In packages/node-opcua-server/source/opcua_server.ts at line 1886-1887, after RSA-OAEP decrypting the UserNameIdentityToken password blob, the server reads a 4-byte little-endian length field and extracts buff[4 : 4+length] as the password. It never verifies that the trailing bytes equal session.nonce.

This has two consequences:

  1. Forged empty password: An attacker who retrieves the server's public key via an unauthenticated GetEndpoints call can craft a token where the 4-byte length field equals serverNonce.length (32). The server computes length = 32 - 32 = 0 and calls isValidUser(username, ""). Any account that accepts an empty password is compromised.

  2. Unconditional replay attack: Because nonce binding is structurally absent, any captured UserNameIdentityToken ciphertext can be replayed in a different session unconditionally.

The impact is compounded by a second issue: when the channel uses SecurityMode=None, verifyClientSignature returns true unconditionally (security_policy.ts:697-700), bypassing the channel-level signature check entirely.


Proof of Concept (logic, no exploit code)

1. GetEndpoints (unauthenticated) → retrieve server public key and RSA token policy
2. OpenSecureChannel (SecurityMode=None)
3. CreateSession
4. Craft plaintext: [0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00]  (readUInt32LE = 32 = serverNonce.length)
5. RSA-OAEP encrypt with server public key → 256-byte ciphertext
6. ActivateSession with crafted UserNameIdentityToken
7. Server decrypts → length = 32 - 32 = 0 → password = ""
8. isValidUser(username, "") is called

Dynamically confirmed: decryption produces password = "" with no error and no nonce verification.


Suggested Fix

After decrypting the password blob, verify that buff.slice(4 + passwordLength) equals session.nonce before extracting the password. Reject the token if verification fails.


I am following a 90-day responsible disclosure policy. I am happy to provide additional technical details under embargo. Please confirm receipt at your earliest convenience.

Reporter: Stanley Tobias Discovery date: 2026-03-23

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "node-opcua"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "2.165.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-54155"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-20T18:35:33Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "**Summary**\nA missing nonce verification in the UserNameIdentityToken authentication handler allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to forge a password token that extracts as an empty string, and to replay captured authentication tokens across sessions.\n\n**Affected versions:** \u003c= 2.165.0\n**Tested version:** 2.165.0\n**CVSS Score:** 8.1 (High)\n**CVSS Vector:** CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L\n**CWE:** CWE-347 Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature\n\n---\n\n**Root Cause**\n\nIn `packages/node-opcua-server/source/opcua_server.ts` at line 1886-1887, after RSA-OAEP decrypting the UserNameIdentityToken password blob, the server reads a 4-byte little-endian length field and extracts `buff[4 : 4+length]` as the password. It never verifies that the trailing bytes equal `session.nonce`.\n\nThis has two consequences:\n\n1. **Forged empty password:** An attacker who retrieves the server\u0027s public key via an unauthenticated `GetEndpoints` call can craft a token where the 4-byte length field equals `serverNonce.length` (32). The server computes `length = 32 - 32 = 0` and calls `isValidUser(username, \"\")`. Any account that accepts an empty password is compromised.\n\n2. **Unconditional replay attack:** Because nonce binding is structurally absent, any captured UserNameIdentityToken ciphertext can be replayed in a different session unconditionally.\n\nThe impact is compounded by a second issue: when the channel uses `SecurityMode=None`, `verifyClientSignature` returns `true` unconditionally (security_policy.ts:697-700), bypassing the channel-level signature check entirely.\n\n---\n\n**Proof of Concept (logic, no exploit code)**\n\n```\n1. GetEndpoints (unauthenticated) \u2192 retrieve server public key and RSA token policy\n2. OpenSecureChannel (SecurityMode=None)\n3. CreateSession\n4. Craft plaintext: [0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00]  (readUInt32LE = 32 = serverNonce.length)\n5. RSA-OAEP encrypt with server public key \u2192 256-byte ciphertext\n6. ActivateSession with crafted UserNameIdentityToken\n7. Server decrypts \u2192 length = 32 - 32 = 0 \u2192 password = \"\"\n8. isValidUser(username, \"\") is called\n```\n\nDynamically confirmed: decryption produces `password = \"\"` with no error and no nonce verification.\n\n---\n\n**Suggested Fix**\n\nAfter decrypting the password blob, verify that `buff.slice(4 + passwordLength)` equals `session.nonce` before extracting the password. Reject the token if verification fails.\n\n---\n\nI am following a 90-day responsible disclosure policy. I am happy to provide additional technical details under embargo. Please confirm receipt at your earliest convenience.\n\nReporter: Stanley Tobias\nDiscovery date: 2026-03-23",
  "id": "GHSA-mq36-523m-x7vv",
  "modified": "2026-08-20T18:35:33Z",
  "published": "2026-08-20T18:35:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/node-opcua/node-opcua/security/advisories/GHSA-mq36-523m-x7vv"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/node-opcua/node-opcua"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "node-opcua missing nonce verification in UserNameIdentityToken authentication"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Loading…

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Loading…

Loading…

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.


Loading…