GHSA-MQ8J-3H7H-P8G7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-06-16 23:14 – Updated: 2022-06-16 23:14
VLAI?
Summary
Compromised child renderer processes could obtain IPC access without nodeIntegrationInSubFrames being enabled
Details

Impact

This vulnerability allows a renderer with JS execution to obtain access to a new renderer process with nodeIntegrationInSubFrames enabled which in turn allows effective access to ipcRenderer.

Please note the misleadingly named nodeIntegrationInSubFrames option does not implicitly grant Node.js access rather it depends on the existing sandbox setting. If your application is sandboxed then nodeIntegrationInSubFrames just gives access to the sandboxed renderer APIs (which includes ipcRenderer).

If your application then additionally exposes IPC messages without IPC senderFrame validation that perform privileged actions or return confidential data this access to ipcRenderer can in turn compromise your application / user even with the sandbox enabled.

Patches

This has been patched and the following Electron versions contain the fix:

  • 18.0.0-beta.6
  • 17.2.0
  • 16.2.6
  • 15.5.5

Workarounds

Ensure that all IPC message handlers appropriately validate senderFrame as per our security tutorial here.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at security@electronjs.org.

Severity ?
2.2 (Low)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "electron"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "15.5.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "electron"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "16.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "16.2.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "electron"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "17.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "17.2.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 18.0.0-beta.5"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "electron"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "18.0.0-beta.1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "18.0.0-beta.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-29247"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-668"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2022-06-16T23:14:33Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-06-13T21:15:00Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nThis vulnerability allows a renderer with JS execution to obtain access to a new renderer process with `nodeIntegrationInSubFrames` enabled which in turn allows effective access to `ipcRenderer`.\n\nPlease note the misleadingly named `nodeIntegrationInSubFrames` option does not implicitly grant Node.js access rather it depends on the existing `sandbox` setting.  If your application is sandboxed then `nodeIntegrationInSubFrames` just gives access to the sandboxed renderer APIs (which includes `ipcRenderer`).\n\nIf your application then additionally exposes IPC messages without IPC `senderFrame` validation that perform privileged actions or return confidential data this access to `ipcRenderer` can in turn compromise your application / user even with the sandbox enabled.\n\n### Patches\nThis has been patched and the following Electron versions contain the fix:\n\n* `18.0.0-beta.6`\n* `17.2.0`\n* `16.2.6`\n* `15.5.5`\n\n### Workarounds\nEnsure that all IPC message handlers appropriately validate `senderFrame` as per our [security tutorial here](https://github.com/electron/electron/blob/main/docs/tutorial/security.md#17-validate-the-sender-of-all-ipc-messages).\n\n### For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at [security@electronjs.org](mailto:security@electronjs.org).",
  "id": "GHSA-mq8j-3h7h-p8g7",
  "modified": "2022-06-16T23:14:33Z",
  "published": "2022-06-16T23:14:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/electron/electron/security/advisories/GHSA-mq8j-3h7h-p8g7"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-29247"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/electron/electron"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Compromised child renderer processes could obtain IPC access without nodeIntegrationInSubFrames being enabled"
}


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  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
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  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.



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