GHSA-MRPH-W4HH-GX3G

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-06 18:14 – Updated: 2026-02-06 19:06
VLAI
Summary
Gogs has arbitrary file read/write via Path Traversal in Git hook editing
Details

Vulnerability Description

In the endpoint:

/username/reponame/settings/hooks/git/:name

the :name parameter:

  • Is URL-decoded by macaron routing, allowing decoded slashes (/)
  • Is then passed directly to:
git.Repository.Hook("custom_hooks", name)

which internally resolves the path as:

filepath.Join(repoPath, "custom_hooks", name)

Because no path sanitization is applied, supplying ../ sequences allows access to arbitrary paths outside the repository.

As a Result:

  • GET: Arbitrary file contents are displayed in the hook edit page textarea (Local File Inclusion).
  • POST: Existing files can be overwritten with attacker-controlled content (Arbitrary File Write).

Attack Prerequisites

  • The attacker is an authenticated user
  • The attacker has Admin or higher privileges on the target repository
  • The attacker has the AllowGitHook permission (or is a site administrator)
  • The target file is readable/writable by the Gogs process OS permissions

Attack Scenario

  1. An attacker (with AllowGitHook + repository Admin privileges) accesses the Git hook edit URL
  2. A path containing ../ is supplied in :name, fully URL-encoded using %2f
  3. The server resolves custom_hooks/../../... without validation
  4. Arbitrary file contents are displayed and existing files can be overwritten

Potential Impact

  • Sensitive information disclosure: app.ini, databases, logs, environment variables, etc.
  • Configuration or data tampering: Overwriting existing files
  • Secondary impact: Extraction of SECRET_KEY and database credentials may allow token forging or further compromise
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.13.3"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "gogs.io/gogs"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.13.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-23633"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-06T18:14:51Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-06T18:15:56Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Vulnerability Description\n\nIn the endpoint:\n\n```\n/username/reponame/settings/hooks/git/:name\n```\n\nthe `:name` parameter:\n\n* Is URL-decoded by **macaron routing**, allowing decoded slashes (`/`)\n* Is then passed directly to:\n\n```go\ngit.Repository.Hook(\"custom_hooks\", name)\n```\n\nwhich internally resolves the path as:\n\n```go\nfilepath.Join(repoPath, \"custom_hooks\", name)\n```\n\nBecause no path sanitization is applied, supplying `../` sequences allows access to **arbitrary paths outside the repository**.\n\n### As a Result:\n\n* **GET:** Arbitrary file contents are displayed in the hook edit page textarea (**Local File Inclusion**).\n* **POST:** Existing files can be overwritten with attacker-controlled content (**Arbitrary File Write**).\n\n---\n\n## Attack Prerequisites\n\n* The attacker is an authenticated user\n* The attacker has **Admin or higher privileges** on the target repository\n* The attacker has the **AllowGitHook** permission (or is a site administrator)\n* The target file is readable/writable by the **Gogs process OS permissions**\n\n---\n\n## Attack Scenario\n\n1. An attacker (with AllowGitHook + repository Admin privileges) accesses the Git hook edit URL\n2. A path containing `../` is supplied in `:name`, fully URL-encoded using `%2f`\n3. The server resolves `custom_hooks/../../...` without validation\n4. Arbitrary file contents are displayed and existing files can be overwritten\n\n---\n\n## Potential Impact\n\n* **Sensitive information disclosure:** `app.ini`, databases, logs, environment variables, etc.\n* **Configuration or data tampering:** Overwriting existing files\n* **Secondary impact:** Extraction of `SECRET_KEY` and database credentials may allow token forging or further compromise",
  "id": "GHSA-mrph-w4hh-gx3g",
  "modified": "2026-02-06T19:06:58Z",
  "published": "2026-02-06T18:14:51Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs/security/advisories/GHSA-mrph-w4hh-gx3g"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23633"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs/commit/4894629903f9508fe85567c44f68804f008f1655"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs/releases/tag/v0.13.4"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Gogs has arbitrary file read/write via Path Traversal in Git hook editing"
}



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