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GHSA-P4XR-MFR6-CF8X

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-15 06:32 – Updated: 2026-08-17 06:33
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

geneve: gate GRO hint in geneve_gro_complete() on gs->gro_hint

geneve_gro_receive() reads the GRO hint through geneve_sk_gro_hint_off(), which honours it only when the socket enabled IFLA_GENEVE_GRO_HINT (gs->gro_hint). geneve_gro_complete() instead calls the low-level geneve_opt_gro_hint_off() and acts on the hint unconditionally.

On a tunnel without the hint, receive aggregates the frames as plain ETH_P_TEB while complete still honours an attacker-supplied hint option: it inflates gh_len by gro_hint->nested_hdr_len (u8) and redirects the dispatch type, so the inner gro_complete handler runs at nhoff + gh_len, an offset receive never pulled nor validated, reading out of bounds of the skb head:

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ipv6_gro_complete (net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c:196) Read of size 1 at addr ffff88800fe91980 by task exploit/153 ipv6_gro_complete (net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c:196) geneve_gro_complete (drivers/net/geneve.c:965) udp_gro_complete (net/ipv4/udp_offload.c:940) inet_gro_complete (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1621) __gro_flush (net/core/gro.c:306)

Gate the complete path on gs->gro_hint too via geneve_sk_gro_hint_off(), so both paths agree. Tunnels that enable the hint are unaffected.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-72408"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-15T06:22:14Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ngeneve: gate GRO hint in geneve_gro_complete() on gs-\u003egro_hint\n\ngeneve_gro_receive() reads the GRO hint through geneve_sk_gro_hint_off(),\nwhich honours it only when the socket enabled IFLA_GENEVE_GRO_HINT\n(gs-\u003egro_hint). geneve_gro_complete() instead calls the low-level\ngeneve_opt_gro_hint_off() and acts on the hint unconditionally.\n\nOn a tunnel without the hint, receive aggregates the frames as plain\nETH_P_TEB while complete still honours an attacker-supplied hint option: it\ninflates gh_len by gro_hint-\u003enested_hdr_len (u8) and redirects the dispatch\ntype, so the inner gro_complete handler runs at nhoff + gh_len, an offset\nreceive never pulled nor validated, reading out of bounds of the skb head:\n\n  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ipv6_gro_complete (net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c:196)\n  Read of size 1 at addr ffff88800fe91980 by task exploit/153\n   ipv6_gro_complete (net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c:196)\n   geneve_gro_complete (drivers/net/geneve.c:965)\n   udp_gro_complete (net/ipv4/udp_offload.c:940)\n   inet_gro_complete (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1621)\n   __gro_flush (net/core/gro.c:306)\n\nGate the complete path on gs-\u003egro_hint too via geneve_sk_gro_hint_off(), so\nboth paths agree. Tunnels that enable the hint are unaffected.",
  "id": "GHSA-p4xr-mfr6-cf8x",
  "modified": "2026-08-17T06:33:28Z",
  "published": "2026-08-15T06:32:23Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72408"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2651c174445884ac9e85622aeade9c1f7b98d8e5"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/49c2e7c0a69999a75ef5eaebe1559a20d0b3c15a"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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