ghsa-p52g-cm5j-mjv4
Vulnerability from github
Published
2023-02-08 22:31
Modified
2023-02-24 19:03
Summary
openssl-src subject to Timing Oracle in RSA Decryption
Details

A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption implementation which could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across a network in a Bleichenbacher style attack. To achieve a successful decryption an attacker would have to be able to send a very large number of trial messages for decryption. The vulnerability affects all RSA padding modes: PKCS#1 v1.5, RSA-OEAP and RSASVE.

For example, in a TLS connection, RSA is commonly used by a client to send an encrypted pre-master secret to the server. An attacker that had observed a genuine connection between a client and a server could use this flaw to send trial messages to the server and record the time taken to process them. After a sufficiently large number of messages the attacker could recover the pre-master secret used for the original connection and thus be able to decrypt the application data sent over that connection.

Show details on source website


{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "openssl-src"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "111.25.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "openssl-src"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "300.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "300.0.12"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-4304"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-203"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-02-08T22:31:42Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-02-08T20:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption implementation which could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across a network in a Bleichenbacher style attack. To achieve a successful decryption an attacker would have to be able to send a very large number of trial messages for decryption. The vulnerability affects all RSA padding modes: PKCS#1 v1.5, RSA-OEAP and RSASVE.\n\nFor example, in a TLS connection, RSA is commonly used by a client to send an encrypted pre-master secret to the server. An attacker that had observed a genuine connection between a client and a server could use this flaw to send trial messages to the server and record the time taken to process them. After a sufficiently large number of messages the attacker could recover the pre-master secret used for the original connection and thus be able to decrypt the application data sent over that connection.\n",
  "id": "GHSA-p52g-cm5j-mjv4",
  "modified": "2023-02-24T19:03:43Z",
  "published": "2023-02-08T22:31:42Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-4304"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2023-0007.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202402-08"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20230207.txt"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "openssl-src subject to Timing Oracle in RSA Decryption"
}


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