GHSA-P53F-Q495-P25H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-11 21:31 – Updated: 2026-09-14 15:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvme-tcp: reject a read that transferred too few bytes
nvme_tcp_recv_data() completes a request once the current C2HData PDU has been consumed. Nothing compares the total bytes received against the length the command asked for: struct nvme_tcp_request has no receive-side counter, queue->data_remaining is per queue, and blk_mq_end_request() completes for blk_rq_bytes(rq) unconditionally with no residual concept anywhere above.
A controller can therefore answer a 4096-byte read with 512 bytes and have it reported as a complete read; user space then gets 4096 bytes of which 3584 are whatever was already in the page. I reproduced that with a test target.
Count the bytes received and refuse to complete a successful read whose count does not match, at the two NVME_TCP_F_DATA_SUCCESS paths and in nvme_tcp_process_nvme_cqe(). The success test shifts req->status right by one, because the driver keeps the wire value there and shifts it on completion, so the check must see what the completion path will see. Only REQ_OP_READ is checked, because there the length comes from the sectors the request covers; a passthrough command is built by its submitter, which picks both command and buffer, so the kernel has nothing to compare against.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-89480"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-11T20:19:29Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnvme-tcp: reject a read that transferred too few bytes\n\nnvme_tcp_recv_data() completes a request once the current C2HData PDU\nhas been consumed. Nothing compares the total bytes received against\nthe length the command asked for: struct nvme_tcp_request has no\nreceive-side counter, queue-\u003edata_remaining is per queue, and\nblk_mq_end_request() completes for blk_rq_bytes(rq) unconditionally\nwith no residual concept anywhere above.\n\nA controller can therefore answer a 4096-byte read with 512 bytes and\nhave it reported as a complete read; user space then gets 4096 bytes of\nwhich 3584 are whatever was already in the page. I reproduced that with\na test target.\n\nCount the bytes received and refuse to complete a successful read whose\ncount does not match, at the two NVME_TCP_F_DATA_SUCCESS paths and in\nnvme_tcp_process_nvme_cqe(). The success test shifts req-\u003estatus right\nby one, because the driver keeps the wire value there and shifts it on\ncompletion, so the check must see what the completion path will see.\nOnly REQ_OP_READ is checked, because there the length comes from the\nsectors the request covers; a passthrough command is built by its\nsubmitter, which picks both command and buffer, so the kernel has\nnothing to compare against.",
"id": "GHSA-p53f-q495-p25h",
"modified": "2026-09-14T15:32:26Z",
"published": "2026-09-11T21:31:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89480"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7fa3f73f6c8ddc5f0425b50fb2a626a782ef7d12"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/832a685efeb5d925ee7d30011d2dbe45f81447a3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8a02ad98798fd01f51f648c1fdd8f3c9d07195d3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/99066cf9bba175f610ceb61a35f6fc9fbc33ff65"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a5c1bb0fb1bab2f24a081339c145870697f6d220"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/aa107e3a68f4af177d60f2d87679e7f67179a36c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fca3ebb63e5c82561cd9934365dcc0d068008006"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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