GHSA-P633-Q8R4-85R4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-06 09:31 – Updated: 2026-10-06 09:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: btmtksdio, btmtkuart: validate WMT event length before struct access
btmtksdio.c and btmtkuart.c cast a received WMT event straight to struct btmtk_hci_wmt_evt and read its op/flag fields without checking the event is long enough to contain them, unlike btmtk.c. The FUNC_CTRL case then further casts to struct btmtk_hci_wmt_evt_funcc and reads its 2-byte status field, again without a length check. Firmware that sends a short or malformed WMT event makes both drivers read past the end of the received SKB.
Mirror btmtk.c: validate the base WMT header with skb_pull_data() before touching any of its fields, and when a FUNC_CTRL event turns out to be the short, header-only form (a plain enable/disable ack with no status word), decode the result from the header's own flag byte instead (0 = success, otherwise failure).
Verified setup on MT7920, MT7921, MT7922 and MT7925: no regression.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-98292"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-06T09:18:19Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nBluetooth: btmtksdio, btmtkuart: validate WMT event length before struct access\n\nbtmtksdio.c and btmtkuart.c cast a received WMT event straight to\nstruct btmtk_hci_wmt_evt and read its op/flag fields without checking\nthe event is long enough to contain them, unlike btmtk.c. The\nFUNC_CTRL case then further casts to struct btmtk_hci_wmt_evt_funcc\nand reads its 2-byte status field, again without a length check.\nFirmware that sends a short or malformed WMT event makes both drivers\nread past the end of the received SKB.\n\nMirror btmtk.c: validate the base WMT header with skb_pull_data()\nbefore touching any of its fields, and when a FUNC_CTRL event turns\nout to be the short, header-only form (a plain enable/disable ack\nwith no status word), decode the result from the header\u0027s own flag\nbyte instead (0 = success, otherwise failure).\n\nVerified setup on MT7920, MT7921, MT7922 and MT7925: no regression.",
"id": "GHSA-p633-q8r4-85r4",
"modified": "2026-10-06T09:31:33Z",
"published": "2026-10-06T09:31:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98292"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5a5cfd8488c97e1b8939515429fe4c81e9f2df4f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8879e3e0a84a86954c855caceead4867e74a9a27"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.