GHSA-P6PW-XX6V-J4HH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-07 18:31 – Updated: 2026-08-08 03:31
VLAI
Details

Six Android App Widget configuration activities in the Datadog Android application are declared android:exported="true" with no permission guard: IncidentWidgetActivity, MonitorSavedViewWidgetActivity, OnCallShiftsWidgetActivity, OnCallPagesWidgetActivity, SloWidgetActivity, and DashboardWidgetActivity. All six extend a shared base WidgetActivity that reads AppWidgetManager.EXTRA_APPWIDGET_ID from Intent extras and, when no resolved deep-link destination is supplied, uses that caller-controlled widget ID to look up the stored widget definition, fetch the associated user session, and perform an automatic login with source UserSessionSourceLogin.Automatic. Android App Widget IDs are small sequential integers assigned by AppWidgetManager. A zero-permission co-installed application can brute-force them by launching any of the six configuration activities with EXTRA_APPWIDGET_ID set to 1..N until one matches a configured widget on the victim device. When a match occurs, the activity foregrounds with the victim's session already loaded and renders the widget configuration UI, which is backed by live data pickers (SLOs, dashboards, incident severities and types, on-call pages and shifts) fetched through the victim's authenticated HTTP client. Exfiltration is screen-visible only — programmatic return of data to the caller is not possible from these activities. Disclosure is therefore a visual side-channel: accessibility services, screen recording, or screenshot capture. Preconditions: a malicious co-installed application, at least one of the six widgets configured on the victim's home screen, and an active Datadog session cached locally.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-44965"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-926"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-07T18:17:14Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Six Android App Widget configuration activities in the Datadog Android application are declared android:exported=\"true\" with no permission guard: IncidentWidgetActivity, MonitorSavedViewWidgetActivity, OnCallShiftsWidgetActivity, OnCallPagesWidgetActivity, SloWidgetActivity, and DashboardWidgetActivity. All six extend a shared base WidgetActivity that reads AppWidgetManager.EXTRA_APPWIDGET_ID from Intent extras and, when no resolved deep-link destination is supplied, uses that caller-controlled widget ID to look up the stored widget definition, fetch the associated user session, and perform an automatic login with source UserSessionSourceLogin.Automatic.\nAndroid App Widget IDs are small sequential integers assigned by AppWidgetManager. A zero-permission co-installed application can brute-force them by launching any of the six configuration activities with EXTRA_APPWIDGET_ID set to 1..N until one matches a configured widget on the victim device. When a match occurs, the activity foregrounds with the victim\u0027s session already loaded and renders the widget configuration UI, which is backed by live data pickers (SLOs, dashboards, incident severities and types, on-call pages and shifts) fetched through the victim\u0027s authenticated HTTP client.\nExfiltration is screen-visible only \u2014 programmatic return of data to the caller is not possible from these activities. Disclosure is therefore a visual side-channel: accessibility services, screen recording, or screenshot capture. \nPreconditions: a malicious co-installed application, at least one of the six widgets configured on the victim\u0027s home screen, and an active Datadog session cached locally.",
  "id": "GHSA-p6pw-xx6v-j4hh",
  "modified": "2026-08-08T03:31:12Z",
  "published": "2026-08-07T18:31:46Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44965"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/926.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://developer.android.com/develop/ui/views/appwidgets/configuration"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://trust.datadoghq.com/?tcuUid=2e8b8fa5-39ca-43f4-9f6a-aeafafb440ef"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

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