GHSA-P8PC-4Q8F-R225
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-05-20 18:30 – Updated: 2025-11-14 18:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: ecdsa - Harden against integer overflows in DIV_ROUND_UP()
Herbert notes that DIV_ROUND_UP() may overflow unnecessarily if an ecdsa implementation's ->key_size() callback returns an unusually large value. Herbert instead suggests (for a division by 8):
X / 8 + !!(X & 7)
Based on this formula, introduce a generic DIV_ROUND_UP_POW2() macro and use it in lieu of DIV_ROUND_UP() for ->key_size() return values.
Additionally, use the macro in ecc_digits_from_bytes(), whose "nbytes" parameter is a ->key_size() return value in some instances, or a user-specified ASN.1 length in the case of ecdsa_get_signature_rs().
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-37984"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-190"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-05-20T18:15:45Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncrypto: ecdsa - Harden against integer overflows in DIV_ROUND_UP()\n\nHerbert notes that DIV_ROUND_UP() may overflow unnecessarily if an ecdsa\nimplementation\u0027s -\u003ekey_size() callback returns an unusually large value.\nHerbert instead suggests (for a division by 8):\n\n X / 8 + !!(X \u0026 7)\n\nBased on this formula, introduce a generic DIV_ROUND_UP_POW2() macro and\nuse it in lieu of DIV_ROUND_UP() for -\u003ekey_size() return values.\n\nAdditionally, use the macro in ecc_digits_from_bytes(), whose \"nbytes\"\nparameter is a -\u003ekey_size() return value in some instances, or a\nuser-specified ASN.1 length in the case of ecdsa_get_signature_rs().",
"id": "GHSA-p8pc-4q8f-r225",
"modified": "2025-11-14T18:31:20Z",
"published": "2025-05-20T18:30:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-37984"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/921b8167f10708e38080f84e195cdc68a7a561f1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b16510a530d1e6ab9683f04f8fb34f2e0f538275"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f02f0218be412cff1c844addf58e002071be298b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f2133b849ff273abddb6da622daddd8f6f6fa448"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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