GHSA-PFVC-3P5H-X7H6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-31 16:16 – Updated: 2026-07-31 16:16Impact
Type: Exposure of sensitive information / insufficiently protected credentials leading to privilege escalation and full node compromise.
Wings exposes its entire daemon configuration to the egg configuration-file
templating engine. When Wings renders a server's configuration files, any
{{config.<path>}} placeholder in a replacement value is resolved against the
full marshalled daemon configuration, with no restriction on which paths may be
read.
Because the Panel substitutes user-controlled egg variable values into these
replacements before sending them to Wings, a low-privileged user can smuggle a
{{config.*}} placeholder through a variable value. The placeholder is then
resolved by Wings and written into a file inside the user's own server, where it
can be read via the file manager or SFTP.
This allows reading, among other values:
{{config.token}}- the node's daemon token, which is both the API bearer for the Panel⇆Wings channel and the HMAC signing key for every JWT the node issues;{{config.token_id}};{{config.docker.registries}}- configured container-registry credentials.
Who is impacted: Any deployment where a user who is not fully trusted can set
an egg variable value (e.g. a server owner or a subuser with the startup.update
permission) and the server's egg renders a user-editable variable into a
configuration file via {{server.build.env.*}}. This pattern is common across
stock and community eggs, so most multi-tenant / shared-hosting deployments are
affected.
Resulting impact: Disclosure of the node daemon token lets the attacker forge authentication tokens and act against every server on that node, a full-node compromise reachable from a low-privileged account.
Patches
Yes. Fixed in Wings v1.12.3 (Panel is unaffected; the fix is Wings-only).
Wings no longer exposes its full configuration to the templating engine only an
explicit, non-secret subset (the Docker network interface) can be resolved by
{{config.*}} placeholders.
Users should upgrade Wings to v1.12.3 or later.
After upgrading, rotate the affected nodes' daemon tokens, since a previously
exfiltrated token remains valid until rotated (Admin → Nodes → Configuration →
reset the token, then re-deploy config.yml to the node).
Workarounds
For operators who cannot upgrade immediately:
- Audit your eggs and ensure no user-editable variable is rendered into a configuration file, or mark such variables non-editable.
These reduce exposure but are not a complete fix; upgrading Wings is the recommended action.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/pterodactyl/wings"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.12.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-52855"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-522"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-31T16:16:46Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\n**Type:** Exposure of sensitive information / insufficiently protected credentials\nleading to privilege escalation and full node compromise.\n\nWings exposes its **entire** daemon configuration to the egg configuration-file\ntemplating engine. When Wings renders a server\u0027s configuration files, any\n`{{config.\u003cpath\u003e}}` placeholder in a replacement value is resolved against the\nfull marshalled daemon configuration, with no restriction on which paths may be\nread.\n\nBecause the Panel substitutes **user-controlled** egg variable values into these\nreplacements before sending them to Wings, a low-privileged user can smuggle a\n`{{config.*}}` placeholder through a variable value. The placeholder is then\nresolved by Wings and written into a file inside the user\u0027s own server, where it\ncan be read via the file manager or SFTP.\n\nThis allows reading, among other values:\n\n- `{{config.token}}` - the node\u0027s daemon token, which is both the API bearer for\n\u00a0\u00a0the Panel\u21c6Wings channel **and** the HMAC signing key for every JWT the node\n\u00a0\u00a0issues;\n- `{{config.token_id}}`;\n- `{{config.docker.registries}}` - configured container-registry credentials.\n\n**Who is impacted:** Any deployment where a user who is not fully trusted can set\nan egg variable value (e.g. a server owner or a subuser with the `startup.update`\npermission) **and** the server\u0027s egg renders a user-editable variable into a\nconfiguration file via `{{server.build.env.*}}`. This pattern is common across\nstock and community eggs, so most multi-tenant / shared-hosting deployments are\naffected.\n\n**Resulting impact:** Disclosure of the node daemon token lets the attacker forge\nauthentication tokens and act against **every server on that node**, a full-node compromise reachable from a low-privileged\naccount.\n\n### Patches\n\nYes. Fixed in **Wings `v1.12.3`** (Panel is unaffected; the fix is Wings-only).\n\nWings no longer exposes its full configuration to the templating engine only an\nexplicit, non-secret subset (the Docker network interface) can be resolved by\n`{{config.*}}` placeholders.\n\nUsers should upgrade Wings to `v1.12.3` or later.\n\n**After upgrading, rotate the affected nodes\u0027 daemon tokens**, since a previously\nexfiltrated token remains valid until rotated (Admin \u2192 Nodes \u2192 Configuration \u2192\nreset the token, then re-deploy `config.yml` to the node).\n\n### Workarounds\n\nFor operators who cannot upgrade immediately:\n\n- Audit your eggs and ensure no **user-editable** variable is rendered into a\n\u00a0\u00a0configuration file, or mark such variables non-editable.\n\nThese reduce exposure but are not a complete fix; upgrading Wings is the\nrecommended action.",
"id": "GHSA-pfvc-3p5h-x7h6",
"modified": "2026-07-31T16:16:46Z",
"published": "2026-07-31T16:16:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pterodactyl/wings/security/advisories/GHSA-pfvc-3p5h-x7h6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pterodactyl/wings/commit/eb65e27ae077a63e38518c490768486af1cd86a9"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/pterodactyl/wings"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pterodactyl/wings/releases/tag/v1.12.3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Wings exposes node configuration secrets through egg configuration-file templating"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.