GHSA-PFX5-JW3V-F6MP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-25 12:31 – Updated: 2026-07-25 12:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: goodix - clamp the device-reported contact count
goodix_ts_read_input_report() copies the number of touch points reported by the device into an on-stack buffer
u8 point_data[2 + GOODIX_MAX_CONTACT_SIZE * GOODIX_MAX_CONTACTS];
which is sized for at most GOODIX_MAX_CONTACTS (10) contacts. The only runtime check bounds the per-interrupt count against ts->max_touch_num, but that value is taken verbatim from a 4-bit field of the device configuration block and is never clamped:
ts->max_touch_num = ts->config[MAX_CONTACTS_LOC] & 0x0f;
The nibble can be 0..15, so a malfunctioning, malicious or counterfeit controller (or an attacker tampering with the I2C bus) can advertise up to 15 contacts. goodix_ts_read_input_report() then accepts a touch_num of up to 15 and the second goodix_i2c_read() writes ts->contact_size * (touch_num - 1) bytes past the one-contact header into point_data - up to 30 bytes (45 with the 9-byte report format) beyond the 92-byte buffer: a stack out-of-bounds write.
Clamp max_touch_num to GOODIX_MAX_CONTACTS, the number of contacts point_data[] is sized for, when reading it from the configuration.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-64274"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-25T10:17:07Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nInput: goodix - clamp the device-reported contact count\n\ngoodix_ts_read_input_report() copies the number of touch points reported\nby the device into an on-stack buffer\n\n\tu8 point_data[2 + GOODIX_MAX_CONTACT_SIZE * GOODIX_MAX_CONTACTS];\n\nwhich is sized for at most GOODIX_MAX_CONTACTS (10) contacts. The only\nruntime check bounds the per-interrupt count against ts-\u003emax_touch_num,\nbut that value is taken verbatim from a 4-bit field of the device\nconfiguration block and is never clamped:\n\n\tts-\u003emax_touch_num = ts-\u003econfig[MAX_CONTACTS_LOC] \u0026 0x0f;\n\nThe nibble can be 0..15, so a malfunctioning, malicious or counterfeit\ncontroller (or an attacker tampering with the I2C bus) can advertise up\nto 15 contacts. goodix_ts_read_input_report() then accepts a touch_num\nof up to 15 and the second goodix_i2c_read() writes\nts-\u003econtact_size * (touch_num - 1) bytes past the one-contact header into\npoint_data - up to 30 bytes (45 with the 9-byte report format) beyond the\n92-byte buffer: a stack out-of-bounds write.\n\nClamp max_touch_num to GOODIX_MAX_CONTACTS, the number of contacts\npoint_data[] is sized for, when reading it from the configuration.",
"id": "GHSA-pfx5-jw3v-f6mp",
"modified": "2026-07-25T12:31:28Z",
"published": "2026-07-25T12:31:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64274"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2a67668690129953e898923260a2dd1c7c196495"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3b32303460155603d25444274856013d211d5e1f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/46addbd13dbf4aacb71cfbca964a5e552d0f45ae"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4bfea9c3a0981c1c7fc5d1a1b27197b2de247902"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5ed62a96e06be4e94b8296b7932afee550a70e04"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/719d1a2c83a46be6bf81af905e4f6adb3d32dc28"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/98b2caef249183b572c04451365246f919707845"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e825f352ef5271255cd08cc994b0dc25648a2f38"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Sightings
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