GHSA-PG97-JVMF-QFVC

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-16 15:45 – Updated: 2026-09-16 15:45
VLAI
Summary
djust has Cross-Site Request Forgery on the Server-Sent-Events transport: a cross-origin page can drive a victim-authenticated SSE session
Details

Impact

The SSE client→server POST endpoints are @csrf_exempt and the SSE GET stream endpoint had no Origin check, so a cross-origin page could drive a victim-cookie-authenticated SSE session: force the victim's browser to GET the stream URL (which creates and mounts a LiveView as the victim) and POST to the message endpoint with credentials: include to fire state-changing event handlers as the victim. The URL session_id is client-chosen (validated only for UUID format), so it is not a CSRF token, and a JSON body sent as text/plain is a CORS simple request with no preflight.

Patches

Fixed in djust 1.0.7. All three SSE endpoints validate the request Origin against ALLOWED_HOSTS (mirroring the WebSocket CSWSH defense) and reject cross-origin requests with 403; the POST endpoints additionally require Content-Type: application/json (415 otherwise), closing the text/plain simple-request bypass.

Workarounds

Disable the SSE transport, or front it with a proxy that enforces an Origin allowlist.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "djust"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.0.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-61593"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-352"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-16T15:45:03Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nThe SSE client\u2192server POST endpoints are `@csrf_exempt` and the SSE GET stream endpoint had no Origin check, so a cross-origin page could drive a victim-cookie-authenticated SSE session: force the victim\u0027s browser to GET the stream URL (which **creates and mounts** a LiveView as the victim) and POST to the message endpoint with `credentials: include` to **fire state-changing event handlers as the victim**. The URL `session_id` is client-chosen (validated only for UUID *format*), so it is not a CSRF token, and a JSON body sent as `text/plain` is a CORS *simple request* with no preflight.\n\n### Patches\nFixed in **djust 1.0.7**. All three SSE endpoints validate the request `Origin` against `ALLOWED_HOSTS` (mirroring the WebSocket CSWSH defense) and reject cross-origin requests with **403**; the POST endpoints additionally require `Content-Type: application/json` (**415** otherwise), closing the `text/plain` simple-request bypass.\n\n### Workarounds\nDisable the SSE transport, or front it with a proxy that enforces an Origin allowlist.",
  "id": "GHSA-pg97-jvmf-qfvc",
  "modified": "2026-09-16T15:45:03Z",
  "published": "2026-09-16T15:45:03Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/djust-org/djust/security/advisories/GHSA-pg97-jvmf-qfvc"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/djust-org/djust"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/djust-org/djust/releases/tag/v1.0.7"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "djust has Cross-Site Request Forgery on the Server-Sent-Events transport: a cross-origin page can drive a victim-authenticated SSE session"
}



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