GHSA-PGCV-8W9Q-57F9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-11 21:31 – Updated: 2026-09-13 09:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: validate directory-index entry counts when reading metadata
ocfs2_validate_dx_leaf() and ocfs2_validate_dx_root() check the ECC and signature of an indexed-directory block before it reaches higher-level callers, but neither validator bounds the ocfs2_dx_entry_list counts against the capacity of the block that holds them.
ocfs2_dx_dir_search() then walks
for (i = 0; i < le16_to_cpu(entry_list->de_num_used); i++)
dx_entry = &entry_list->de_entries[i];
over de_num_used entries with no bounds check. entry_list is either dx_leaf->dl_list (from ocfs2_read_dx_leaf) or, for an inline root, dx_root->dr_entries. A crafted on-disk image can set de_num_used (and de_count, which is the __counted_by_le() bound of de_entries) to 0xffff and make the walk read far past the end of the 4KB metadata block, giving a slab out-of-bounds read reachable from any path lookup, stat() or open() on an indexed directory once the image is mounted.
Commit 775c17386a6f ("ocfs2: validate dx_root extent list fields during block read") already bounds dr_list for the non-inline dx_root, but left the inline dr_entries path and the dx_leaf dl_list unchecked. Add the same read-time validation for both entry lists: de_count must equal the capacity of the block (ocfs2_dx_entries_per_leaf()/per_root()) and de_num_used must not exceed de_count, rejecting corrupted metadata with -EFSCORRUPTED before ocfs2_dx_dir_search() can walk an out-of-range entry array.
de_count is always written as exactly the block capacity when a leaf or inline root is formatted, so the equality check does not reject any valid image.
Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-89492"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-11T20:19:31Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nocfs2: validate directory-index entry counts when reading metadata\n\nocfs2_validate_dx_leaf() and ocfs2_validate_dx_root() check the ECC and\nsignature of an indexed-directory block before it reaches higher-level\ncallers, but neither validator bounds the ocfs2_dx_entry_list counts\nagainst the capacity of the block that holds them.\n\nocfs2_dx_dir_search() then walks\n\n\tfor (i = 0; i \u003c le16_to_cpu(entry_list-\u003ede_num_used); i++)\n\t\tdx_entry = \u0026entry_list-\u003ede_entries[i];\n\nover de_num_used entries with no bounds check. entry_list is either\ndx_leaf-\u003edl_list (from ocfs2_read_dx_leaf) or, for an inline root,\ndx_root-\u003edr_entries. A crafted on-disk image can set de_num_used (and\nde_count, which is the __counted_by_le() bound of de_entries) to 0xffff\nand make the walk read far past the end of the 4KB metadata block, giving\na slab out-of-bounds read reachable from any path lookup, stat() or open()\non an indexed directory once the image is mounted.\n\nCommit 775c17386a6f (\"ocfs2: validate dx_root extent list fields during\nblock read\") already bounds dr_list for the non-inline dx_root, but left\nthe inline dr_entries path and the dx_leaf dl_list unchecked. Add the\nsame read-time validation for both entry lists: de_count must equal the\ncapacity of the block (ocfs2_dx_entries_per_leaf()/per_root()) and\nde_num_used must not exceed de_count, rejecting corrupted metadata with\n-EFSCORRUPTED before ocfs2_dx_dir_search() can walk an out-of-range entry\narray.\n\nde_count is always written as exactly the block capacity when a leaf or\ninline root is formatted, so the equality check does not reject any valid\nimage.\n\nFound by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai).",
"id": "GHSA-pgcv-8w9q-57f9",
"modified": "2026-09-13T09:32:13Z",
"published": "2026-09-11T21:31:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89492"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b8a5c0c32df2c5b685ceef76ac77e37c7e1dc3ed"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bc70726ddad53c7e9a9a85915bf2415b0d4f42f9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fcfcba8fe17dbf2c8805690b8cc25e32d81249a4"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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