GHSA-PH8W-WRCH-H8V5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-19 18:31 – Updated: 2026-07-20 15:32
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ipv6: ioam: refresh hdr pointer before ioam6_event()

Reported by Sashiko:

In ipv6_hop_ioam(), the hdr pointer is initialized to point into the skb's linear data buffer. Later, the code calls skb_ensure_writable(), which might reallocate the buffer:

if (skb_ensure_writable(skb, optoff + 2 + hdr->opt_len))
    goto drop;

/* Trace pointer may have changed */
trace = (struct ioam6_trace_hdr *)(skb_network_header(skb)
                   + optoff + sizeof(*hdr));

ioam6_fill_trace_data(skb, ns, trace, true);

ioam6_event(IOAM6_EVENT_TRACE, dev_net(skb->dev),
        GFP_ATOMIC, (void *)trace, hdr->opt_len - 2);

If the skb is cloned or lacks sufficient linear headroom, skb_ensure_writable() will invoke pskb_expand_head(), which reallocates the skb's data buffer and frees the old one, invalidating pointers to it. While the code recalculates the trace pointer immediately after the call to skb_ensure_writable(), it fails to recalculate the hdr pointer.

This patch fixes the above by recalculating the hdr pointer before passing hdr->opt_len to ioam6_event(), so that we avoid any UaF.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-64132"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-416"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-19T16:17:55Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nipv6: ioam: refresh hdr pointer before ioam6_event()\n\nReported by Sashiko:\n\nIn ipv6_hop_ioam(), the hdr pointer is initialized to point into the\nskb\u0027s linear data buffer. Later, the code calls skb_ensure_writable(),\nwhich might reallocate the buffer:\n\n\tif (skb_ensure_writable(skb, optoff + 2 + hdr-\u003eopt_len))\n\t\tgoto drop;\n\n\t/* Trace pointer may have changed */\n\ttrace = (struct ioam6_trace_hdr *)(skb_network_header(skb)\n\t\t\t\t\t   + optoff + sizeof(*hdr));\n\n\tioam6_fill_trace_data(skb, ns, trace, true);\n\n\tioam6_event(IOAM6_EVENT_TRACE, dev_net(skb-\u003edev),\n\t\t    GFP_ATOMIC, (void *)trace, hdr-\u003eopt_len - 2);\n\nIf the skb is cloned or lacks sufficient linear headroom,\nskb_ensure_writable() will invoke pskb_expand_head(), which reallocates\nthe skb\u0027s data buffer and frees the old one, invalidating pointers to\nit. While the code recalculates the trace pointer immediately after the\ncall to skb_ensure_writable(), it fails to recalculate the hdr pointer.\n\nThis patch fixes the above by recalculating the hdr pointer before\npassing hdr-\u003eopt_len to ioam6_event(), so that we avoid any UaF.",
  "id": "GHSA-ph8w-wrch-h8v5",
  "modified": "2026-07-20T15:32:01Z",
  "published": "2026-07-19T18:31:53Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64132"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/24de676da63c1122d2c13b0d546238b66d1b4e62"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5af905aa8e91ff8d94572a1e089558f21dcf24ed"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/769723124b7c3b2bfea4cf68ad292698b87c8d01"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e46e6bc97fb1f339730ff1ba74267fbf48e7a422"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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