GHSA-PJ3J-HRQ9-5J4F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-10 15:33 – Updated: 2026-08-19 18:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mac802154: llsec: reject frames shorter than the authentication tag
llsec_do_decrypt_auth() computes the associated-data length for the AEAD request as
assoclen += datalen - authlen;
where datalen is the number of bytes after the MAC header and authlen (4, 8 or 16) is the length of the authentication tag. Nothing verifies that the frame actually carries at least authlen payload bytes. A secured frame whose payload is shorter than the tag makes datalen - authlen negative; assoclen is then passed to aead_request_set_ad() as an unsigned value close to 4 GiB, so crypto_aead_decrypt() walks far off the end of the scatterlist that only spans the real frame.
The frame is fully attacker-controlled and reaches this path from any IEEE 802.15.4 peer in radio range. Reject frames whose payload is shorter than the authentication tag before the subtraction.
Dynamically reproduced on a KASAN kernel as a general-protection-fault in the AEAD scatterwalk, and the fix confirmed.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-68125"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-10T13:19:57Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmac802154: llsec: reject frames shorter than the authentication tag\n\nllsec_do_decrypt_auth() computes the associated-data length for the\nAEAD request as\n\n\tassoclen += datalen - authlen;\n\nwhere datalen is the number of bytes after the MAC header and authlen\n(4, 8 or 16) is the length of the authentication tag. Nothing verifies\nthat the frame actually carries at least authlen payload bytes. A\nsecured frame whose payload is shorter than the tag makes\ndatalen - authlen negative; assoclen is then passed to\naead_request_set_ad() as an unsigned value close to 4 GiB, so\ncrypto_aead_decrypt() walks far off the end of the scatterlist that\nonly spans the real frame.\n\nThe frame is fully attacker-controlled and reaches this path from any\nIEEE 802.15.4 peer in radio range. Reject frames whose payload is\nshorter than the authentication tag before the subtraction.\n\nDynamically reproduced on a KASAN kernel as a general-protection-fault\nin the AEAD scatterwalk, and the fix confirmed.",
"id": "GHSA-pj3j-hrq9-5j4f",
"modified": "2026-08-19T18:32:05Z",
"published": "2026-08-10T15:33:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68125"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2d6b42a61373144298070668fddf06efe79cf2ff"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5bbf0cd9b6a7076af86c75e87e180099be2e11ae"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/de80808f37d99c6dc67bb6f97eea00c8f57a8821"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e09e0301d616c1ef38a5e64e8e4326fd39df13cc"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ec7e62d77193131227df49d654d118fdf5a59892"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f20dedce0429b293d4bad604e0d3f65d8ac96c83"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f27ce82eb04960465df71634b196a48a4ecafd50"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fd3a3f28ed60c6af4b2a39933b151d6b27842c3b"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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