GHSA-PMCV-MGCF-RVXG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-06-16 23:51 – Updated: 2022-06-16 23:51
VLAI?
Summary
Non-aligned u32 read in Chacha20 encryption and decryption
Details

The implementation does not enforce alignment requirements on input slices while incorrectly assuming 4-byte alignment through an unsafe call to std::slice::from_raw_parts_mut, which breaks the contract and introduces undefined behavior.

This affects Chacha20 encryption and decryption in crypto2.

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "crypto2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "0.1.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2022-06-16T23:51:32Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The implementation does not enforce alignment requirements on input slices while incorrectly assuming 4-byte alignment through an unsafe call to `std::slice::from_raw_parts_mut`, which breaks the contract and introduces undefined behavior.\n\nThis affects Chacha20 encryption and decryption in crypto2.\n",
  "id": "GHSA-pmcv-mgcf-rvxg",
  "modified": "2022-06-16T23:51:32Z",
  "published": "2022-06-16T23:51:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/shadowsocks/crypto2/issues/27"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/shadowsocks/crypto2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2021-0121.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [],
  "summary": "Non-aligned u32 read in Chacha20 encryption and decryption"
}


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