GHSA-PXXC-GX8X-H7J2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-24 18:31 – Updated: 2026-09-24 18:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: fix to zero post-EOF data when extending file size
generic/794 4s ... - output mismatch (see /share/git/fstests/results//generic/794.out.bad) --- tests/generic/794.out 2026-06-12 08:46:32.766426241 +0800 +++ /share/git/fstests/results//generic/794.out.bad 2026-07-05 18:32:55.000000000 +0800 @@ -1,4 +1,16 @@ QA output created by 794 append_write +FAIL: non-zero data in gap [4080,4096) after shutdown+remount +000000 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a >ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ< +* +001000 truncate_up ... (Run 'diff -u /share/git/fstests/tests/generic/794.out /share/git/fstests/results//generic/794.out.bad' to see the entire diff) Ran: generic/794 Failures: generic/794 Failed 1 of 1 tests
Steps of generic/794: 1. write 4096 bytes to file w/ 0x5a 2. use fiemap to get PBA of first block in file 3. truncate file to 4080 4. umount; write 4096 bytes to file w/ 0x5a directly via PBA; mount 5. extend filesize via a) append 4096 from offset 4096, or b) truncate 8192, or c) fallocate 4096 from offset 4096 6. verify the gap is zeroed in memory [4080,4096) 7. sync range 4096 from offset 4096; shutdown -f (flush meta before shutdown) 8. umount; mount; verify [4080,4096) is zeroed or not.
When extending file size (e.g. via truncate, fallocate, or write) across an unaligned EOF boundary, we need to ensure that post-EOF data in the partial page is zeroed out in pagecache and marked dirty, then writeback the cache to persist zeroed data before committing inode w/ updated i_size.
This help to prevent stale disk data beyond the previous EOF from being exposed after remounting or crash recovery.
Since f2fs is a LFS filesystem, we only support direct write via PBA in pinfile, and pinfile has section-aligned filesize, so in Android, there should no problem, but for other usage in different environment, let's fix this w/ fsync_mode=strict mount option.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-93235"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-24T16:17:19Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nf2fs: fix to zero post-EOF data when extending file size\n\ngeneric/794 4s ... - output mismatch (see /share/git/fstests/results//generic/794.out.bad)\n --- tests/generic/794.out 2026-06-12 08:46:32.766426241 +0800\n +++ /share/git/fstests/results//generic/794.out.bad 2026-07-05 18:32:55.000000000 +0800\n @@ -1,4 +1,16 @@\n QA output created by 794\n append_write\n +FAIL: non-zero data in gap [4080,4096) after shutdown+remount\n +000000 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a \u003eZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ\u003c\n +*\n +001000\n truncate_up\n ...\n (Run \u0027diff -u /share/git/fstests/tests/generic/794.out /share/git/fstests/results//generic/794.out.bad\u0027 to see the entire diff)\nRan: generic/794\nFailures: generic/794\nFailed 1 of 1 tests\n\nSteps of generic/794:\n1. write 4096 bytes to file w/ 0x5a\n2. use fiemap to get PBA of first block in file\n3. truncate file to 4080\n4. umount; write 4096 bytes to file w/ 0x5a directly via PBA; mount\n5. extend filesize via\n a) append 4096 from offset 4096, or\n b) truncate 8192, or\n c) fallocate 4096 from offset 4096\n6. verify the gap is zeroed in memory [4080,4096)\n7. sync range 4096 from offset 4096; shutdown -f (flush meta before shutdown)\n8. umount; mount; verify [4080,4096) is zeroed or not.\n\nWhen extending file size (e.g. via truncate, fallocate, or write) across an\nunaligned EOF boundary, we need to ensure that post-EOF data in the partial\npage is zeroed out in pagecache and marked dirty, then writeback the cache to\npersist zeroed data before committing inode w/ updated i_size.\n\nThis help to prevent stale disk data beyond the previous EOF from being exposed\nafter remounting or crash recovery.\n\nSince f2fs is a LFS filesystem, we only support direct write via PBA in pinfile,\nand pinfile has section-aligned filesize, so in Android, there should no problem,\nbut for other usage in different environment, let\u0027s fix this w/ fsync_mode=strict\nmount option.",
"id": "GHSA-pxxc-gx8x-h7j2",
"modified": "2026-09-24T18:31:23Z",
"published": "2026-09-24T18:31:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-93235"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/32c7f11a24268ba8d3bb50ea7f54d33f698cd253"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5eced87b7d19dbc76ebdddaf322046f9ac582fcb"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6882d458d2e403f6ba7b45542dd31a6b7531eb2e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/91ec55ddc097ccddd25ffb95a3d079b2ef362372"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c42608c09b6b5d5967bf211c255914c068c2cde1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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