GHSA-Q4Q8-9C96-GJ73
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-11 21:31 – Updated: 2026-09-13 09:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ceph: fix leaked inode reference on writeback abort at umount
ceph_dirty_folio() takes a wrbuffer claim on each newly dirtied folio: it bumps i_wrbuffer_ref (taking an ihold() on the 0->1 transition) and attaches the snap_context to folio->private. That claim is released only by ceph_put_wrbuffer_cap_refs(), which for a submitted write runs from writepages_finish().
In ceph_submit_write(), if ceph_inc_osd_stopping_blocker() fails -- which happens during umount -- the request is aborted before submission: the already-collected folios are only redirtied and unlocked, so writepages_finish() never runs and the claim is leaked. redirty_page_for_writepage() -> folio_redirty_for_writepage() -> filemap_dirty_folio() sets PG_dirty directly and does not go through ->dirty_folio, so ceph_dirty_folio() is not re-entered to rebalance it. Because every subsequent writeback also fails the osd_stopping_blocker, i_wrbuffer_ref never returns to 0, the ihold() is never dropped, and the inode cannot be evicted:
VFS: Busy inodes after unmount of ceph kernel BUG at fs/super.c:650!
Release the orphaned claim in the abort path before redirtying, via ceph_undo_wrbuffer_claim(): detach the snap_context, drop the wrbuffer reference (letting i_wrbuffer_ref reach 0 and iput() the inode), and drop the snap_context reference -- i.e. do what writepages_finish() would have done for these never-submitted folios.
Only the locked_pages entries are undone; folios still in the fbatch were never dirty-cleared by this call (folio_clear_dirty_for_io() is the ownership-transfer point, and a successful move NULLs the fbatch slot), so they hold no claim this call owns.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-89646"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-11T20:19:50Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nceph: fix leaked inode reference on writeback abort at umount\n\nceph_dirty_folio() takes a wrbuffer claim on each newly dirtied folio: it\nbumps i_wrbuffer_ref (taking an ihold() on the 0-\u003e1 transition) and\nattaches the snap_context to folio-\u003eprivate. That claim is released only\nby ceph_put_wrbuffer_cap_refs(), which for a submitted write runs from\nwritepages_finish().\n\nIn ceph_submit_write(), if ceph_inc_osd_stopping_blocker() fails -- which\nhappens during umount -- the request is aborted before submission: the\nalready-collected folios are only redirtied and unlocked, so\nwritepages_finish() never runs and the claim is leaked.\nredirty_page_for_writepage() -\u003e folio_redirty_for_writepage() -\u003e\nfilemap_dirty_folio() sets PG_dirty directly and does not go through\n-\u003edirty_folio, so ceph_dirty_folio() is not re-entered to rebalance it.\nBecause every subsequent writeback also fails the osd_stopping_blocker,\ni_wrbuffer_ref never returns to 0, the ihold() is never dropped, and the\ninode cannot be evicted:\n\n VFS: Busy inodes after unmount of ceph\n kernel BUG at fs/super.c:650!\n\nRelease the orphaned claim in the abort path before redirtying, via\nceph_undo_wrbuffer_claim(): detach the snap_context, drop the wrbuffer\nreference (letting i_wrbuffer_ref reach 0 and iput() the inode), and drop\nthe snap_context reference -- i.e. do what writepages_finish() would have\ndone for these never-submitted folios.\n\nOnly the locked_pages entries are undone; folios still in the fbatch were\nnever dirty-cleared by this call (folio_clear_dirty_for_io() is the\nownership-transfer point, and a successful move NULLs the fbatch slot), so\nthey hold no claim this call owns.",
"id": "GHSA-q4q8-9c96-gj73",
"modified": "2026-09-13T09:32:26Z",
"published": "2026-09-11T21:31:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89646"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ac7a5a5385762df458d10cccc086a4e079be7409"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c25aee9c630fb86f98d79eccb75765067079b972"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ec32015a955c5d326c5e26610edfdcccd52f2314"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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