GHSA-Q4VM-PQ3Q-8WGQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-14 20:17 – Updated: 2026-07-14 20:17
VLAI
Summary
nebula-mesh: Operator session tokens stored in plaintext in the database
Details

Impact

Operator session tokens are stored in plaintext in the operator_sessions table (the token column is the PRIMARY KEY). The session token is a 32-byte random hex value sent directly in a cookie and valid for 24 hours.

  • internal/models/operator.go:61OperatorSession.Token holds the plaintext token.
  • internal/store/sqlite_operators.go:590CreateOperatorSession inserts sess.Token verbatim.
  • internal/store/sqlite_operators.go:603,642,681,698 — lookups/updates/deletes use WHERE token = ? against the plaintext value.

Anyone who can read the database (backup, snapshot, file copy, or SQL-level disclosure) obtains every active session token and can hijack operator sessions directly, with no further authentication.

This is functionally identical to the plaintext enrollment-token issue fixed in GHSA-ghmh-jhmj-wcmf. API keys (OperatorAPIKey.KeyHash) and enrollment tokens (EnrollmentToken.TokenHash) already store only a SHA256 hash; session tokens were missed.

Patches

Store only a SHA256 hash of the session token, mirroring API keys and enrollment tokens: 1. Add a HashSessionToken helper (alongside the existing token-hash helpers). 2. Migration to add a token_hash column. 3. Update CreateOperatorSession, PromoteOperatorSession, and GetOperatorBySession to write/look up by hash. 4. Drop the plaintext token column in a follow-up migration.

Sessions are ephemeral (24h TTL), so all active sessions can be invalidated on deployment — no backward compatibility needed.

Workarounds

Restrict and encrypt database backups; rotate the operator database. These mitigate exposure but do not fix the underlying storage of plaintext tokens.

Resources

  • internal/models/operator.go:58-66
  • internal/store/sqlite_operators.go:577-698
  • Migration 005_operators.up.sql:27
  • Prior related advisory: GHSA-ghmh-jhmj-wcmf
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.3.7"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.3.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-53603"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-312",
      "CWE-522"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-14T20:17:04Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Impact\n\nOperator session tokens are stored in plaintext in the `operator_sessions` table (the `token` column is the PRIMARY KEY). The session token is a 32-byte random hex value sent directly in a cookie and valid for 24 hours.\n\n- `internal/models/operator.go:61` \u2014 `OperatorSession.Token` holds the plaintext token.\n- `internal/store/sqlite_operators.go:590` \u2014 `CreateOperatorSession` inserts `sess.Token` verbatim.\n- `internal/store/sqlite_operators.go:603,642,681,698` \u2014 lookups/updates/deletes use `WHERE token = ?` against the plaintext value.\n\nAnyone who can read the database (backup, snapshot, file copy, or SQL-level disclosure) obtains every active session token and can hijack operator sessions directly, with no further authentication.\n\nThis is functionally identical to the plaintext enrollment-token issue fixed in GHSA-ghmh-jhmj-wcmf. API keys (`OperatorAPIKey.KeyHash`) and enrollment tokens (`EnrollmentToken.TokenHash`) already store only a SHA256 hash; session tokens were missed.\n\n## Patches\n\nStore only a SHA256 hash of the session token, mirroring API keys and enrollment tokens:\n1. Add a `HashSessionToken` helper (alongside the existing token-hash helpers).\n2. Migration to add a `token_hash` column.\n3. Update `CreateOperatorSession`, `PromoteOperatorSession`, and `GetOperatorBySession` to write/look up by hash.\n4. Drop the plaintext `token` column in a follow-up migration.\n\nSessions are ephemeral (24h TTL), so all active sessions can be invalidated on deployment \u2014 no backward compatibility needed.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nRestrict and encrypt database backups; rotate the operator database. These mitigate exposure but do not fix the underlying storage of plaintext tokens.\n\n## Resources\n\n- `internal/models/operator.go:58-66`\n- `internal/store/sqlite_operators.go:577-698`\n- Migration `005_operators.up.sql:27`\n- Prior related advisory: GHSA-ghmh-jhmj-wcmf",
  "id": "GHSA-q4vm-pq3q-8wgq",
  "modified": "2026-07-14T20:17:04Z",
  "published": "2026-07-14T20:17:04Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh/security/advisories/GHSA-q4vm-pq3q-8wgq"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh/commit/7cb01bab281ded557f8b6c81dab5f48d4c10182e"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh/releases/tag/v0.3.8"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "nebula-mesh: Operator session tokens stored in plaintext in the database"
}



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