GHSA-Q4VM-PQ3Q-8WGQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-14 20:17 – Updated: 2026-07-14 20:17Impact
Operator session tokens are stored in plaintext in the operator_sessions table (the token column is the PRIMARY KEY). The session token is a 32-byte random hex value sent directly in a cookie and valid for 24 hours.
internal/models/operator.go:61—OperatorSession.Tokenholds the plaintext token.internal/store/sqlite_operators.go:590—CreateOperatorSessioninsertssess.Tokenverbatim.internal/store/sqlite_operators.go:603,642,681,698— lookups/updates/deletes useWHERE token = ?against the plaintext value.
Anyone who can read the database (backup, snapshot, file copy, or SQL-level disclosure) obtains every active session token and can hijack operator sessions directly, with no further authentication.
This is functionally identical to the plaintext enrollment-token issue fixed in GHSA-ghmh-jhmj-wcmf. API keys (OperatorAPIKey.KeyHash) and enrollment tokens (EnrollmentToken.TokenHash) already store only a SHA256 hash; session tokens were missed.
Patches
Store only a SHA256 hash of the session token, mirroring API keys and enrollment tokens:
1. Add a HashSessionToken helper (alongside the existing token-hash helpers).
2. Migration to add a token_hash column.
3. Update CreateOperatorSession, PromoteOperatorSession, and GetOperatorBySession to write/look up by hash.
4. Drop the plaintext token column in a follow-up migration.
Sessions are ephemeral (24h TTL), so all active sessions can be invalidated on deployment — no backward compatibility needed.
Workarounds
Restrict and encrypt database backups; rotate the operator database. These mitigate exposure but do not fix the underlying storage of plaintext tokens.
Resources
internal/models/operator.go:58-66internal/store/sqlite_operators.go:577-698- Migration
005_operators.up.sql:27 - Prior related advisory: GHSA-ghmh-jhmj-wcmf
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.3.7"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.3.8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-53603"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-312",
"CWE-522"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-14T20:17:04Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Impact\n\nOperator session tokens are stored in plaintext in the `operator_sessions` table (the `token` column is the PRIMARY KEY). The session token is a 32-byte random hex value sent directly in a cookie and valid for 24 hours.\n\n- `internal/models/operator.go:61` \u2014 `OperatorSession.Token` holds the plaintext token.\n- `internal/store/sqlite_operators.go:590` \u2014 `CreateOperatorSession` inserts `sess.Token` verbatim.\n- `internal/store/sqlite_operators.go:603,642,681,698` \u2014 lookups/updates/deletes use `WHERE token = ?` against the plaintext value.\n\nAnyone who can read the database (backup, snapshot, file copy, or SQL-level disclosure) obtains every active session token and can hijack operator sessions directly, with no further authentication.\n\nThis is functionally identical to the plaintext enrollment-token issue fixed in GHSA-ghmh-jhmj-wcmf. API keys (`OperatorAPIKey.KeyHash`) and enrollment tokens (`EnrollmentToken.TokenHash`) already store only a SHA256 hash; session tokens were missed.\n\n## Patches\n\nStore only a SHA256 hash of the session token, mirroring API keys and enrollment tokens:\n1. Add a `HashSessionToken` helper (alongside the existing token-hash helpers).\n2. Migration to add a `token_hash` column.\n3. Update `CreateOperatorSession`, `PromoteOperatorSession`, and `GetOperatorBySession` to write/look up by hash.\n4. Drop the plaintext `token` column in a follow-up migration.\n\nSessions are ephemeral (24h TTL), so all active sessions can be invalidated on deployment \u2014 no backward compatibility needed.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nRestrict and encrypt database backups; rotate the operator database. These mitigate exposure but do not fix the underlying storage of plaintext tokens.\n\n## Resources\n\n- `internal/models/operator.go:58-66`\n- `internal/store/sqlite_operators.go:577-698`\n- Migration `005_operators.up.sql:27`\n- Prior related advisory: GHSA-ghmh-jhmj-wcmf",
"id": "GHSA-q4vm-pq3q-8wgq",
"modified": "2026-07-14T20:17:04Z",
"published": "2026-07-14T20:17:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh/security/advisories/GHSA-q4vm-pq3q-8wgq"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh/commit/7cb01bab281ded557f8b6c81dab5f48d4c10182e"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh/releases/tag/v0.3.8"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "nebula-mesh: Operator session tokens stored in plaintext in the database"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.