GHSA-Q62H-354G-5R85

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-02 20:31 – Updated: 2026-07-02 20:31
VLAI
Summary
Steeltoe's env sanitizer misses connection strings — leaks embedded DB passwords
Details

Summary

The Sanitizer component in the Environment actuator redacts configuration values by matching the configuration key name against a suffix list. The default list (password, secret, key, token, .*credentials.*, vcap_services) does not cover the standard .NET pattern ConnectionStrings:<name> or Steeltoe Connectors' Steeltoe:Client:<type>:Default:ConnectionString. There is no value-based scrubbing, so full connection string values including embedded Password= and user:pass@host segments are returned verbatim in /actuator/env responses.

Impact

Any caller who can reach /actuator/env can receive connection strings containing plaintext credentials. Those credentials enable direct connection to the backing database, bypassing the application tier.

Affected configuration

  • Application configuration contains credentials in ConnectionStrings:* or *:ConnectionString keys.
  • On standard deployments: env is added to Management:Endpoints:Actuator:Exposure:Include. This is not the default.
  • On Cloud Foundry: the /cloudfoundryapplication/env path is accessible to any authenticated CF user with read_basic_data permissions (Space Auditor and above) regardless of the exposure configuration.

Mitigations

If an immediate upgrade is not possible:

  • On the standard path, remove env from the actuator exposure list.
  • Add .*connectionstring.* to KeysToSanitize as a defense-in-depth measure for both paths.
  • Require authorization on actuator endpoints.
Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.1.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Steeltoe.Management.Endpoint"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.2.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.3.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Steeltoe.Management.EndpointCore"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.4.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-50200"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200",
      "CWE-319"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-02T20:31:11Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-17T22:16:24Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThe `Sanitizer` component in the Environment actuator redacts configuration values by matching the configuration key name against a suffix list. The default list (`password`, `secret`, `key`, `token`, `.*credentials.*`, `vcap_services`) does not cover the standard .NET pattern `ConnectionStrings:\u003cname\u003e` or Steeltoe Connectors\u0027 `Steeltoe:Client:\u003ctype\u003e:Default:ConnectionString`. There is no value-based scrubbing, so full connection string values including embedded `Password=` and `user:pass@host` segments are returned verbatim in `/actuator/env` responses.\n\n### Impact\n\nAny caller who can reach `/actuator/env` can receive connection strings containing plaintext credentials. Those credentials enable direct connection to the backing database, bypassing the application tier.\n\n### Affected configuration\n\n- Application configuration contains credentials in `ConnectionStrings:*` or `*:ConnectionString` keys.\n- On standard deployments: `env` is added to `Management:Endpoints:Actuator:Exposure:Include`. This is not the default.\n- On Cloud Foundry: the `/cloudfoundryapplication/env` path is accessible to any authenticated CF user with `read_basic_data` permissions (Space Auditor and above) regardless of the exposure configuration.\n\n### Mitigations\n\nIf an immediate upgrade is not possible:\n\n- On the standard path, remove `env` from the actuator exposure list.\n- Add `.*connectionstring.*` to `KeysToSanitize` as a defense-in-depth measure for both paths.\n- Require authorization on actuator endpoints.",
  "id": "GHSA-q62h-354g-5r85",
  "modified": "2026-07-02T20:31:11Z",
  "published": "2026-07-02T20:31:11Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/SteeltoeOSS/security-advisories/security/advisories/GHSA-q62h-354g-5r85"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-50200"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/SteeltoeOSS/Steeltoe/commit/bef9f14b710232fca3fbe87e48fdd1b9e6b60d43"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/SteeltoeOSS/Steeltoe/commit/e50cd31a429b191841120f0d38fa9dda8f751b0a"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/SteeltoeOSS/Steeltoe"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Steeltoe\u0027s env sanitizer misses connection strings \u2014 leaks embedded DB passwords"
}



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