GHSA-Q6PP-3Q54-QW37
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:11 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:11In Go before 1.10.6 and 1.11.x before 1.11.3, the "go get" command is vulnerable to remote code execution when executed with the -u flag and the import path of a malicious Go package, or a package that imports it directly or indirectly. Specifically, it is only vulnerable in GOPATH mode, but not in module mode (the distinction is documented at https://golang.org/cmd/go/#hdr-Module_aware_go_get). Using custom domains, it's possible to arrange things so that a Git repository is cloned to a folder named ".git" by using a vanity import path that ends with "/.git". If the Git repository root contains a "HEAD" file, a "config" file, an "objects" directory, a "refs" directory, with some work to ensure the proper ordering of operations, "go get -u" can be tricked into considering the parent directory as a repository root, and running Git commands on it. That will use the "config" file in the original Git repository root for its configuration, and if that config file contains malicious commands, they will execute on the system running "go get -u".
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-16873"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-20"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-12-14T14:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In Go before 1.10.6 and 1.11.x before 1.11.3, the \"go get\" command is vulnerable to remote code execution when executed with the -u flag and the import path of a malicious Go package, or a package that imports it directly or indirectly. Specifically, it is only vulnerable in GOPATH mode, but not in module mode (the distinction is documented at https://golang.org/cmd/go/#hdr-Module_aware_go_get). Using custom domains, it\u0027s possible to arrange things so that a Git repository is cloned to a folder named \".git\" by using a vanity import path that ends with \"/.git\". If the Git repository root contains a \"HEAD\" file, a \"config\" file, an \"objects\" directory, a \"refs\" directory, with some work to ensure the proper ordering of operations, \"go get -u\" can be tricked into considering the parent directory as a repository root, and running Git commands on it. That will use the \"config\" file in the original Git repository root for its configuration, and if that config file contains malicious commands, they will execute on the system running \"go get -u\".",
"id": "GHSA-q6pp-3q54-qw37",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:11:23Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:11:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-16873"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2018-16873"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://groups.google.com/forum/?pli=1#!topic/golang-announce/Kw31K8G7Fi0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2021/03/msg00014.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2021/03/msg00015.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201812-09"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2019-03/msg00044.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2019-05/msg00060.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2019-06/msg00011.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2019-06/msg00015.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2019-07/msg00010.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2020-04/msg00041.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/106226"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.