ghsa-q6pp-3q54-qw37
Vulnerability from github
In Go before 1.10.6 and 1.11.x before 1.11.3, the "go get" command is vulnerable to remote code execution when executed with the -u flag and the import path of a malicious Go package, or a package that imports it directly or indirectly. Specifically, it is only vulnerable in GOPATH mode, but not in module mode (the distinction is documented at https://golang.org/cmd/go/#hdr-Module_aware_go_get). Using custom domains, it's possible to arrange things so that a Git repository is cloned to a folder named ".git" by using a vanity import path that ends with "/.git". If the Git repository root contains a "HEAD" file, a "config" file, an "objects" directory, a "refs" directory, with some work to ensure the proper ordering of operations, "go get -u" can be tricked into considering the parent directory as a repository root, and running Git commands on it. That will use the "config" file in the original Git repository root for its configuration, and if that config file contains malicious commands, they will execute on the system running "go get -u".
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-16873"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-20"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-12-14T14:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In Go before 1.10.6 and 1.11.x before 1.11.3, the \"go get\" command is vulnerable to remote code execution when executed with the -u flag and the import path of a malicious Go package, or a package that imports it directly or indirectly. Specifically, it is only vulnerable in GOPATH mode, but not in module mode (the distinction is documented at https://golang.org/cmd/go/#hdr-Module_aware_go_get). Using custom domains, it\u0027s possible to arrange things so that a Git repository is cloned to a folder named \".git\" by using a vanity import path that ends with \"/.git\". If the Git repository root contains a \"HEAD\" file, a \"config\" file, an \"objects\" directory, a \"refs\" directory, with some work to ensure the proper ordering of operations, \"go get -u\" can be tricked into considering the parent directory as a repository root, and running Git commands on it. That will use the \"config\" file in the original Git repository root for its configuration, and if that config file contains malicious commands, they will execute on the system running \"go get -u\".",
"id": "GHSA-q6pp-3q54-qw37",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:11:23Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:11:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-16873"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2018-16873"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://groups.google.com/forum/?pli=1#!topic/golang-announce/Kw31K8G7Fi0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2021/03/msg00014.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2021/03/msg00015.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201812-09"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2019-03/msg00044.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2019-05/msg00060.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2019-06/msg00011.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2019-06/msg00015.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2019-07/msg00010.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2020-04/msg00041.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/106226"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.