GHSA-Q764-G6FM-555V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-01-23 22:05 – Updated: 2023-02-07 04:11Summary
If a malicious URI is passed to the library, the library can be tricked into performing an operation on a different API endpoint than intended.
Details
The code Spotipy uses to parse URIs and URLs accepts user data too liberally which allows a malicious user to insert arbitrary characters into the path that is used for API requests. Because it is possible to include .., an attacker can redirect for example a track lookup via spotifyApi.track() to an arbitrary API endpoint like playlists, but this is possible for other endpoints as well.
Before the security advisory feature was enabled on GitHub, I was already in contact with Stéphane Bruckert via e-mail, and he asked me to look into a potential fix.
My recommendation is to perform stricter parsing of URLs and URIs, which I implemented in the patch included at the end of the report. If you prefer, I can also invite you to a private fork of the repository.
Impact
The impact of this vulnerability depends heavily on what operations a client application performs when it handles a URI from a user and how it uses the responses it receives from the API.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "spotipy"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.22.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-23608"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-01-23T22:05:11Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-01-26T21:18:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nIf a malicious URI is passed to the library, the library can be tricked into performing an operation on a different API endpoint than intended.\n\n### Details\nThe [code Spotipy uses to parse URIs and URLs ](https://github.com/spotipy-dev/spotipy/blob/master/spotipy/client.py#L1942) accepts user data too liberally which allows a malicious user to insert arbitrary characters into the path that is used for API requests. Because it is possible to include `..`, an attacker can redirect for example a track lookup via `spotifyApi.track()` to an arbitrary API endpoint like playlists, but this is possible for other endpoints as well.\n\nBefore the security advisory feature was enabled on GitHub, I was already in contact with St\u00e9phane Bruckert via e-mail, and he asked me to look into a potential fix. \n\nMy recommendation is to perform stricter parsing of URLs and URIs, which I implemented in the patch included at the end of the report. If you prefer, I can also invite you to a private fork of the repository.\n\n### Impact\nThe impact of this vulnerability depends heavily on what operations a client application performs when it handles a URI from a user and how it uses the responses it receives from the API.\n",
"id": "GHSA-q764-g6fm-555v",
"modified": "2023-02-07T04:11:52Z",
"published": "2023-01-23T22:05:11Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/spotipy-dev/spotipy/security/advisories/GHSA-q764-g6fm-555v"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-23608"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/spotipy-dev/spotipy"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Path traversal in spotipy"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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