GCVE Workshop - 22 September 2026 (14:00-18:00), Luxembourg Before The Vulnopticon Conference - Registration

GHSA-Q84H-7QFG-C6J8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-18 15:32 – Updated: 2026-09-18 15:32
VLAI
Details

vm2 (npm) versions 3.12.0 and earlier contain a sandbox escape in VM and NodeVM. When an embedder exposes a host API that returns a host-realm Promise, the bridge's rejection sanitizer (hostPromiseSanitizeReject / makeSanitizedPromiseCallback / normalizeHostPromiseCallbacks in lib/bridge.js) only wraps then/catch rejection slots that hold a function, and the sandbox-side Symbol.species/.then neutralization is installed only on the sandbox intrinsic Promise.prototype, so it never applies to a host Promise. Code running inside the sandbox can overwrite p.constructor[Symbol.species] on the host Promise and then call p.then() with no onRejected handler; V8 substitutes its internal Thrower, which re-throws the raw host rejection value into a resolve/reject closure captured by the attacker. This delivers an unsanitized, fully functional bridge proxy of the host object to sandboxed code, bypassing handleException and hostPromiseSanitizeReject. If the rejection value is host-pivotable (for example a host process object), this results in arbitrary code execution on the host. Fixed in 3.12.1.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-93606"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-693"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-18T14:19:12Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "vm2 (npm) versions 3.12.0 and earlier contain a sandbox escape in `VM` and `NodeVM`. When an embedder exposes a host API that returns a host-realm Promise, the bridge\u0027s rejection sanitizer (hostPromiseSanitizeReject / makeSanitizedPromiseCallback / normalizeHostPromiseCallbacks in lib/bridge.js) only wraps `then`/`catch` rejection slots that hold a function, and the sandbox-side `Symbol.species`/`.then` neutralization is installed only on the sandbox intrinsic `Promise.prototype`, so it never applies to a host Promise. Code running inside the sandbox can overwrite `p.constructor[Symbol.species]` on the host Promise and then call `p.then()` with no `onRejected` handler; V8 substitutes its internal Thrower, which re-throws the raw host rejection value into a resolve/reject closure captured by the attacker. This delivers an unsanitized, fully functional bridge proxy of the host object to sandboxed code, bypassing handleException and hostPromiseSanitizeReject. If the rejection value is host-pivotable (for example a host `process` object), this results in arbitrary code execution on the host. Fixed in 3.12.1.",
  "id": "GHSA-q84h-7qfg-c6j8",
  "modified": "2026-09-18T15:32:19Z",
  "published": "2026-09-18T15:32:19Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/security/advisories/GHSA-6454-5x88-m6jw"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-93606"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/vm2-before-3.12.1-sandbox-escape-via-promise-symbol-species"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Loading…

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Loading…

Loading…

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.


Loading…