GHSA-QCQV-JMH6-H97C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-24 18:31 – Updated: 2026-09-24 18:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: usb-audio: caiaq: validate EP1 reply lengths
usb_ep1_command_reply_dispatch() uses buf[0] as a command byte and then reads command-specific fixed items from the same URB buffer. Several paths use buf + 1, buf[1], buf[2], or buf + 3 without first proving that urb->actual_length contains those bytes.
Add per-command length checks, use a payload length derived from the bytes after the command byte for the control-state copy, and reject short analog input payloads before the input helper reads fixed offsets from the EP1 reply.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-93808"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-24T17:17:13Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nALSA: usb-audio: caiaq: validate EP1 reply lengths\n\nusb_ep1_command_reply_dispatch() uses buf[0] as a command byte and then\nreads command-specific fixed items from the same URB buffer. Several\npaths use buf + 1, buf[1], buf[2], or buf + 3 without first proving that\nurb-\u003eactual_length contains those bytes.\n\nAdd per-command length checks, use a payload length derived from the\nbytes after the command byte for the control-state copy, and reject short\nanalog input payloads before the input helper reads fixed offsets from\nthe EP1 reply.",
"id": "GHSA-qcqv-jmh6-h97c",
"modified": "2026-09-24T18:31:30Z",
"published": "2026-09-24T18:31:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-93808"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/74f3c639f64fa5da4e1613149798b5089bce2807"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/aba30af07d4fe499b50209801eba9da8a815522f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/af8a172c4f71ac30d625f2966d2389a7fa872819"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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