GHSA-QJ49-7RGR-PFMQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-12-27 15:31 – Updated: 2025-05-02 09:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix NULL ptr deref in crypto_aead_setkey()
Neither SMB3.0 or SMB3.02 supports encryption negotiate context, so when SMB2_GLOBAL_CAP_ENCRYPTION flag is set in the negotiate response, the client uses AES-128-CCM as the default cipher. See MS-SMB2 3.3.5.4.
Commit b0abcd65ec54 ("smb: client: fix UAF in async decryption") added a @server->cipher_type check to conditionally call smb3_crypto_aead_allocate(), but that check would always be false as @server->cipher_type is unset for SMB3.02.
Fix the following KASAN splat by setting @server->cipher_type for SMB3.02 as well.
mount.cifs //srv/share /mnt -o vers=3.02,seal,...
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in crypto_aead_setkey+0x2c/0x130 Read of size 8 at addr 0000000000000020 by task mount.cifs/1095 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1095 Comm: mount.cifs Not tainted 6.12.0 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-3.fc41 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80 ? crypto_aead_setkey+0x2c/0x130 kasan_report+0xda/0x110 ? crypto_aead_setkey+0x2c/0x130 crypto_aead_setkey+0x2c/0x130 crypt_message+0x258/0xec0 [cifs] ? __asan_memset+0x23/0x50 ? __pfx_crypt_message+0x10/0x10 [cifs] ? mark_lock+0xb0/0x6a0 ? hlock_class+0x32/0xb0 ? mark_lock+0xb0/0x6a0 smb3_init_transform_rq+0x352/0x3f0 [cifs] ? lock_acquire.part.0+0xf4/0x2a0 smb_send_rqst+0x144/0x230 [cifs] ? __pfx_smb_send_rqst+0x10/0x10 [cifs] ? hlock_class+0x32/0xb0 ? smb2_setup_request+0x225/0x3a0 [cifs] ? __pfx_cifs_compound_last_callback+0x10/0x10 [cifs] compound_send_recv+0x59b/0x1140 [cifs] ? __pfx_compound_send_recv+0x10/0x10 [cifs] ? __create_object+0x5e/0x90 ? hlock_class+0x32/0xb0 ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x9a/0xf0 cifs_send_recv+0x23/0x30 [cifs] SMB2_tcon+0x3ec/0xb30 [cifs] ? __pfx_SMB2_tcon+0x10/0x10 [cifs] ? lock_acquire.part.0+0xf4/0x2a0 ? __pfx_lock_release+0x10/0x10 ? do_raw_spin_trylock+0xc6/0x120 ? lock_acquire+0x3f/0x90 ? _get_xid+0x16/0xd0 [cifs] ? __pfx_SMB2_tcon+0x10/0x10 [cifs] ? cifs_get_smb_ses+0xcdd/0x10a0 [cifs] cifs_get_smb_ses+0xcdd/0x10a0 [cifs] ? __pfx_cifs_get_smb_ses+0x10/0x10 [cifs] ? cifs_get_tcp_session+0xaa0/0xca0 [cifs] cifs_mount_get_session+0x8a/0x210 [cifs] dfs_mount_share+0x1b0/0x11d0 [cifs] ? __pfxlockacquire+0x10/0x10 ? pfx_dfs_mount_share+0x10/0x10 [cifs] ? lock_acquire.part.0+0xf4/0x2a0 ? find_held_lock+0x8a/0xa0 ? hlock_class+0x32/0xb0 ? lock_release+0x203/0x5d0 cifs_mount+0xb3/0x3d0 [cifs] ? do_raw_spin_trylock+0xc6/0x120 ? __pfx_cifs_mount+0x10/0x10 [cifs] ? lock_acquire+0x3f/0x90 ? find_nls+0x16/0xa0 ? smb3_update_mnt_flags+0x372/0x3b0 [cifs] cifs_smb3_do_mount+0x1e2/0xc80 [cifs] ? __pfx_vfs_parse_fs_string+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_cifs_smb3_do_mount+0x10/0x10 [cifs] smb3_get_tree+0x1bf/0x330 [cifs] vfs_get_tree+0x4a/0x160 path_mount+0x3c1/0xfb0 ? kasan_quarantine_put+0xc7/0x1d0 ? __pfx_path_mount+0x10/0x10 ? kmem_cache_free+0x118/0x3e0 ? user_path_at+0x74/0xa0 __x64_sys_mount+0x1a6/0x1e0 ? __pfx___x64_sys_mount+0x10/0x10 ? mark_held_locks+0x1a/0x90 do_syscall_64+0xbb/0x1d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-53185"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-416",
"CWE-476"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-12-27T14:15:25Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsmb: client: fix NULL ptr deref in crypto_aead_setkey()\n\nNeither SMB3.0 or SMB3.02 supports encryption negotiate context, so\nwhen SMB2_GLOBAL_CAP_ENCRYPTION flag is set in the negotiate response,\nthe client uses AES-128-CCM as the default cipher. See MS-SMB2\n3.3.5.4.\n\nCommit b0abcd65ec54 (\"smb: client: fix UAF in async decryption\") added\na @server-\u003ecipher_type check to conditionally call\nsmb3_crypto_aead_allocate(), but that check would always be false as\n@server-\u003ecipher_type is unset for SMB3.02.\n\nFix the following KASAN splat by setting @server-\u003ecipher_type for\nSMB3.02 as well.\n\nmount.cifs //srv/share /mnt -o vers=3.02,seal,...\n\nBUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in crypto_aead_setkey+0x2c/0x130\nRead of size 8 at addr 0000000000000020 by task mount.cifs/1095\nCPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1095 Comm: mount.cifs Not tainted 6.12.0 #1\nHardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-3.fc41\n04/01/2014\nCall Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80\n ? crypto_aead_setkey+0x2c/0x130\n kasan_report+0xda/0x110\n ? crypto_aead_setkey+0x2c/0x130\n crypto_aead_setkey+0x2c/0x130\n crypt_message+0x258/0xec0 [cifs]\n ? __asan_memset+0x23/0x50\n ? __pfx_crypt_message+0x10/0x10 [cifs]\n ? mark_lock+0xb0/0x6a0\n ? hlock_class+0x32/0xb0\n ? mark_lock+0xb0/0x6a0\n smb3_init_transform_rq+0x352/0x3f0 [cifs]\n ? lock_acquire.part.0+0xf4/0x2a0\n smb_send_rqst+0x144/0x230 [cifs]\n ? __pfx_smb_send_rqst+0x10/0x10 [cifs]\n ? hlock_class+0x32/0xb0\n ? smb2_setup_request+0x225/0x3a0 [cifs]\n ? __pfx_cifs_compound_last_callback+0x10/0x10 [cifs]\n compound_send_recv+0x59b/0x1140 [cifs]\n ? __pfx_compound_send_recv+0x10/0x10 [cifs]\n ? __create_object+0x5e/0x90\n ? hlock_class+0x32/0xb0\n ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x9a/0xf0\n cifs_send_recv+0x23/0x30 [cifs]\n SMB2_tcon+0x3ec/0xb30 [cifs]\n ? __pfx_SMB2_tcon+0x10/0x10 [cifs]\n ? lock_acquire.part.0+0xf4/0x2a0\n ? __pfx_lock_release+0x10/0x10\n ? do_raw_spin_trylock+0xc6/0x120\n ? lock_acquire+0x3f/0x90\n ? _get_xid+0x16/0xd0 [cifs]\n ? __pfx_SMB2_tcon+0x10/0x10 [cifs]\n ? cifs_get_smb_ses+0xcdd/0x10a0 [cifs]\n cifs_get_smb_ses+0xcdd/0x10a0 [cifs]\n ? __pfx_cifs_get_smb_ses+0x10/0x10 [cifs]\n ? cifs_get_tcp_session+0xaa0/0xca0 [cifs]\n cifs_mount_get_session+0x8a/0x210 [cifs]\n dfs_mount_share+0x1b0/0x11d0 [cifs]\n ? __pfx___lock_acquire+0x10/0x10\n ? __pfx_dfs_mount_share+0x10/0x10 [cifs]\n ? lock_acquire.part.0+0xf4/0x2a0\n ? find_held_lock+0x8a/0xa0\n ? hlock_class+0x32/0xb0\n ? lock_release+0x203/0x5d0\n cifs_mount+0xb3/0x3d0 [cifs]\n ? do_raw_spin_trylock+0xc6/0x120\n ? __pfx_cifs_mount+0x10/0x10 [cifs]\n ? lock_acquire+0x3f/0x90\n ? find_nls+0x16/0xa0\n ? smb3_update_mnt_flags+0x372/0x3b0 [cifs]\n cifs_smb3_do_mount+0x1e2/0xc80 [cifs]\n ? __pfx_vfs_parse_fs_string+0x10/0x10\n ? __pfx_cifs_smb3_do_mount+0x10/0x10 [cifs]\n smb3_get_tree+0x1bf/0x330 [cifs]\n vfs_get_tree+0x4a/0x160\n path_mount+0x3c1/0xfb0\n ? kasan_quarantine_put+0xc7/0x1d0\n ? __pfx_path_mount+0x10/0x10\n ? kmem_cache_free+0x118/0x3e0\n ? user_path_at+0x74/0xa0\n __x64_sys_mount+0x1a6/0x1e0\n ? __pfx___x64_sys_mount+0x10/0x10\n ? mark_held_locks+0x1a/0x90\n do_syscall_64+0xbb/0x1d0\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f",
"id": "GHSA-qj49-7rgr-pfmq",
"modified": "2025-05-02T09:30:29Z",
"published": "2024-12-27T15:31:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-53185"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/22127c1dc04364cda3da812161e70921e6c3c0af"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/44c495818d9c4a741ab9e6bc9203ccc9f55f6f40"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/46f8e25926817272ec8d5bfbd003569bdeb9a8c8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4a788ebbb10db9da453d52eaf44a41c13dc446df"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4bdec0d1f658f7c98749bd2c5a486e6cfa8565d2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/92c5b62879073b489793a067dbe8d4f2728cdcad"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9b8904b53b5ace0519c74cd89fc3ca763f3856d4"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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