Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-QM33-P5P9-F8VG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-08 23:35 – Updated: 2026-06-08 23:35

Summary

nebula-mesh: GET /api/v1/audit-log discloses all entries to any operator

Details

internal/api/audit.go:12 — handleGetAuditLog does no admin check. The route is bearer-auth gated only; any operator API key returns the full audit log via store.ListAuditEntries (up to limit=1000). This includes cross-tenant actor names, host/CA/operator IDs, action timestamps, and masked-IP entries from rate-limit refusals — enough surface for a tenant to enumerate the server's activity, infer staffing patterns, or identify high-value targets.

Affected

All released versions up to v0.3.1.

Reproducer

curl -H "Authorization: Bearer <any-operator-key>" \
  https://server/api/v1/audit-log?limit=1000

Suggested fix

Two options, either acceptable:

if !actorIsAdmin(ctx) { 403 } — strictest; matches the "operator management is admin-only" stance.
Scope to actor: filter store.ListAuditEntries by actor.Username plus a subquery of CA IDs the actor owns. Operators see their own audit entries plus entries against their CA's resources.

Recommend option 1 unless the UI needs per-operator audit views.

Suggested patch

Verified locally: go vet, go test -race -count=1 ./..., golangci-lint v2.12 all clean.

diff --git a/internal/api/audit.go b/internal/api/audit.go
index 3236631..57b57ce 100644
--- a/internal/api/audit.go
+++ b/internal/api/audit.go
@@ -10,6 +10,10 @@ import (
 const defaultAuditLimit = 100

 func (s *Server) handleGetAuditLog(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+   if !actorIsAdmin(r.Context()) {
+       writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "audit log access requires the admin role")
+       return
+   }
    filter := store.AuditFilter{
        Action: r.URL.Query().Get("action"),
        Limit:  defaultAuditLimit,
diff --git a/internal/api/audit_admin_test.go b/internal/api/audit_admin_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..47e1ca4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/api/audit_admin_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+package api
+
+import (
+   "context"
+   "crypto/sha256"
+   "encoding/hex"
+   "net/http"
+   "net/http/httptest"
+   "testing"
+
+   "github.com/google/uuid"
+   "github.com/juev/nebula-mesh/internal/models"
+)
+
+// TestHandleGetAuditLog_NonAdminForbidden confirms a non-admin operator
+// API key cannot read the audit log. The legacy config-key path stays
+// admin and is covered by the happy-path test elsewhere.
+func TestHandleGetAuditLog_NonAdminForbidden(t *testing.T) {
+   srv, _ := newTestServer(t)
+
+   nonAdminKey := uuid.New().String()
+   keyHash := sha256.Sum256([]byte(nonAdminKey))
+   if err := srv.store.CreateOperator(context.Background(), &models.Operator{
+       ID: uuid.New().String(), Username: "non-admin", PasswordHash: "x",
+       Role: "user", Status: models.OperatorStatusActive,
+   }); err != nil {
+       t.Fatal(err)
+   }
+   op, err := srv.store.GetOperatorByUsername(context.Background(), "non-admin")
+   if err != nil {
+       t.Fatal(err)
+   }
+   if err := srv.store.CreateOperatorAPIKey(context.Background(), &models.OperatorAPIKey{
+       ID: uuid.New().String(), OperatorID: op.ID, KeyHash: hex.EncodeToString(keyHash[:]),
+   }); err != nil {
+       t.Fatal(err)
+   }
+
+   req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/api/v1/audit-log", nil)
+   req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+nonAdminKey)
+   rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+   srv.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+
+   if rec.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
+       t.Errorf("non-admin audit-log status = %d, want 403", rec.Code)
+   }
+}
+
+// TestHandleGetAuditLog_LegacyKeyAllowed confirms the legacy config-key
+// path still reaches the handler (preserves backward compatibility).
+func TestHandleGetAuditLog_LegacyKeyAllowed(t *testing.T) {
+   srv, _ := newTestServer(t)
+
+   req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/api/v1/audit-log", nil)
+   req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+testAPIKey)
+   rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+   srv.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+
+   if rec.Code == http.StatusForbidden {
+       t.Errorf("legacy key rejected with 403; want pass-through")
+   }
+}

Severity

7.1 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.3.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/juev/nebula-mesh"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.3.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-47726"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-285"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-08T23:35:55Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "`internal/api/audit.go:12` \u2014 `handleGetAuditLog` does no admin check. The route is bearer-auth gated only; any operator API key returns the full audit log via `store.ListAuditEntries` (up to limit=1000). This includes cross-tenant actor names, host/CA/operator IDs, action timestamps, and masked-IP entries from rate-limit refusals \u2014 enough surface for a tenant to enumerate the server\u0027s activity, infer staffing patterns, or identify high-value targets.\n\n## Affected\nAll released versions up to v0.3.1.\n\n## Reproducer\n```\ncurl -H \"Authorization: Bearer \u003cany-operator-key\u003e\" \\\n  https://server/api/v1/audit-log?limit=1000\n```\n\n## Suggested fix\nTwo options, either acceptable:\n\n1. `if !actorIsAdmin(ctx) { 403 }` \u2014 strictest; matches the \"operator management is admin-only\" stance.\n2. Scope to actor: filter `store.ListAuditEntries` by `actor.Username` plus a subquery of CA IDs the actor owns. Operators see their own audit entries plus entries against their CA\u0027s resources.\n\nRecommend option 1 unless the UI needs per-operator audit views.\n\n## Suggested patch\n\nVerified locally: `go vet`, `go test -race -count=1 ./...`, `golangci-lint v2.12` all clean.\n\n```diff\ndiff --git a/internal/api/audit.go b/internal/api/audit.go\nindex 3236631..57b57ce 100644\n--- a/internal/api/audit.go\n+++ b/internal/api/audit.go\n@@ -10,6 +10,10 @@ import (\n const defaultAuditLimit = 100\n \n func (s *Server) handleGetAuditLog(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n+\tif !actorIsAdmin(r.Context()) {\n+\t\twriteError(w, http.StatusForbidden, \"audit log access requires the admin role\")\n+\t\treturn\n+\t}\n \tfilter := store.AuditFilter{\n \t\tAction: r.URL.Query().Get(\"action\"),\n \t\tLimit:  defaultAuditLimit,\ndiff --git a/internal/api/audit_admin_test.go b/internal/api/audit_admin_test.go\nnew file mode 100644\nindex 0000000..47e1ca4\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/internal/api/audit_admin_test.go\n@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@\n+package api\n+\n+import (\n+\t\"context\"\n+\t\"crypto/sha256\"\n+\t\"encoding/hex\"\n+\t\"net/http\"\n+\t\"net/http/httptest\"\n+\t\"testing\"\n+\n+\t\"github.com/google/uuid\"\n+\t\"github.com/juev/nebula-mesh/internal/models\"\n+)\n+\n+// TestHandleGetAuditLog_NonAdminForbidden confirms a non-admin operator\n+// API key cannot read the audit log. The legacy config-key path stays\n+// admin and is covered by the happy-path test elsewhere.\n+func TestHandleGetAuditLog_NonAdminForbidden(t *testing.T) {\n+\tsrv, _ := newTestServer(t)\n+\n+\tnonAdminKey := uuid.New().String()\n+\tkeyHash := sha256.Sum256([]byte(nonAdminKey))\n+\tif err := srv.store.CreateOperator(context.Background(), \u0026models.Operator{\n+\t\tID: uuid.New().String(), Username: \"non-admin\", PasswordHash: \"x\",\n+\t\tRole: \"user\", Status: models.OperatorStatusActive,\n+\t}); err != nil {\n+\t\tt.Fatal(err)\n+\t}\n+\top, err := srv.store.GetOperatorByUsername(context.Background(), \"non-admin\")\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\tt.Fatal(err)\n+\t}\n+\tif err := srv.store.CreateOperatorAPIKey(context.Background(), \u0026models.OperatorAPIKey{\n+\t\tID: uuid.New().String(), OperatorID: op.ID, KeyHash: hex.EncodeToString(keyHash[:]),\n+\t}); err != nil {\n+\t\tt.Fatal(err)\n+\t}\n+\n+\treq := httptest.NewRequest(\"GET\", \"/api/v1/audit-log\", nil)\n+\treq.Header.Set(\"Authorization\", \"Bearer \"+nonAdminKey)\n+\trec := httptest.NewRecorder()\n+\tsrv.ServeHTTP(rec, req)\n+\n+\tif rec.Code != http.StatusForbidden {\n+\t\tt.Errorf(\"non-admin audit-log status = %d, want 403\", rec.Code)\n+\t}\n+}\n+\n+// TestHandleGetAuditLog_LegacyKeyAllowed confirms the legacy config-key\n+// path still reaches the handler (preserves backward compatibility).\n+func TestHandleGetAuditLog_LegacyKeyAllowed(t *testing.T) {\n+\tsrv, _ := newTestServer(t)\n+\n+\treq := httptest.NewRequest(\"GET\", \"/api/v1/audit-log\", nil)\n+\treq.Header.Set(\"Authorization\", \"Bearer \"+testAPIKey)\n+\trec := httptest.NewRecorder()\n+\tsrv.ServeHTTP(rec, req)\n+\n+\tif rec.Code == http.StatusForbidden {\n+\t\tt.Errorf(\"legacy key rejected with 403; want pass-through\")\n+\t}\n+}\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-qm33-p5p9-f8vg",
  "modified": "2026-06-08T23:35:55Z",
  "published": "2026-06-08T23:35:55Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/juev/nebula-mesh/security/advisories/GHSA-qm33-p5p9-f8vg"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh/commit/8baaace54c2a23e7c351b3efab5a31ab07b125dc"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh/releases/tag/v0.3.2"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/juev/nebula-mesh"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "nebula-mesh: GET /api/v1/audit-log discloses all entries to any operator"
}

CVE-2026-47726 (GCVE-0-2026-47726)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-07-28 17:58 – Updated: 2026-07-28 18:43

Title

nebula-mesh: GET /api/v1/audit-log discloses all entries to any operator

Summary

nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh virtual private network. Prior to version 0.3.2, internal/api/audit.go:12 — handleGetAuditLog does no admin check. The route is bearer-auth gated only; any operator API key returns the full audit log via store.ListAuditEntries (up to limit=1000). This includes cross-tenant actor names, host/CA/operator IDs, action timestamps, and masked-IP entries from rate-limit refusals — enough surface for a tenant to enumerate the server's activity, infer staffing patterns, or identify high-value targets. This issue has been patched in version 0.3.2.

Severity

7.1 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

SSVC

Exploitation: poc Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-07-28 18:43 UTC

CWE

CWE-285 - Improper Authorization

Assigner

GitHub_M CNA under the mitre root

CNA scorecard C 72/100 over 7552 records in the last 180 days details

References

3 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh/security…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh/commit/8…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh/releases…	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
juev	nebula-mesh	Affected: < 0.3.2

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-47726",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "poc"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-07-28T18:43:07.814775Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-07-28T18:43:23.969Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "references": [
          {
            "tags": [
              "exploit"
            ],
            "url": "https://github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh/security/advisories/GHSA-qm33-p5p9-f8vg"
          }
        ],
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "nebula-mesh",
          "vendor": "juev",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 0.3.2"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh virtual private network. Prior to version 0.3.2, internal/api/audit.go:12 \u2014 handleGetAuditLog does no admin check. The route is bearer-auth gated only; any operator API key returns the full audit log via store.ListAuditEntries (up to limit=1000). This includes cross-tenant actor names, host/CA/operator IDs, action timestamps, and masked-IP entries from rate-limit refusals \u2014 enough surface for a tenant to enumerate the server\u0027s activity, infer staffing patterns, or identify high-value targets. This issue has been patched in version 0.3.2."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV4_0": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackRequirements": "NONE",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "baseScore": 7.1,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
            "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
            "version": "4.0",
            "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-285",
              "description": "CWE-285: Improper Authorization",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-07-28T17:58:27.219Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh/security/advisories/GHSA-qm33-p5p9-f8vg",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh/security/advisories/GHSA-qm33-p5p9-f8vg"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh/commit/8baaace54c2a23e7c351b3efab5a31ab07b125dc",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh/commit/8baaace54c2a23e7c351b3efab5a31ab07b125dc"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh/releases/tag/v0.3.2",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh/releases/tag/v0.3.2"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-qm33-p5p9-f8vg",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "nebula-mesh: GET /api/v1/audit-log discloses all entries to any operator"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-47726",
    "datePublished": "2026-07-28T17:58:27.219Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-05-19T21:29:25.483Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-07-28T18:43:23.969Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

Action not permitted